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The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To 
help bring philosophy closer to the form of science, to the goal where it can lay aside the 
title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing—that is what I have set myself to do. 
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ABSTRACT 
Heidegger calls his philosophy a “science of being” (BPP 11). The intersecting 
phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical, existential, and anthropological themes of 
Being and Time, as well as Heidegger’s many influences, make the task of determining 
the subject matter and method of this science a difficult one. This dissertation defends 
two main theses. First, Heidegger is a metaphysical realist. He intends his inquiry into 
being to “carve reality at the joints.” This is an unpopular reading, so I devote a large 
portion of the dissertation to criticizing competing non-metaphysical and anti-realist 
interpretations. Second, Being and Time and surrounding works combine the many 
philosophical threads mentioned above into a unified, coherent, and original whole.  
 In Chapter 1 I offer an interpretation of the subject matter of Heidegger’s science 
and criticize a competing style of interpretation, the “meaning interpretation.” In Chapter 
2 I offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s method and criticize interpreters who claim that 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology is inconsistent with his 
scientific aspirations. In Chapter 3 I attempt to resolve two puzzles about Husserl and 
Heidegger’s conceptions of scientific philosophy. In Chapter 4 I offer a realist account of 
Heidegger’s debt to Kant, contrasting it with an influential reading of Heidegger as a 
“temporal idealist.” In Chapter 5 I examine Heidegger’s turn to anthropological and 
	
	 viii 
biological themes after Being and Time and reject interpretations on which this turn 
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This dissertation grew out of dissatisfaction with Heidegger. Serious work in the history 
of philosophy can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can significantly deepen 
one’s understanding of texts that seem foreign or quaint from a contemporary 
perspective, making them vital again and curing contemporary debates of a kind of 
myopia. On the other hand, it can make one’s philosophical heroes seem much less heroic 
by exposing ways in which their thought is much less original than it might at first seem. 
This can of course be a good thing: philosophy is less likely to approach the truth, or at 
least reasonable belief, when it degrades into factionalism and discipleship. Moreover, it 
can spur a rethinking of the philosophical canon, rehabilitating the study of figures who 
have been marginalized by the contingencies of philosophical fashion, or worse, 
prejudice and social injustice. In the case of Heidegger, the wealth of materials now 
available in his Gesamtausgabe and the painstaking archival work of scholars like 
Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren have enriched our understanding of the path leading 
up to Being and Time. But they have also shown, even more clearly than the book itself 
does, that Heidegger’s early thought is an attempt to combine philosophical approaches 
and influences that first, do not obviously sit well together, and second, make the 
question of what is original in Heidegger inevitable. These questions are not just 
scholarly, but also personal: they ask me to justify spending all these years reading 
Heidegger, instead of devoting myself to more noble, or more lucrative, pursuits. 
 The goal of the dissertation is to give an account of what Heidegger means when 




lectures, and books from roughly the first decade of his mature thought, beginning in the 
“War Emergency Semester” of 1919 and ending in the Winter Semester of 1929-30. I 
argue that Heidegger’s early thought forms a coherent, unified whole, rather than a mere 
aggregate of phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical, existentialist, and 
anthropological themes and Aristotelian, Augustinian, Kantian, Diltheyan, and Husserlian 
influences. Somewhat more fancifully, I want to show that the project carried out in 
works building up to, surrounding, and including Being and Time is a per se unity, rather 
than an accidental unity like a heap of sand or a bucket of clams. 
 To this end, each chapter attempts to show how multiple threads and influences of 
Heidegger’s thought hang together. Moreover, they situate my overall interpretation of 
the Being and Time project against the backdrop of interpreters who, either by 
emphasizing one thread or influence at the expense of others or by missing the subtle 
ways in which these threads and influences are transformed in Heidegger’s hands, 
misinterpret the subject matter, method, and central claims of Heidegger’s science. I 
argue, against the dominant trend in Heidegger scholarship, that Heidegger is a 
metaphysical realist. He intends his inquiry into being to “carve reality at the joints.” The 
phenomenological, hermeneutical, existentialist, and anthropological threads of Being 
and Time and surrounding works neither conflict with this aim, nor are they merely 
incidental to it.  
 Chapter 1 examines the relationship between Heidegger’s phenomenological and 
metaphysical aspirations. It presents an interpretation of the subject matter of Being and 




interpreters’. Chapter 2 turns to the method of Heidegger’s “science,” arguing that 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology is compatible with, and a 
supplement to, Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as a rigorous science. Chapter 3 
raises two puzzles about Husserl and Heidegger’s sciences: first, why does Heidegger 
claim that one must be authentic to do fundamental ontology, and second, why do 
Husserl and Heidegger think the positive sciences require phenomenological 
clarification? Chapter 4 offers an interpretation of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, contrasting 
the resulting realist reading with an influential reading of Heidegger as a “temporal 
idealist.” Chapter 5 closes by examining Heidegger’s turn to anthropological and 
biological themes after Being and Time and argues that this turn does not, contrary to 
what some have argued, undermine Heidegger’s science of being.  
 A fuller account of the coherence of Heidegger’s early thought would have to go 
beyond this dissertation in at least three ways. First, one influence who is conspicuously 
missing on the list above is Kierkegaard. Heidegger draws liberally on Kierkegaard’s 
analyses of anxiety, repetition, and “the moment” in Division II, but claims that in 
general more can be learned from Kierkegaard’s edifying writings than his philosophical 
writings due to the corrupting influence of Hegel on the latter (BT 278n). An 
interpretation of this claim is crucial for a defense both of Heidegger’s originality and of 
the coherence of importing these existentialist concepts into an ontological framework. 
Second, while the dissertation engages with a fairly large group of major interpreters, I 
haven’t examined interpreters who read Heidegger as a pragmatist. Finally, while I reject 




hypotheses on offer, and I have not made any claims about whether, when, why, or to 







Chapter One: Phenomenology and Metaphysics in Being and Time 
 
What is the primary subject matter of Being and Time? Heidegger seems to tell us on the 
first page of the book. 
‘For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the 
expression “being”. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become 
perplexed.’  
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the 
word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the 
meaning of being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the 
expression ‘being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the 
meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of 
the meaning of being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of 
time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being. (BT 19) 
 
The answer at first seems obvious: being (Sein). But that’s where the interpretive trouble 
begins. Interpreters are split on how to understand Heidegger’s use of Sein: is his 
investigation genuinely metaphysical, or is his use of Sein idiosyncratic, standing in for 
Sinn (sense or meaning)? The former style of interpretation is motivated in part by 
Heidegger’s intellectual debt to Aristotle and scholasticism, the latter by his intellectual 
debts to phenomenology and transcendental philosophy, which are thought to be 
inherently non-metaphysical. The confusion is compounded by Heidegger’s alternation 
between using and mentioning ‘being’. Is the motivating question of the book what 
‘being’ means or what being means—and what would the latter question mean, anyway? 
 An adequate interpretation of Heidegger’s early work has to come to terms with 
the interlocking metaphysical (Aristotelian) and transcendental (Kantian, Husserlian) 
themes of Being and Time. The diversity of incompatible interpretations of that work 
arises, I suggest, when interpreters emphasize one of Heidegger’s many influences—




phenomenological, hermeneutic, existential, anthropological—at the expense of others. A 
comprehensive interpretation of Being and Time should show how these strands form a 
unified whole, rather than a disconnected heap; this interpretive demand is important, too, 
for anyone intent on defending the novelty of Heidegger’s work, despite its obvious 
debt—attested to by his development in lectures throughout the 1920s—to a huge swath 
of the history of philosophy.1  
 In what follows, I evaluate the successes and shortcomings of the two rival 
interpretations of Being and Time, which I call ‘metaphysical realist interpretations’ and 
‘meaning interpretations’, respectively. To get clear on the relation between 
phenomenology and ontology in Being and Time, I suggest, it’s important to distinguish 
two questions, one ontological and the other phenomenological. The former is a question 
about the basic ontological categories into which entities fall; the latter is a question 
about how an investigation into those categories is possible. I motivate this distinction by 
showing that Heidegger understands the relationship between phenomenology and 
ontology exactly as Husserl does. 
																																																								
1 Herman Philipse analyzes this convergence of philosophical threads in both Being and Time and later 
works in detail. He sees five leitmotifs in Heidegger’s work: (i) a meta-Aristotelian theme, (ii) a 
phenomenologico-hermeneutical theme, (iii) a transcendental theme, (iv) a neo-Hegelian theme, and (v) a 
postmonotheist theme. He also emphasizes that the importance of the principle of charity in trying to unify 
these themes, though he ultimately opts for a psychological explanation in terms of what he calls 
“Heidegger’s Pascalian Grand Strategy” (Philosophy of Being, 230): “First, by a purely secular analysis of 
the human condition he had to convince his readers that everyday life is inauthentic, and that authenticity 
consists in anticipating death with dread, in facing up to existential guilt, and in many other unpleasant 
things. The ontological analysis of Dasein had to be secular in order to convince the unbeliever, and it had 
to paint life in this world in dark and gloomy colors in order to arouse the craving for religion. The second 
phase was to satisfy this religious craving by explicitly metaphysical writings such as Was ist Metaphysik?” 
(Philosophy of Being, 372). I am more confident than Philipse that the interlocking themes of at least the 




 After surveying extant meaning and metaphysical realist interpretations in §§1-2, 
I argue for the following theses: 
1. ‘Being’ does not mean meaning, intelligibility, or significance. (§3) 
2. Being and Time involves elements both of what Husserl calls ‘formal ontology’ 
and what he calls ‘regional ontology’. (§§4-5) 
3. Heidegger’s most notable contributions to regional ontology can be characterized 
as what is today called ‘social ontology’. (§5) 
4. Phenomenology serves both a methodological and foundational role for ontology, 
and it is itself a kind of regional ontology. (§6) 
The view that emerges is metaphysically realist, but it also does more justice to the 
complex influence of Husserl on Being and Time than other metaphysical realist views on 
offer.    
§1 Meaning Interpretations 
 
Meaning interpretations—those on which ‘being’ means meaning, intelligibility, or 
significance—get their intuitive support from a number of puzzling passages in which 
Heidegger asserts the dependence of being and truth on Dasein. The central such 
passage—call it ‘the dependence passage’—occurs in Being and Time §43: 
Of course only as long as Dasein is... ‘is there’ being. When Dasein does not exist, 
‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of thing can 
be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world 
can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, 
nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of being 
and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can be said that in this case entities 
will still continue to be. (BT 255) 
 
Heidegger goes on to remind the reader that being, but not entities, depends on the 




idealism’ and the claim that at least some entities do not depend on Dasein ‘ontic 
realism’. Meaning interpreters attribute this pair of claims to Heidegger. As I will shortly 
argue, however, they form an unstable pair.  
 Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carman, Steven Crowell, and Thomas Sheehan agree in 
broad strokes that Heidegger uses ‘being’ idiosyncratically to refer to meaning. Dreyfus, 
for instance, defines ‘being’ as “a fundamental aspect of entities, viz. their intelligibility” 
(Being-in-the-world, xi) and interprets the dependence passages accordingly: “There is no 
intelligibility in itself. We cannot ask whether things were intelligible before we were 
around, or if they would go on being intelligible if we ceased to exist. Intelligibility is not 
a property of things; it is relative to Dasein. When Dasein does not exist, things are 
neither intelligible nor unintelligible” (Being-in-the-world, 257). 
 It is common for meaning interpreters to emphasize the radical difference 
between Heidegger’s project and traditional metaphysics, or, more strongly, to claim that 
Heidegger rejects metaphysical realism. Carman, for example, claims that “Heidegger is 
no metaphysical realist,” since he “categorically rejects the reductionist thesis that there 
is just one correct and complete description of the world” (Heidegger’s Analytic, 166). 
On Carman’s reading, Heidegger’s existential analytic is modeled on Kant’s 
transcendental analytic; both investigate “the transcendental conditions of the 
intelligibility of entities to finite human understanding,” though Heidegger’s account of 
the “hermeneutic conditions” of intelligibility is more basic than Kant’s account 
(Heidegger’s Analytic, 155-6). On this account, Heidegger is interested in “what it means 




Dasein, nothing would mean anything” (Heidegger’s Analytic, 201). This is compatible 
with the claim that “[w]ithout Dasein, there would still be occurrent entities; indeed, they 
would have much (or at least more or less) the same ontic structure we find in them in our 
everyday encounters and in scientific inquiry” (Ibid.). 
 Crowell develops his meaning interpretation by noting supposed continuities 
between Husserl’s phenomenology and Being and Time. Crowell argues that the 
phenomenological reduction, which is employed by both Husserl and Heidegger, opens 
up the peculiarly phenomenological subject matter of “the space of meaning,” which 
“cannot be approached with the resources of traditional metaphysical (ancient) or 
epistemological (modern) philosophical paradigms” (Space of Meaning, 182). The 
“ontological difference” between entities and being is a distinction between “entities and 
the meaning of entities” (Space of Meaning, 5) or “the difference between entities 
grasped naively and the meaning structures that enable such a grasp” (Space of Meaning, 
196). While I follow Crowell in recognizing a deep continuity between Husserl and 
Heidegger’s projects, I think that this part of his account is too simple; as I’ll argue 
below, his account collapses the ontological and phenomenological components of Being 
and Time, which intertwine in complex ways but must be kept distinct.  
 The “new paradigm” in Heidegger research, advocated by Thomas Sheehan, also 
equates meaning with being. “The first step” of the new paradigm “is to realize that 
Heidegger’s work was phenomenological from beginning to end. This entails that his 
work was focused not on ‘the being of beings’ (Sein) but on ‘the meaning of the 




to the dependence passages to recommend interpreting Sein as Sinn, which depends 
unproblematically on Dasein. He concludes that “the primacy in Heidegger’s work lies 
with sense, intelligibility, and significance (Sinn, Verständlichkeit, Bedeutung) rather 
than with ‘being’ (Sein) understood merely as mind-independent existence” (“What If 
Heidegger,” 386). Sheehan echoes a common theme among meaning interpreters: 
phenomenology, and transcendental philosophy more generally, has a fundamentally 
different subject matter than traditional metaphysics. 
 By reinterpreting ‘being’ as meaning, meaning interpreters avoid the seemingly 
idealist consequences of the dependence passage. These idealist consequences are 
embraced by William Blattner, who points to Heidegger’s definition of being as “that 
which determines entities as entities” (BT 25) as reason to think that meaning interpreters 
trivialize the dependence passage (“Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?,” 188-9). 
Metaphysical realist interpreters are stuck between a rock and a hard place: it looks like 
they can have their metaphysics or their realism, but not both. Fortunately, two 
metaphysical realist interpreters have offered plausible ways to explain away the anti-
realist appearance of the dependence passage. It’s to them that I now turn. 
§2 Metaphysical Realist Interpretations  
I think it’s safe to say that the meaning interpretation, or some variety of broadly anti-
realist interpretation, is the majority view among Heidegger scholars. Recently, however, 
a number of commentators have begun interpreting Heidegger’s project in robustly 
metaphysical terms. I will focus in the following on two such commentators, Kris 




 So far I have relied on a rough and ready sense of what metaphysical realism is. 
Let me make this more precise. Hilary Putnam, whose discussion of metaphysical realism 
is cited by numerous anti-realist readers of Heidegger, characterizes metaphysical realism 
as the view that “the world... contain[s] Self-Identifying Objects... the world, and not 
thinkers, sorts things into kinds” (Reason, Truth, and History, 53). A recent defender of 
metaphysical realism, Theodore Sider, believes that “the world has an objective structure; 
truth-seekers must discern that structure; they must carve at the joints; communities that 
choose the wrong groupings may get at the truth, but they nevertheless fail badly in their 
attempt to understand the world” (“Ontological Realism,” 398). Metaphysical anti-
realists, by contrast, believe that “every grouping of objects is just as good, objectively 
speaking, as every other, that no objects ‘go together’ simply because of the nature of 
things” (Ibid.). A metaphysical view that includes Nelson Goodman’s grue and bleen as 
primitives does no better—and no worse—at describing reality than one that instead 
includes blue and green.  
Another form of anti-realism not clearly captured by Sider’s definition holds not 
only that all classifications are equally good, but also that which things there are depends 
on our adoption of a contingent conceptual scheme. On this form of anti-realism, whether 
there are such things as in-cars and out-cars, the mereological fusion of my nose and the 
Eiffel Tower, or the middle third of Uncle Henry’s cigar depends on how we happen to 
speak. Consider, for instance, Eli Hirsch’s quantifier variance.2 It’s important to note, 
however, that it’s possible to recognize the dependence of social kinds on human beings 
																																																								




while still being a metaphysical realist about social kinds. Social kinds have what John 
Searle calls “epistemic objectivity” (“Social Ontology,” 15) and, as Amie Thomasson 
argues, the social sciences take themselves to be “reporting objective facts about these 
social entities, and discovering facts, and even kinds of things, that were previously 
unknown” (Thomasson, “Foundations,” 269). As I’ll discuss below, recent social 
ontology has stressed the need to expand traditional accounts of metaphysical realism to 
accommodate social kinds. Metaphysical realism, as I understand it, is the view that the 
goal of metaphysics is to develop concepts that best represent the most basic ontological 
categories and kinds. On the version of metaphysical realism I attribute to Heidegger, a 
metaphysical language that omits concepts that describe the categories and kinds that 
apply to social phenomena is an impoverished one. I take Heidegger’s distinctions 
between different modes of being—presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), readiness-to-hand 
(Zuhandenheit), existence (Existenz), life, subsistence (Bestand)—as attempts to “carve 
reality at the joints.” 
McDaniel enlists Heidegger as an ally in his rehabilitation of “ontological 
pluralism,” the view that in addition to many kinds of things, there are also many kinds of 
being. On this view, modes of being like presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, and 
existence are best represented by semantically restricted, perfectly natural existential 
quantifiers. There is a general mode of being, too, but it is less natural than the specific 
modes. McDaniel also defends a “two domains” view on which no present-at-hand entity 
is numerically identical to any ready-to-hand entity. Finally, McDaniel explains the 




Heidegger uses abstract noun phrases like Vorhandenheit as singular terms in true 
ontological propositions, the singular terms in such propositions are not ontologically 
committing. Rather, modes of being like presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, and 
existence have “being in the sense of being true,” unlike genuine present-at-hand, ready-
to-hand, and existing entities.  
On Kelly’s reading, the dependence passage expresses Heidegger’s Aristotelian 
conceptualism. That is, Kelly “attribute[s] to Heidegger the Aristotelian conceptualist 
position of denying the mind-independence of universals and their instantiation while 
affirming the mind-independence of entities of various kinds qua entities of those kinds” 
(“Heidegger the Metaphysician,” 5). McDaniel and Kelly thus employ effectively the 
same strategy for dealing with the dependence passages. While true ontological 
propositions appear to quantify over modes of being (“There are multiple modes of 
being”) or refer to them with a singular term (“Presence-at-hand is a mode of being”), 
they really function to sort entities into highly natural quantifier domains or kinds. 
Heidegger thereby avoids ontological commitment to modes of being (qua universals). 
This is the meaning of the so-called “ontological difference”: “The being of entities ‘is’ 
not itself an entity” (BT 26).3 
McDaniel and Kelly’s metaphysical realist readings differ in two important 
respects. First, Kelly claims that modes of being are natural kinds, so he denies that 
Heidegger adopts ontological pluralism in the sense defined above. Second, Kelly adopts 
																																																								
3 Note that David Lewis introduced the concept of naturalness to do the work of David Armstrong’s sparse 
theory of universals in a nominalistic framework (“New Work”). Similarly, I take the dependence passages 
and the ontological difference to express Heidegger’s commitment to metaphysical realism in a 




a “one domain view,” on which an entity’s possessing one mode of being may entail that 
it possesses another. For example, something with existence necessarily also possesses 
life and presence-at-hand. I will end up siding with McDaniel on both these points. 
I find McDaniel and Kelly’s deflations of the dependence passage persuasive. 
Insofar as the metaphysical realist interpretation has the resources to plausibly explain 
away the anti-realist appearance of the dependence passage, and insofar as the meaning 
interpretation has textual problems of its own, the metaphysical realist interpretation will 
emerge as the more natural reading.  I turn in the next section to a catalogue of problems 
for the meaning interpretation. 
§3 Against Meaning Interpretations 
In this section I raise three objections to meaning interpretations. First, meaning 
interpretations don’t capture most of the phenomena Heidegger includes under title 
‘being’: that-being, essence, such-being, and true-being. Second, meaning interpretations 
are inconsistent with an Aristotelian view about essence that Heidegger endorses. Third, 
meaning interpretations oversimplify the relationship between phenomenology and 
metaphysics.  
Before posing these objections, let me make one point about a reading of the 
dependence passage that meaning interpreters may have in mind. Blattner contrasts a 
“weak” reading of the dependence passage with his “strong,” temporal idealist reading. 
On the weak reading, Heidegger is making a series of trivial points: “No Dasein, no 
discovery… No Dasein, no understanding” (“Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?,” 188). He 




order to deflate the conclusion that appears to follow from the dependence passage—
namely, the dependence of being, but not entities, on Dasein. Now the dependence of 
discovery and understanding on Dasein is surely trivial, but what about “independence” 
and the “in-itself”? Blattner thinks this is no problem for the weak reading: 
“…independence is independence of (i.e. from) Dasein, presumably, and so if Dasein did 
not exist, then nothing could be independent of it… No Dasein, no independence” (Ibid.).  
This can’t be Heidegger’s view. On any plausible theory of ontological 
dependence, if x exists in a possible world where y does not exist, x is independent of y. 
According to ontic realism, present-at-hand entities exist in a possible world where there 
is no Dasein. Present-at-hand entities are independent of Dasein in that world. So there is 
independence in that world. Moreover, even granting the weak reading in the case of 
independence, it still needs to explain how the “in-itself” can depend on Dasein. In §5 I 
suggest that there are historical reasons to understand the “in-itself” in terms of 
intrinsicness. So understood, it would be hard to see how Heidegger could maintain ontic 
realism while claiming that entities’ intrinsic properties depend on Dasein.  
As Blattner points out, meaning interpreters put too much weight on one of many 
ways in which Heidegger characterizes being. In Being and Time, he defines being as 
“that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already 
understood” (BT 25-6). Meaning interpreters one-sidedly emphasize the second half of 
this claim. Shortly after giving this definition, Heidegger notes that ‘being’ captures a 
number of phenomena: “Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, is being; 




its being as it is; in reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in 
the ‘there is’” (BT 26). In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger discusses the 
“basic articulation of being” into what-being and that-being or way-of-being (BPP 119-
21). In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, he further divides what-being into essence 
and such-being and includes being-true as one of the meanings of the copula (FCM 326-
33). The investigation of being is “a clarification of the existence mode of things and 
their regional constitution” (MFL 151). What this suggests is that meaning interpreters 
need to give deflationary interpretations of metaphysical concepts like essence and 
explain how, in line with what the dependence passage seems to say, essence can depend 
on Dasein. But it’s not clear that they could do this while still attributing ontic realism to 
Heidegger. 
 A second objection to the meaning interpretation is that Heidegger appears to 
endorse the Aristotelian view that an entity is identical with its being. When Heidegger 
defines ‘meaning’, he notes that “[w]hen entities within-the-world are discovered along 
with the being of Dasein—that is, when they have come to be understood—we say that 
they have meaning. But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the 
entity, or alternatively, being” (BT 192-3). This passage both clearly distinguishes 
meaning and being and identifies an entity with its being. Aristotle endorses a similar 
view in Metaphysics Z: “...each thing itself and its essence are one and the same, and not 




know its essence...” (1031b18-20).4 An entity’s being is just what it is. The identification 
of an entity and its being makes sense of the claim that “[t]he being of entities ‘is’ not 
itself an entity.” Moreover, it does so in a way that is consonant with the nominalist 
interpretations of the dependence passage offered by McDaniel and Kelly. The point is 
that the being of an entity is nothing over and above the entity itself (like, e.g., a 
universal), and to understand the being of an entity is just to understand what it 
(essentially) is (BT 26). Finally, if Heidegger holds this Aristotelian view about essence, 
he cannot be both an ontological idealist and an ontic realist: if being depends on Dasein, 
and an entity’s being is just the entity itself, the entity depends on Dasein. 
 My final objection to meaning interpretations is that they oversimplify the 
relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics in Being and Time. Crowell and 
Sheehan both claim that Heidegger’s interest in being is filtered through Husserl’s 
phenomenology and thereby differs from traditional metaphysical inquiries into being. 
While I agree on the importance of Husserl’s phenomenology for an interpretation of the 
Being and Time project, I deny that Heidegger (or Husserl, for that matter) conceives of 
phenomenology as a successor discipline to metaphysics. I spell out the complex 
relationship between the phenomenological and metaphysical dimensions of Being and 
Time in §§5-6. Before doing so, however, I need to lay out the Husserlian background 
against which that relationship should be understood.  
§4 Formal and Regional Ontology in Husserl 
																																																								
4 Similarly, Descartes holds that there is merely a conceptual distinction between a substance and its 




Husserl distinguishes between formal and regional ontology. Both kinds of ontology are 
sciences of essences, rather than sciences of facts, and are thus known a priori. The goal 
of this section is to characterize formal and regional ontology, Husserl’s a priori method, 
and the relations between formal and regional ontology and phenomenology with an eye 
toward showing how these features are mirrored in Being and Time in the next two 
sections.  
  Formal ontology studies the formal or logical categories that apply to any object 
whatsoever. The formal categories include “property, relative constitution, state of 
affairs, relation, identity, sameness, set (collection), number, whole and part, genus and 
species” (Id 22). Husserl’s early work in formal ontology appears in the 1894 
“Psychological Studies in Elementary Logic” and in the second and third Logical 
Investigations, which deal with the distinction between the real and the ideal, on the one 
hand, and mereology and dependence, on the other.  
 Four elements of Husserl’s formal ontology will be of interest for the following: 
(i) the distinction between species and moment; (ii) the distinction between moment and 
piece; (iii) the relation of foundation; and (iv) the distinction between an abstractum and a 
concretum.  
 In the second Logical Investigation Husserl criticizes the nominalist and 
conceptualist theories of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and others for failing to register 
the phenomenological fact of our consciousness of universality. 5  Intentions toward 
																																																								
5 Husserl’s phenomenological argument for universals avoids the suspect appeal to inference to the best 




individuals differ essentially from intentions toward universals, and both are capable of 
intuitive fulfillment. In the recognition that multiple particulars share a property, for 
instance, I undergo a unique act, founded upon my acts of intuiting the particulars, 
through which their common species (redness, say) is given; in such a case I can “judge 
with self-evidence: ‘In all these cases individual moments differ, but in each the same 
Species is realized: this red is the same as that...” (LI v.1 240). The objects of universal 
thought and intuition are, in contrast to the real (temporal) objects of individual thought 
and intuition, ideal. The distinction between the real and the ideal is central to Husserl’s 
rejection of psychologism; if logical knowledge is to be vindicated, we have to make 
sense of how knowledge of ideal, i.e., necessary and repeatable, facts and objects can be 
known. Phenomenology, too, studies idealities—specifically, the essences of conscious 
acts.   
 Among properties, Husserl distinguishes between species, which are given 
through universal intuition, and moments, which are given through individual intuition.6 
Moments are individual, non-repeatable instances of species; in the language introduced 
by D.C. Williams, they are tropes. Each red particular has its own moment of red. When 
a red particular is destroyed, its moment of red is destroyed, but not the species of which 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Constituent Ontologies,” 397-8). For Husserl, we have reason to posit universals because they are given to 
us. 
6 Husserl’s view is an example of a constituent ontology, rather than a relational ontology. Constituent 
ontologies are those on which the mereological structure of a concrete particular includes entities that don’t 
belong to the ontological category concrete particular (e.g. tropes/moments); relational ontologies are 
those on which the mereological structure of a concrete particular includes only entities that belong to the 
ontological category concrete particular (i.e. pieces). Van Inwagen proposes distinguishing constituent 
ontologies from relational ontologies, on the one hand, and monocategorial ontologies like austere 
nominalism, on the other, by characterizing the former as views “that affirm the existence of properties and 
affirm further that at least some of these properties are perceivable…” (“Relational vs. Constituent 
Ontologies,” 402). Note that for Husserl both species and moments are perceivable: the former through 




it’s an instance. Husserl understands moments as dependent parts of things, and in the 
third Investigation he distinguishes them from independent parts, which he calls ‘pieces’. 
Moments, e.g., color and extension, can only exist within a wider whole, and there are 
laws of essence necessitating their co-instantiation in a whole. Moments stand in relations 
of foundation, and foundation can be reciprocal or one-sided. Color and extension, for 
instance, are reciprocally founded on each other. Acts of universal intuition, on the other 
hand, are one-sidedly founded on acts of individual intuition; while the former cannot 
exist without the latter, the converse doesn’t obtain. Foundation is defined in modal 
terms: x depends on y iff necessarily, if x exists, then y exists. 
 The relation of foundation can be called upon to define the notion of an 
abstractum and a concretum. An abstractum is a dependent part (moment) of some whole, 
which may itself have independent parts (pieces). For instance, “[w]e speak of the 
portions of a duration, although this is something abstract” (LI v.2 29). Abstracta can also 
have abstract parts, and thus be concrete relative to those parts. For instance, an object’s 
color and its extension are abstract relative to the object, but concrete relative to the hue, 
saturation, and brightness of the color. Finally, “[a] concretum that itself is abstract in no 
direction can be called an ‘absolute concretum’” (LI v.2 29). Absolute concreta are “the 
primordial kind of object, with respect to which all other objects present themselves... 
merely as variants” (Id 21). In more traditional terms, absolute concreta are substances, 
about which I’ll have more to say in the next section.  
 Formal ontology studies “the forms of any possible ontology at all (namely, all 




constitution common to them all” (Id 23). Material or regional ontologies study the 
essences of various highly general “regions,” such as nature, consciousness, and culture.7 
Regional ontologies are supposed to provide foundations for the sciences: “[e]very 
science of facts... has essential, theoretical foundations in eidetic ontologies” (Id 19). 
Regional ontologies study the essential relations of compatibility, incompatibility, 
and necessary co-instantiation of different kinds of properties. Such essential relations are 
discovered through the method of eidetic variation. Starting with an instance—obtained 
either through perception or imagination—of the universal to be studied, features of the 
example are varied freely. Whatever properties are seen to persist invariantly through 
arbitrary variations in the example are identified as the universal common to all its 
instances.8 Conversely, whatever can be imaginatively removed from an example without 
changing its type is not part of its essence. Finally, the experience of conflict or 
frustration that arises from trying to combine two moments in a single object is evidence 
of their incompatibility (LI VI Ch. 4).  
 What is the relationship between (formal and regional) ontology and 
phenomenology for Husserl? First, phenomenology provides an account of how a priori 
knowledge is possible. Having demonstrated the untenability of psychologism in the 
Prolegomena, the six Logical Investigations take up the task of showing we manage to 
have knowledge of the idealities studied by pure logic: “Logical concepts, as valid 
thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition: they must arise out of an ideational 
																																																								
7 See D.W. Smith, Husserl, 157. 
8 See FTL §97 and EJ III.2 for elaboration. See also Kasmier, “A Defense,” for a defense of the method and 




intuition founded on certain experiences... The phenomenology of the logical experiences 
aims at giving us a sufficiently wide descriptive... understanding of these mental states 
and their indwelling sense, as will enable us to give fixed meanings to all the fundamental 
concepts of logic” (LI v.1 168). In general, phenomenology asks: “How can the ideality 
of the universal qua concept or law enter the flux of real mental states and become an 
epistemic possession of the thinking person?” (LI v.1 169).  
 Second, phenomenology is itself a kind of ontology—namely, the regional 
ontology of consciousness. In Dallas Willard’s words, phenomenology “necessarily 
involve[s] ontological analyses of consciousness, both of the act and the stream. That is 
inevitable, since they are directed against analyses of consciousness that include or are 
founded upon mistakes in ontology, both formal and material” (“Phenomenology and 
Metaphysics”). Since formal ontology prescribes the form of any regional ontology, it is 
implicated in the work of phenomenology:  
 You don’t first do your phenomenological work and then, when it is done, do your formal 
 ontology... such basic questions as those about the distinction between existence  and non-
 existence, identity and difference, the Real (individual) and the Ideal (universal), and 
 about the theory of whole and part (cornerstone of any formal ontology) are thoroughly 
 worked out in the course of the basic descriptive work of phenomenology as the 
 descriptive theory of the essences of experiences. (Ibid.) 
 
Indeed, this explains why Husserl remarks that formal ontology—unlike sciences of fact, 
regional ontologies of transcendent essences, formal logic, and mathematics—cannot be 
bracketed (Id §59): phenomenology is a regional ontology of intentionality—the ontology 
of the “region of pure consciousness”—and thus it relies on the theories of whole and 




ontology. Inverting Heidegger’s claim that “only as phenomenology is ontology 
possible,” we can add that “only as ontology is phenomenology possible” (BT 60). 
 In §6 I will argue that Heidegger’s conception of the relationship between 
phenomenology and ontology exactly mirrors Husserl’s. On the one hand, 
phenomenology is enlisted to show how ontological knowledge is possible. On the other, 
phenomenology is itself a kind of ontology—namely, the ontology or “existential 
analytic” of Dasein. Before doing that, I want to devote §5 to showing how Husserl’s 
schema of formal and regional ontology can be applied to Being and Time. 
§5 Formal and Regional Ontology in Heidegger 
Do Heidegger’s distinctions between modes of being—presence-at-hand, readiness-to-
hand, existence, life, subsistence, and so on—belong to formal ontology or regional 
ontology? I think the answer is a little bit of both. 
 At least a large part of what Heidegger means by Vorhandenheit is captured by 
the notion of substance.9 Obviously there’s a lot to be said about the historical and 
philosophical complexities attending this notion; I will have to rely on some brief 
indications for present purposes. For Aristotle, substance has a special priority among the 
categories: “Something is said to be in many ways... For on the one hand ‘being’ signifies 
the what-it-is and a this something, and on the other quality, quantity, or one of the other 
things predicated as these are. But while things are said to be in this many ways, it is 
																																																								
9 Though see McManus, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth and Golob, Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom 
and Normativity for problems with this simple identification. McManus lists 36 not obviously equivalent 
analyses of Vorhandenheit that he finds in the literature, and suggests that BT 254 makes trouble for this 
interpretation (Measure of Truth, 53-6). Golob suggests that the equation of present-at-hand entities with 
substances is complicated by scope of his ambitions; he wants his critique to apply equally to Aristotelian, 
Cartesian, Leibnizian, and Kantian ontology, and Kant’s phenomenal substances lack the independence and 




evident that primary among these is the what-it-is, which is just what signifies the 
substance” (1028a10-15). Indeed, substance is so primary that “the question that was 
asked long ago, is now, and always will be asked, and is always giving rise to puzzles—
namely, What is being?—is just the question, What is substance?” (1028b1-3). For 
Heidegger, this is getting off on the wrong foot. 
 A substance—more precisely, a primary substance—is “that which is neither said 
of a subject nor in a subject, i.e., the individual man or horse” (2a13-5). “Neither said of a 
subject nor in a subject” is meant to distinguish primary substances—this suches—from 
secondary substances (kinds), on the one hand, and attributes, on the other. Substances, as 
the subjects of change, are able to “receive contraries” (4a10-1). As noted above, 
substances are identical with their essences, and “the essence of each thing is what it is 
said to be intrinsically” (1029b13). The notion of substance is tied to a specific kind of 
definition in which the definiendum is “said not by way of saying one thing of another” 
(1030a10). Kit Fine develops Aristotelian conceptions of essence and ontological 
dependence in terms of real definitions: “The notion of one object depending on another 
is... the real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of 
another” (“Ontological Dependence,” 275). Fine offers analyses of substance and 
reciprocal dependence on this definitional model.  
 The conception of substance most clearly present in Being and Time is that of 
Descartes: “By substance we can understanding nothing other than a thing which exists 
in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence” (Principles of Philosophy, 




and finite substances; finite substance should rather be defined as “things that need only 
the concurrence of God to exist” (Ibid.). Second, Descartes appears to deny that 
individual bodies are substances; instead, “there is only corporal substance as such,” of 
which individual bodies are temporary arrangements (Woolhouse, The Concept of 
Substance, 22-4). Set these aside. What’s important is that some version of the 
independence conception of substance is in the background of Heidegger’s notion of 
presence-at-hand.  
Another conception of substance that will be useful in the following can be traced 
back to Leibniz. The basic thought is that, contra Descartes, extension cannot account for 
the unity of a substance because it is relational; only intrinsic properties can unify a 
substance, and the best candidates for intrinsic properties are mental or proto-mental. On 
this view, entities whose natures were exhausted by extension would be mere 
aggregates—entia per accidens—rather than true unities—entia per se.10 As Robert M. 
Adams puts the point “...we may conjecture that the reality of a substance must include 
something intrinsic and qualitative over and above any formal or structural features it 
may possess” (“Idealism Vindicated,” 40). The Leibniz/Adams point that only mental or 
proto-mental properties are sufficiently intrinsic or qualitative is not important here; the 
important point is that, on this conception, the nature of a substance is captured by its 
intrinsic properties.  
I suggest that the independence and intrinsicness conceptions of substance capture 
what Heidegger means by ‘independence’ and ‘the in-itself’ in the dependence passage, 
																																																								




respectively. Heidegger denies that human artifacts and persons are substances in these 
traditional senses.11 These entities depend for their existence and nature on other such 
entities—they are holistically dependent upon one another. The most obvious example of 
holistic dependence comes from the discussion of tools: “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such 
thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of 
equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 
‘something in-order-to’” (BT 97). Tools are also essentially characterized by a “for-the-
sake-of-which,” i.e., a relation to possible projects of Dasein. 
It’s equally true that Dasein, construed as a person or self, is essentially 
characterized by its relation to what Heidegger calls a “world.” There could be no 
carpenters, e.g., without hammers, nails, and boards: “The phenomenon of the world co-
determines the constitution of the being of the ‘I’” (BT 368). The self is also essentially 
dependent upon other selves: “So far as Dasein is at all, it has being-with-one-another as 
its kind of being” (BT 163). As B. Scot Rousse nicely puts the point, “taken strictly, there 
is no such thing as a Dasein” (“Heidegger, Sociality, Human Agency,” 432). The claim 
here is not that the human being who is a carpenter could not have existed were there no 
hammers and nails, or that some global catastrophe could not leave only one human 
being. As I will explain shortly, I read Heidegger as attributing different persistence 
																																																								
11 He does sometimes refer to the “independence,” “substantiality,” and “in-itself” character of artifacts and 
persons. For instance, he remarks that the “‘system of relations’, as something constitutive for worldhood, 
is so far from volatilizing the being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world 
provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are ‘substantially’ ‘in 
themselves’” (BT 122). Contrasting the being of Dasein from that of “reality,” Heidegger remarks that “the 
substance of man is existence” (BT 255). He also uses the term Selbständigkeit, which can mean 
independence or autonomy, to characterize Dasein’s authenticity. His rhetorical point, I take it, is that these 




conditions to persons and human organisms, much as Locke distinguishes personal 
identity from “the identity of man” (Locke, Essay, 332). The claim, then, is that persons 
or selves essentially occupy some kind of social role in terms of which they understand 
themselves, so the existence of persons or selves is generically dependent on there being 
some “world,” i.e., system of social roles, practices, and artifacts, or other.   
 If human artifacts and persons are not substances, it would appear that no ready-
to-hand or existing entity is identical to any substance, and thus to any present-at-hand 
entity. As Cerbone points out, though, the text pulls in the direction of both the “one 
domain” and the “two domains” views.12 I find McDaniel’s case for the “two domain” 
view persuasive: Heidegger attributes different essential properties to present-at-hand and 
ready-to-hand entities, gives phenomenological descriptions of situations in which their 
respective independence and dependence are given, and describes the change-over to the 
theoretical attitude as involving a discovery of new things.13 Instead of elaborating on or 
adding to these arguments, I want to follow out a suggestion made by both Cerbone and 
McDaniel that can help to explain Heidegger’s ambivalence about characterizing the 
present-at-hand/ready-to-hand distinction sometimes in terms of a distinction in entities 
and sometimes in terms of a distinction in aspects. This is the suggestion that the 
distinction should be understood in terms of the notion of material constitution.  
 Heidegger sometimes claims that tools and Dasein can be considered in terms of 
presence-at-hand. Tool breakdown, for instance, has “the function of bringing to the fore 
the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand” (BT 104, my emphasis). 
																																																								
12 See Cerbone, “Heidegger’s Hammer,” 312. 




Likewise, when we transition from using a hammer to making judgments about its 
weight, this changeover involves “looking at the ready-to-hand thing which we 
encounter, and looking at it ‘in a new way’ as something present-at-hand” (BT 412). 
Dasein “can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. 
To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of being-in” 
(BT 82).  
 Lynne Rudder Baker argues that, while constitution is not identity, it is a unity-
relation that allows for two-way sharing of properties. On Baker’s account, constituted 
and constituting entities have different primary kinds; for instance, my primary kind is 
person, while my body’s primary kind is human animal. I have certain properties 
nonderivatively in virtue of my primary kind and others derivatively in virtue of the 
primary kind of the entity that constitutes me (namely, my body): “I really am a body 
(derivatively); if my foot itches, then I itch. And my body is really a person (now); when 
I have a right to be in a certain seat, my body has a right to be in that seat” (Baker, 
Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 39). This account can help to explain why tools and 
Dasein can rightly be considered as present-at-hand (or, in the latter case, living); though 
they are not identical with their constituting material substance (or organism), they do 
share properties like weight with it in virtue of the unity-relation of material constitution. 
The changeover is a transition from nonderivative to derivative properties. In contrast to 
the natural scientific changeover involved in seeing an artifact or a person in physical or 
biological terms, the human sciences adopt a theoretical stance toward these entities 




become the ‘object’ of a science without having to lose its character as equipment. A 
modification of our understanding of being does not seem to be necessarily constitutive 
for the genesis of the theoretical attitude ‘towards things’. Certainly not, if this 
‘modification’ is to imply a change in the kind of being which, in understanding the 
entity before us, we understand it to possess” (BT 413).14  
 I’ll have more to say about material constitution below, but first let me note that 
holistic dependence and material constitution are plausibly within the purview of formal 
ontology. First, formal ontology is traditionally understood to include the theory of 
dependence, and holistic dependence can be seen as an extension of Husserl’s notion of 
mutual founding; whereas Husserl applies mutual founding to moments, holistic 
dependence is a kind of mutual founding between particulars. Second, material 
constitution is “a single comprehensive metaphysical relation that unites items at 
different levels of reality…” (Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 32). Material constitution 
plausibly holds not only between artifacts or persons, on the one hand, and material 
substances, but also between material substances and the aggregates that compose them. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, for instance, argues that not only are the statue and the lump of 
clay distinct, but the lump of clay and the aggregate of atoms that compose it at a time are 
also distinct; just as the statue can survive a replacement of a part that the lump cannot, so 
can the lump survive a replacement of a part that the aggregate cannot.15 Material 
constitution can even hold between artifacts—think, for instance, of Duchamp’s 
																																																								
14 I follow Golob in rejecting the view of Joseph Rouse and William Blattner that Heidegger should have 
recognized that all objects are ready-to-hand (Freedom, Concept and Normativity, 165). Whether an entity 
is ready-to-hand is a matter of that entity’s nature, not of the attitude we take toward it. 




Fountain. The relation of material constitution therefore has a kind of topic-neutrality and 
thus a kind of formality.16 
  As noted above, in Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger introduces the 
“basic articulation of being” into way of being and whatness. I suggest mapping this 
distinction onto the distinction between formal and regional ontology. There are historical 
reasons for doing this: for Aristotle, part of what it means to say that “being is said in 
many ways” is that ‘being’ is not univocal across the categories; the being of substance is 
absolute, while the being of the other categories is relative to substance. Note, too, that 
Husserl calls the essences studied by formal ontology ‘categories’ (Id 24). The 
suggestion, then, is that by enriching the list of categorial relations, Heidegger recognizes 
more equivocity in ‘being’ than Aristotle, for whom the question of being is the question 
of substance.17 Note, also, that Kelly’s identification of modes of being with natural kinds 
runs roughshod over the basic articulation of being thesis; McDaniel’s identification of 
modes of being with the meanings of quantifiers respects this important distinction. 
																																																								
16 McDaniel argues that if ontological pluralism is true, Husserlian formal ontology, understood as the 
study of those features objects have simply in virtue of being objects, is a “doomed project” 
(Fragmentation of Being, 137). He leaves open the possibility of formal ontology construed as a “discipline 
that describes the perfectly natural topic-neutral features that are applicable to objects of any ontological 
category” (Ibid.). Note that, on my construal of Heidegger’s views, the categories of substantiality, holistic 
dependence, and material constitution are not perfectly topic-neutral. They are relatively topic-neutral, 
however; substantiality cuts across the regions of the res cogitans and res corporea, and holistic 
dependence and material constitution cut across the regions of persons and artifacts. Note, too, that Roman 
Ingarden adopts a view of formal ontology as the study of “the ‘categorial form’ of an object (a form which 
can differ according to the different types of things that exist, e.g. individual objects, intentional objects, 
ideas, relations etc.)” (On the Motives, 67n).   
17 For Husserl, to be an object is just to be the subject of true predication (Id 13). Nonetheless, he admits “a 
fundamental categorial split in our unified conception of being (or what is the same, in our concept of an 
object as such); we take account of this split when we distinguish between ideal and real being; between 
being as species and being as what is individual” (LI v.1 250). Notice that Husserl does not identify 
idealities as such as a region; rather, the real-ideal distinction is a formal (categorial) distinction. To the 
extent that I will identify modes of being in Heidegger with formal-ontological categories, I agree with 




 This way of regimenting Heidegger raises another worry. So far I have 
distinguished the modes of being of artifacts and persons from that of substances in terms 
of the relation of holistic dependence. But this can’t be the whole story: after all, artifacts 
and persons don’t have the same mode of being. Indeed, Heidegger distinguishes the 
articulation of Dasein’s being from the articulation of intraworldly entities: “Dasein is not 
constituted by whatness but... by whoness,” so the question about the relationship 
between essence and existence “is not only the question of the relationship of whatness 
and extantness but at the same time the question of the relationship of whoness and 
existence—existence understood in our sense as the mode of being of the being that we 
ourselves are” (BPP 120). The key to distinguishing the modes of being is the claim that 
“[t]he essence of Dasein lies in its existence” (BT 67). One thing that sets Dasein apart 
from a hammer is its relation to the roles on which it depends: the essence of a hammer is 
a specific role, while the essence of Dasein is just to occupy some role or other.  To use 
language from the material constitution literature, particular roles are primary kinds for 
artifacts, but they are only phase sortals for persons: “Teachers may cease to be teachers 
without ceasing to exist (e.g., they may retire)” (Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 34). A 
person’s occupying some social role or other is not accidental, however: “All the such-
being [So-sein] that this entity possesses is primarily being” (BT 67). I gloss this claim as 
follows: all of Dasein’s nonderivative, accidental properties are determinations of the 
essential, determinable property that Heidegger calls Existenz.   
 This way of distinguishing the modes of being of artifacts and Dasein may still 




suggests that formal categories do not apply to Dasein at all, or at least they do not apply 
in the same way as they do to present-at-hand entities. For instance, he sometimes 
suggests that various features of Dasein’s being are not properties and that the category 
property only applies to the present-at-hand (BT 41, 68, 82, 114-5). Similarly, he 
distinguishes senses of ‘fact’ (BT 82) and ‘possibility’ (BT 183) that apply to Dasein 
from those that apply to the present-at-hand. In an early lecture, he claims that Husserl’s 
formal ontology and its notion of an “object as such” arises out of a particular “relational-
sense” (Bezugssinn) called ‘the theoretical attitude’, a fact he tries to remedy with his 
method of “formal indication” (PRL 42). I take Heidegger’s point in warning against 
applying these formal categories to Dasein without further ado to be that all features of 
Dasein’s being should be understood as modes of self-interpretation or ways in which it 
takes a stand on who it is.18 Despite this important caveat, I still suggest that, insofar as 
the notions of substance and dependence belong to formal ontology, it’s profitable to 
distinguish formal and regional components in Heidegger’s ontology. 
 Before moving on, I’ll raise one more worry—not for my interpretation, but for 
the plausibility of Heidegger’s view. Peter van Inwagen, a prominent defender of neo-
Quinean metaontology, argues that “Sartre and Heidegger and all other members of the 
existential-phenomenological tradition are... guilty of ascribing to the ‘being’ of things 
features of those things that should properly be ascribed to their natures” (“Being, 
																																																								
18 “To borrow an example elegantly developed by Blattner, Dasein is distinctive in that for it to be, say, a 
doctor Dasein must behave in a certain way and make sense of that behaviour as part of an ongoing series 
of projects: it is not sufficient that Dasein holds a PhD or a medical degree. In virtue of this distinctive 
nature, Heidegger argues, Dasein needs to be analysed in certain specific ways: for example, one needs to 




Existence, Ontological Commitment,” 478). He holds that “[t]he vast difference between 
me and the table does not consist in our having vastly different sorts of being (Dasein, 
dass sein, ‘that it is’); it consists rather in our having vastly different sorts of nature 
(Wesen, was sein, ‘what it is’)” (“Being, Existence, Ontological Commitment,” 477). 
Recall that Heidegger is clearly not eliding being and nature; his basic articulation of 
being thesis makes this very distinction. I’ve suggested spelling out distinctions in modes 
of being (rather than nature) in terms of different kinds of dependence. There is strong 
historical precedent for marking distinctions in mode of being in terms of some kind of 
dependence: 
Consider the difference between the way a substance exists and the way an attribute 
exists: a substance exists full stop, that is, a complete attribution of existence to a 
substance need mention only the substance itself. But an attribute does not exist full stop, 
but rather only exists in something else. So a complete attribution of existence to an 
[attribute] must mention something other than the attribute itself. The mode of being of a 
substance is a monadic mode; the mode of being of an attribute is a relational mode. 
(McDaniel, “Pasnau on Category Realism,” 21) 
 
In McDaniel’s terms, being is systematically variably polyadic: it changes adicity in a 
systematic way when applied to different kinds of objects, which is “an ugly way for a 
putatively perfectly natural relation to behave” (McDaniel, Fragmentation of Being, 57). 
Attributes, on this scheme, having being-in as their mode of being. There’s an important 
sense in which both ready-to-hand entities and Dasein exist in something else, though the 
relation of existing in is neither parthood nor instantiation. Ready-to-hand entities are 
essentially intraworldly, while Dasein has an essential structure called In-Sein. Though 
the sense in which ready-to-hand entities and Dasein are ‘in’ the world differs in the way 
I noted above, both involve some kind of constitutive dependence on human artifacts and 




metaontology that van Inwagen adopts; they do, however, suggest that Heidegger is not 
simply confused.19 
 I turn now to the regional ontology of Being and Time and other works. Recall 
that meaning interpreters regularly distinguish the phenomenological project from that of 
traditional metaphysics. For Sheehan, for example, “the primacy in Heidegger’s work lies 
with sense, intelligibility, and significance (Sinn, Verständlichkeit, Bedeutung) rather 
than with ‘being’ (Sein) understood merely as mind-independent existence” (“What If 
Heidegger,” 386, my emphasis). Compare Kelly’s metaphysical realist interpretation of 
modes of being as natural kinds: 
...any class is a natural class just in case it is ‘found in or made by nature’, i.e. the world 
per se (Hacking 1990: 135). Natural classes are contradistinguished from classes ‘found 
in’ cognition or ‘made by’ cognisers, i.e. mind-dependent classes... Only if natural classes 
exist can enquirers ‘carve nature at the joints’, i.e. classify entities according to natural 
classifications... (“Heidegger the Metaphysician,” 3) 
 
There’s a common assumption here—indeed, it is the very assumption that Heidegger 
attacks in Being and Time. The assumption is that metaphysics is concerned only with 
“mind-independent existence.”  
 This assumption has been the target of a recent wave of social ontologists. 
Consider Lynne Rudder Baker’s position, for example: 
																																																								
19 “It is my view that Heidegger’s philosophy is so transparently confused that no profound knowledge of 
his writings is a prerequisite for making judgments of [this] sort... I must remind the reader that these 
judgments apply to Heidegger’s philosophy of being (Sein) and not to his philosophy of human being 
(Dasein). It may be that there is much of philosophical value in Heidegger’s investigations of Dasein. If so, 
I would nevertheless insist, what is valuable in these investigations will better reveal its value if his 
philosophical vocabulary is ‘de-ontologized’, if they are rewritten in such a way that all occurrences of 
words related to Sein (and Existenz) are replaced with ‘non-ontological’ words. (I have no doubt that all 
committed students of Heidegger will tell me that it is impossible to ‘de-ontologize’ Heidegger’s 
investigations of Dasein. They may be wrong. If they are right, however, Heidegger’s investigations of 
Dasein are so irremediably vitiated by the radical confusions that are an essential component of his 




 The portion of reality that is excluded from the “in-itself reality independent of our minds 
 and even of our existence” contains much of what we interact with: e.g., artifacts, 
 artworks, economic items (certificates of deposit, credit cards), consumer goods, 
 documents. It also excludes such varied properties as being philanthropic, being in debt, 
 being employed, being drunk, being conscientious, having a banking system, breaking a 
 treaty, suspending habeas corpus, and on and on. Moreover, on the coherent construal of 
 the mind-independent/mind-dependent distinction... carburetors and dreams come out on 
 the same side of the ontological divide. I am confident that it is basically wrong-headed 
 to put artifacts and after-images in the same ontological category, and hence I am also 
 confident that the mind-independence/mind-dependence distinction is itself misguided as 
 a basis for metaphysics. (Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 19-20) 
 
Sally Haslanger argues that “objective types are sometimes constituted by relational 
properties, for example, those things that are taller than the Empire State Building, those 
things that are bigger than a breadbox, those things that earned over $50K last year, those 
things that are someone’s spouse...” (“Social Construction,” 206). At least the last two of 
these types carve at important joints for the purpose of social science, as do race and 
gender (which, according to Haslanger, are socially constructed but nonetheless 
objective). Amie Thomasson considers the ways in which the ontological, 
epistemological, and semantic components of the realist paradigm designed for natural 
kinds fail for social kinds.20 
Baker and David Wiggins point out that for two of the primary architects of the 
traditional substance paradigm described above, Aristotle and Leibniz, artifacts are 
ontologically deficient because they lack an internal principle of activity. Wiggins cites 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics on this point: “That which is a whole and has a certain shape and 
form is one in a still higher degree; and especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, and 
not by force like things which are unified by glue or nails or by being tied together, i.e., if 
it has in itself the cause of its continuity” (1052a22-5). In the scholastic terminology 
																																																								




introduced earlier, artifacts are not entia per se like, paradigmatically, organisms, but 
rather entia per accidens. 21  Thomasson claims that “[r]ecent analytic ontology, 
epistemology, and semantics have largely been driven by the desire to provide theories 
adequate to the natural sciences, and have focused on natural and scientific kinds as the 
primary objects of concern” (“Realism and Human Kinds,” 34). Heidegger’s claim that 
the question of being has been forgotten (BT 21) is the claim that this prejudice toward 
natural kinds described by these recent metaphysicians has been endemic to the entire 
history of philosophy. 
 I want to pursue three connections between Heidegger’s ontology and recent 
social ontology. The first concerns the roles of first-person perspectives and language in 
the constitution of human persons. Baker argues, first, for a constitution view of human 
persons on which persons (unlike human organisms) essentially have first-person 
perspectives, and second, that individual human persons fall within the purview of social 
ontology understood as the study of “all social entities, social kinds and social properties 
that are irreducible and ineliminable” (“Human Persons as Social Entities,” 78). She 
argues for the second point in terms of the first: human persons are essentially beings 
with first-person perspectives; first-person perspectives require language; and language 
requires a linguistic community. Heidegger emphasizes the centrality of both the first-
person perspective and language in the ontology of human persons. First, “Dasein has in 
each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit],” so “one must always use a personal pronoun when 
one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’” (BT 68). Second, discourse (Rede) is an existentiale 
																																																								




(essential feature) of Dasein. Discourse is supposed to be somehow more basic than 
language, and it accounts for how significations become articulated in our experience. 
But discourse is essentially expressible in language, and language is an essential part of 
our being-with. As Searle points out, language is the presupposition of the rich array of 
social institutions that make up our world.22 For Heidegger, individual human selves, 
institutions, and artifacts are all co-constituted in virtue of the discursively articulated 
network he calls ‘world’.  
 A second connection concerns Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s historicity and 
recent work on social constructionism. Heidegger turns to Dasein’s historicality at BT 
II.5 to fill out his account of the human person first in its everydayness (Division I) and 
then insofar as it is authentic (BT II.1-3). Authenticity is understood in terms of being-
toward-death, and Heidegger now worries that this analysis has been one-sided: “Only 
that entity which is ‘between’ birth and death presents the whole which we have been 
seeking” (BT 425). Like ‘death’, ‘birth’ does not refer to a biological process when 
applied to Dasein; rather, it refers to Dasein’s thrownness. Heidegger’s analysis of 
historicality, then, shows how Dasein’s potentiality for authenticity is both enabled and 
constrained by its historical situation. Heidegger rhetorically signals both these points by 
asking: “Will taking over the thrownness of the self into its world perhaps disclose a 
horizon from which existence snatches its factical possibilities away? Have we not said in 
addition that Dasein never comes back behind its thrownness?” (BT 434). The account of 
historicality elaborates on the generic dependence of human selves on a world, while at 
																																																								




the same time casting light on the holistic and historical nature of social roles (or in the 
Heideggerian argot, possibilities for existence). As Golob puts the point, “I cannot now 
be a samurai since the necessary web of goals, tools and the dispositions of other agents 
no longer exists” (Freedom, Concepts and Normativity, 217). Ian Hacking and Sally 
Haslanger have elaborated on the idea that a person’s instantiating a social kind is not 
simply a matter of instantiating some qualitative properties. Hacking, in his account of 
“making up people,” remarks: “The feudal serf putting food on my lady’s table can no 
more chose to be a garcon de café [drawing on Sartre’s discussion of the waiter in bad 
faith] than he can chose to be lord of the manor. But the impossibility is evidently 
different in kind” (“Historical Ontology,” 109). Similarly, in her social constructionist 
account of race and gender, Haslanger draws an analogy to the concept tween: 
“…tweenhood is more than chronological; it is a category that one falls into by virtue of 
occupying a certain social position that tends to overlap with the years 9-12,” and thus 
“there were no tweens in the Middle Ages, and probably aren’t tweens in many parts of 
the world now” (“Social Construction,” 196). Heidegger and these contemporary social 
ontologists are interested in articulating the contextual and historical ways that human 
selves are constituted, as well as the possibilities for inauthenticity and authenticity, 
oppression and liberation this “heritage” harbors.  
 A third connection takes us away from Being and Time and into the territory of 
“late Heidegger.” In particular, the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” contains 
important insights about the ontologies of artifacts and artworks. I’m wary of extending 




recognize that the ontological themes I pick out here are far from exhausting everything 
that is interesting about this rich text. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Heidegger 
endorses a material constitution view of artworks in “The Origin.” To ask about the 
origin of the work of art is to ask about the “source of its nature,” so to determine this 
origin it’s necessary to first clarify the nature of the work of art, i.e., its “workly 
character” OWA 27). The nature of the work of art is puzzling because, on the one hand, 
artworks are material things—they have a “thingly character” (OWA 19): 
 The picture hangs on the wall like a rifle or a hat. A painting, e.g., the one by Van Gogh 
 that represents a pair of peasant shoes, travels from one exhibition to another. Works of 
 art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest. During the First 
 World War Hölderlin’s hymns were packed in the soldier’s knapsack together with 
 cleaning gear. Beethoven’s quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like 
 potatoes in a cellar. (OWA 19) 
 
Nonetheless, says Heidegger, the work of art is not just a thing. The focus of the first half 
or so of the essay is to determine the modes of being of mere things, equipment, and 
works. Both equipment and works are constituted out of some matter: “stone, wood, 
metal, color, language, tone” (OWA 44). Nevertheless, they stand in essentially different 
relations to these materials. Because equipment is essentially characterized by 
“usefulness and serviceability,” the matter “disappears into usefulness” (Ibid.). The work, 
in contrast, is characterized by “[t]he setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth” 
(OWA 46). Here’s a rough gloss on this claim: a work is not a mere thing, because it is 
what it is only in virtue of a world, i.e., a relational complex of historical practices and 
meanings. The “earth” (the constituting material) sets up this world, in the sense that 
some material constituting a work both relies on and contributes to a relational complex 




appropriately comport ourselves to a work of art, in contrast to a piece of equipment, the 
material out of which it’s composed doesn’t fade into the background. On the contrary, 
“[t]he work-being of the work consists in the fighting of the battle between world and 
earth” (OWA 48).  
 One final word about the material constitution readings of Being and Time and 
“The Origin.” Material constitution views were endorsed by three other classical 
phenomenologists: Edmund Husserl, Roman Ingarden, and Max Scheler. In his account 
of image consciousness, Husserl distinguishes between three objects: “(1) the physical 
image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on [the ‘physical image’]; 
(2) the representing or depicting object [the ‘image object’]; and (3) the represented or 
depicted object [the ‘image subject’]” (PICM 21). For Ingarden, a literary work is “a 
formation constructed of several heterogenous strata,” namely, “(1) the stratum of word 
sounds and the phonetic formations of higher order built on them; (2) the stratum of 
meaning units of various orders; (3) the stratum of manifold schematized aspects and 
aspect continua and series, and, finally, (4) the stratum of represented objectivities and 
their vicissitudes” (Literary Work of Art, 29-30). Scheler distinguishes goods (e.g. 
artworks) from mere things on grounds familiar from the literature on material 
constitution: “…a good is destructible… apart from the destruction of the thing 
representing the same real object, e.g., a work of art (a painting) whose colors fade. Also, 
a thing can be divided, but the same real object as a “good” is not thereby divided but 
annihilated…” (Formalism in Ethics, 21). Not only are material constitution views 




phenomenological grounds for maintaining such views. First, as Walter Hopp points out, 
Husserl distinguishes the image object from the physical Dingbild because they have 
different “perceptual manifolds”: “If I turn over a photograph and examine its back side, 
that counts as seeing more of the physical thing. But it does not count as seeing more of 
the image object” (“Image Consciousness,” 133). Second, the phenomenological 
opposition to naturalism is in part a commitment to accord a serious ontological status to 
the ordinary objects that confront of us in everyday life. Like Baker, Heidegger rejects 
eliminativism and reductionism about such entities: “…to reconstruct the thing of use in 
terms of the thing of nature is an ontologically questionable undertaking” (BT 132).   
 I hope to have shown that interpreting Heidegger as engaged in social ontology is 
illuminating both of his motivations (resisting a prejudice toward natural kinds) and of 
his particular analyses (of persons, artworks, tools, and historical artifacts). Finally, I 
hope to have shown that there are distinguishable formal and regional components to 
Heidegger’s ontology. The task of the next and final section is to answer the question 
posed at the outset: what is the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics in 
Being and Time? 
§6 The Ontological Question and the Phenomenological Question 
At the beginning of this paper I distinguished two questions that are often not 
distinguished in the scholarship. Admittedly, Heidegger is not clear about keeping them 
separate.  Nonetheless, I think making the distinction is one of the keys to unlocking 




meaning of ‘being’ and the question about the meaning of being. I call the former ‘the 
ontological question’ and the latter ‘the phenomenological question’. 
 Early in Being and Time, Heidegger draws an analogy between his project and 
various foundational crises and developments in the sciences: the Grundlagenstreit 
between David Hilbert and L.E.J. Brouwer, the preservation of the laws of nature under 
all arbitrary transformations in general relativity, the overcoming of the mechanism-
vitalism debate in biology, the drive to defend the autonomy of the Geisteswissenschaften 
by the historicist school, and a Lutheran emphasis on the primacy of faith over dogma in 
theology. These are examples of crises in the basic concepts of a science. Determining 
the basic concepts of a science is tantamount to laying the foundations for further inquiry 
in that science, and the kind of research that results in drawing out the basic concepts of a 
subject matter is “nothing else than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their 
basic state of being” (BT 30).  
 Recall that for Husserl regional ontologies are foundational for sciences of facts. 
Much of Husserl’s phenomenology, though, is devoted not to developing these regional 
ontologies, but rather to showing how it’s even possible to have a priori knowledge. As 
noted above, this requires an investigation into the essences of experience, meaning, and 
knowledge. This investigation is itself a regional ontology—namely, a regional ontology 
of intentionality.  
 Heidegger describes his own project in this twofold manner: 
The question of being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for 
the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type... 
but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical 




firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and 
perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of 
being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (BT 31) 
 
Foundational projects like those mentioned above are regional ontologies. Their goal is to 
delimit the basic ontological categories by articulating basic, joint-carving concepts. A 
more basic investigation—the one Heidegger begins in Being and Time—is required to 
account for how a priori, ontological knowledge is possible. This is the question of the 
meaning of being, and just as in Husserl, it takes the form of a regional ontology of 
intentionality. 
 Note that on the first page of Being and Time, quoted above, Heidegger quickly 
moves from asking what ‘being’ means to suggesting that we lack a sense of what this 
question is even asking. I suggest that getting clear on how it’s possible to determine 
what ‘being’ means is the real task of the question of the meaning of being. This 
interpretation is bolstered by the fact that for Heidegger, Sinn does not refer solely or 
primarily to linguistic meaning. Heidegger defines Sinn as follows: “Meaning is the 
‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as 
something…” (BT 193). Crucially, Sinn is an existentiale (essential feature) of Dasein. 
Furthermore, the question of the meaning of being “asks about being itself insofar as 
being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein” (BT 193). Putting this all together: to 
determine the meaning of being is to determine the essential structure of Dasein in virtue 
of which being can become intelligible to it. In other words, it’s to determine how 




is why Heidegger suggests on the penultimate page of Being and Time that he had been 
providing “ontological grounds for ontology” (BT 437).  
 Ontological knowledge is phenomenologically grounded in two ways. First, 
phenomenology, as an ontology of intentionality, investigates the essences of experience, 
meaning, and knowledge with an aim of vindicating a claim to a priori knowledge. Call 
this phenomenology’s ‘foundational role’. Second, the method of phenomenology—
namely, eidetic variation—delivers ontological knowledge. Call this phenomenology’s 
‘methodological role’. Though the method is not given explicit attention in Being and 
Time, Heidegger does note that Husserl’s a priori method has “given us the necessary 
tools” to develop a “genuine philosophical empiricism” (BT 75n). McDaniel argues that 
Heidegger endorses a “two domains” view on phenomenological grounds so understood: 
“The present-at-hand show themselves as independent, whereas the ready-to-hand show 
themselves as dependent” (“Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Material Beings,” 344). I agree 
with McDaniel that Heidegger thinks we intuit essential properties, but my view diverges 
from his in emphasizing the foundational role of phenomenology. In one sense, this is 
just a friendly addition to McDaniel’s view; in another, though, it marks a divergence in 
how we understand the “meaning of being” question. On McDaniel’s reading, to answer 
the question of the meaning of being is to “provide informative necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being an entity” (BT 14). On my reading, it is to determine the essential 
features of the ontological questioner in virtue of which experience and knowledge, 
including experience and knowledge of being, are possible.  




The interpretation on offer here does justice to both the phenomenological and 
metaphysical strands in Heidegger’s early thought. It follows metaphysical realist 
interpreters in seeing Heidegger as attempting to “carve reality at the joints” with his 
distinctions between presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, existence, life, and subsistence. 
In spelling out this part of Heidegger’s project, it distinguishes between the elements that 
belong to formal ontology and those that belong to regional ontology. In formal ontology, 
Heidegger rejects the primacy of substance stemming from Aristotle; in regional 
ontology, he develops sketches of ontologies of artifacts, persons, and artworks that 
anticipate recent work in social ontology. It also explains the complex relationship 
between this metaphysical project and phenomenology: phenomenology serves a 
foundational and methodological role for ontology and is itself a regional ontology of 
intentionality. If this account is correct, it goes some way toward defending the unity and 
coherence of Being and Time in light of its curious blending of resources from a variety 





Chapter Two: Hermeneutics in Heidegger’s Science of Being 
 
Early in the Prolegomena Kant remarks that “[i]f it becomes desirable to present any 
cognition as science, it will be necessary first to determine exactly its differentia, which 
no other science has in common with it and which constitutes its peculiarity” (9). The 
peculiar feature of a science “may consist of a simple difference of object, or of the 
sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps of all three conjointly” 
(Ibid.). In his SS 1927 Marburg lectures Heidegger dubs his philosophy a “science of 
being” (Wissenschaft vom Sein) (BPP 11). Applying the Kantian rubric, the purpose of 
this chapter is to identify the source and kind of cognition of Heidegger’s science against 
the backdrop of interpreters who believe Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be a science. 
 The extant portion of Being and Time is, in John van Buren’s phrase, a 
“multilayered palimpsest” of influences and drafts (The Young Heidegger, 238); a study 
of Heidegger’s development from his “hermeneutic breakthrough” in KNS 1919 (Kisiel, 
Genesis, 21) through the twenties sees him approaching his subject matter from 
Aristotelian, Augustinian, Kantian, Diltheyan, and Husserlian angles, among others. The 
sheer diversity of approaches makes the task of determining the peculiar features of his 
science difficult: was Heidegger’s science modeled after Aristotle’s science of being qua 
being, Kant’s critical attempts to secure a scientific path for metaphysics, or Husserl’s 
conception of phenomenology as rigorous science? Or was his project something 
different altogether—a primordial or original science (Urwissenschaft) more basic than 




It’s natural to worry that the interlocking phenomenological, ontological, 
hermeneutical, and existential threads of Being and Time form a “not-obviously-stable 
concoction” (Martin, “Semantics of ‘Dasein’,” 100). Indeed, a number of commentators 
have argued that the hermeneutical approach Heidegger draws from Wilhelm Dilthey is 
flatly incompatible with any aspiration to make his philosophy a “science.” In the 
following, I will assess four such “anti-scientific” interpretations of Heidegger’s method: 
Cristina Lafont’s “hermeneutic idealist” reading; Herman Philipse’s critique of 
Heidegger’s projective theory of interpretation; William Blattner’s hypothesis about the 
demise of the Being and Time project; and Paul Ricoeur’s account of the relationship 
between phenomenology and hermeneutics. I argue that these interpretations rest on 
misinterpretations of three central concepts of Heidegger’s early thought: the 
understanding of being, the hermeneutical situation, and phenomenological destruction. 
After a historical excursus on the “identity-crisis of philosophy” to which Heidegger’s 
early thought attempts a response (§1), I turn in §2 to a description of what I call 
Husserl’s “scientific conception of phenomenology.” In §3 I show how Lafont, Philipse, 
Blattner, and Ricoeur see Heidegger as rejecting, or unable to consistently accept, the 
scientific conception. Finally, in §4 I offer interpretations of the role of the above-
mentioned concepts in Heidegger’s early method and argue that he refines rather than 
rejects the scientific conception. Husserl’s method has to be refined, on Heidegger’s 
view, in order to correct distortions that are introduced when phenomenological inquiry is 
“infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about being” (BT 25). 




Beginning in his KNS 1919 lectures and continuing throughout the twenties, Heidegger 
tries to situate his philosophy in terms of the opposition of “science” (Wissenschaft) 
versus “worldview” (Weltanschauung). This opposition points back to what Herbert 
Schnädelbach calls the “identity-crisis of philosophy” (Philosophy in Germany, 5 et 
passim). With the decline of German idealism after Hegel’s death and the increased 
specialization of the positive sciences, it became unclear what method and subject matter 
was left over for philosophy. A standard neo-Kantian response was that the proper 
subject matter of philosophy was epistemology in the sense of a Wissenschaftslehre, i.e., 
a theory of science taking its cue from Kant’s critical project. Neo-Kantianism, founded 
on Otto Liebmann’s exhortation to go back to Kant, also sought, in Wilhelm 
Windelband’s words, to go beyond him. This extension of the critical spirit is perhaps 
best exemplified by the work of Ernst Cassirer. On Cassirer’s view, scientific 
developments like group theory (Substance and Function), relativity theory (Einstein’s 
Theory of Relativity), and quantum mechanics (Determinism and Indeterminism in 
Modern Physics), as well as studies in linguistics, ethnology, and psychological 
pathology (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms), provide confirmation of the central 
Kantian insight into the symbolically-mediated spontaneity of the human mind. 
 Just as Kant in the Prolegomena asks what makes pure natural science possible, 
Windelband and Heinrich Rickert of the Baden school of neo-Kantianism ask what 
method and intellectual functions underlie the historical or human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften). Windelband famously distinguishes the “nomothetic” method of 




investigates how values determine which individual events and persons the historian 
singles out for study. The efforts of the Baden neo-Kantians to secure autonomy for the 
human sciences overlap with those of the historicist school of Niebuhr, Ranke, Droysen, 
Burckhardt, and Dilthey, who despite internal methodological and doctrinal 
disagreements rally around the principle that “everything that happens in history must be 
explained within history and according to specifically historical methods,” without 
recourse to reductively naturalistic explanations or speculative metaphysics (Beiser, 
“Historicism,” 157). 
 The opposition between science and worldview reaches its starkest expression in 
Husserl’s 1911 essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science.” There he opposes his conception 
of phenomenology to the (to his mind) relativistic and skeptical alternatives of naturalism 
and historicism. The arch-historicist of this essay is Wilhelm Dilthey. Husserl cites what 
he takes to be a bald statement of relativism characteristic of historicism: “...the 
formation of a historical consciousness destroys more thoroughly than does surveying the 
disagreement of systems a belief in the universal validity of any of the philosophies that 
have undertaken to express in a compelling manner the coherence of the world by an 
ensemble of concepts” (cited in PRS 186). It’s worth noting in passing that Dilthey 
disputes the charge of relativism in correspondence with Husserl shortly before Dilthey’s 
death. Whether Husserl’s accusation is ultimately just is not so important here. What is 
important is that we have some indication of why Husserl may have seen Dilthey as an 




Heidegger follows Dilthey in this respect—even if the Dilthey at issue is somewhat of a 
caricature.   
 Like other members of the historicist school, Dilthey frames his work in 
opposition to two tendencies: naturalism and metaphysics. Naturalism appears in the 
guise of “explanatory psychology,” which “tries to subsume mental phenomena under a 
causal nexus by means of a limited number of unambiguously defined elements” 
(Dilthey, “Descriptive and Analytical Psychology,” 88). Dilthey contrasts this 
explanatory approach to the mind with his “descriptive and analytic psychology,” which 
studies the structural and teleological connections between cognitive, emotional, and 
volitional life, drawing data not only from individual introspection but also from the 
realms of “language, myth, religious tradition, custom, law” and “the works of men of 
genius” (“Descriptive and Analytical Psychology,” 93). Dilthey analyzes the history of 
metaphysics into three worldviews—naturalism, the idealism of freedom, and objective 
idealism—which also find expression in religion and poetry. A worldview emerges when 
a great personality, in whom one aspect of mental life is accentuated, “takes his own 
corner for the whole world” (Dilthey, “Present-day Culture,” 115). 
 For Dilthey, then, the significance of “historical consciousness” is that it 
undermines the pretensions to truth (or truth-aptness) of metaphysical systems by 
psychologizing them. In this respect, Dilthey’s theory of worldviews evinces interesting 
similarities with an opponent of metaphysics from a different philosophical tradition: 
Rudolf Carnap. For Dilthey, basic attitudes of varying shades of optimism and pessimism 




enigma of life on the basis of the experiences in which the individual’s varied 
relationships of life are reflected” (“Types of World-View,” 137). Carnap offers an 
expressivist analysis of metaphysical discourse: “The (pseudo)statements of metaphysics 
do not serve for the description of states of affairs... They serve for the expression of the 
general attitude of a person towards life” (“Elimination of Metaphysics,” 78). Carnap 
mentions Dilthey as someone who has “clarified the way in which the basic attitude is 
manifested through the style and manner of a work of art” (“Elimination of 
Metaphysics,” 79). Art is the adequate expression of a basic attitude, whereas 
metaphysics is inadequate because ‘through the form of its works it pretends to be 
something that it is not’ (“Elimination of Metaphysics,” 79). 
 As Wayne Martin points out, Heidegger’s study of Dasein’s Existenzialien in 
Being and Time is surely indebted to Dilthey’s “critique of historical reason,” which sets 
out to identify the “categories of life” that underlie the understanding of historical 
phenomena (“Semantics of ‘Dasein’,” 101-2). The guiding question in the following is 
whether the Heidegger of Being and Time, avowedly or despite himself, is committed to 
the kind of historical relativism Husserl attributes to Dilthey. Lafont reads Heidegger as 
explicitly endorsing this relativistic position. Others worry that Heidegger’s relativism is 
more subterranean. For instance, commentators have long been puzzled by Heidegger’s 
admission that his analysis of authenticity in Division II is guided by “a definite ontical 
way of taking existence, a factical ideal of Dasein” (BT 358). Kisiel worries that this 
admission threatens to “[open] up the old Pandora’s box of worldviews which can 




430). Philipse embraces a suspicious reading of Heidegger’s work as advancing a hidden 
religious agenda. In light of Heidegger’s aspirations to develop a “science of being,” 
interpreters are saddled with the question of whether these tendencies in Heidegger’s 
thought are compatible, or whether, in Carnap’s words, Being and Time “pretends to be 
something that it is not.” 
§2 Husserl’s Scientific Conception of Phenomenology 
This section is devoted to laying out the basic features of Husserl’s conception of 
philosophy as a rigorous science. For Husserl, scientific philosophy is (a) eidetic, (b) 
intuitive, and (c) propositionally articulated. In §3 I examine interpretations on which the 
Heidegger of Being and Time does or should reject one or more of (a), (b), and (c). On 
these interpretations, whatever Heidegger might intend by the phrase “science of being,” 
it cannot consistently express a commitment to the Husserlian conception of philosophy.   
Husserl’s phenomenology begins with the question of how a priori knowledge is 
possible.  In the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations, he unleashes an onslaught of 
arguments against psychologism, the view that psychological facts are the truth-makers 
for logical laws. Contra psychologism, logic is a science concerned with ideal facts that 
are known a priori. The six Logical Investigations go on to investigate meaning (I), the 
distinction between the ideal and the real (II), mereology (III), a priori grammar (IV), 
consciousness (V), and knowledge (VI) with the aim of showing how “the ideality of the 
universal qua concept or law enter[s] the flux of real mental states and become an 
epistemic possession of the thinking person” (LI v.1 169). The upshot of these 




mathesis universalis (logic, mathematics, formal ontology), the realm of the synthetic a 
priori (material or regional ontology), and ordinary perceptual knowledge.  
The central concept in Husserl’s analysis of knowledge is fulfillment (Erfüllung). 
An act of fulfillment is a founded or higher-order act that synthesizes an act of empty 
thought with an intuition of the very object that the thought is about: “What the intention 
means, but presents only in a more or less inauthentic and inadequate manner, the 
fulfillment... sets directly before us... In fulfillment our experience is represented by the 
words: ‘This is the thing itself’” (LI v.2 226-7). The epistemic gold standard is fulfillment 
through an originary intuition, that is, an intuition through which an object is given “as it 
is in itself ‘in person’,” in contrast to a mere re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) like 
memory or image consciousness (Id 13). This is the point of the Principle of All 
Principles: “...each intuition affording [something] in an originary way is a legitimate 
source of knowledge... [W]hatever presents itself to us in ‘Intuition’ in an originary way 
(so to speak, in its actuality in person) is to be taken simply as what it affords itself as, 
but only within the limitations in which it affords itself there” (Id 44). 
 Husserl argues that essences are given in an originary way through a distinctive 
kind of intentional act called “ideation” or “eidetic intuition.” In the second Logical 
Investigation Husserl criticizes nominalist theories of abstraction for failing to recognize 
the difference in “act-character” between intentions directed toward particulars and those 
directed toward universals.23 An eidetic intuition is a founded act built off of an intuition 
																																																								
23  C.f. Husserl’s 1904-5 lectures on intuitive re-presentations (phantasy, image consciousness, and 
memory), where he criticizes Brentano and contemporary psychologists for trying to account for the 




of a particular instance of a property. It’s important to note here that in Husserl’s widened 
sense of ‘intuition’, acts of imagination are intuitive, though non-originary.24 Thus not 
only a perception of a particular, but a mere phantasy presentation of a particular, can 
sustain a founded act of eidetic intuition. Husserl understands the transition from singular 
intuition to universal intuition in terms of his content-interpretation (Inhalt-Auffassung) 
schema: the very same sensations or “hyletic data” that present a red ball, differently 
interpreted or “animated,” can present the universal redness (LI v.1 239-40).25 
 Ontological knowledge is a priori, and ontology falls into two parts: formal and 
regional ontology. The former furnishes categories that characterize objects of any 
possible genus, such as “property, relative constitution, state of affairs, relation, identity, 
sameness, set (collection), number, whole and part, genus and species, and so forth” (Id 
23). The latter studies the material essences of various highly general “regions,” such as 
nature, consciousness, and culture (Smith, Husserl, 157). For Husserl “immediately 
‘seeing’... is the ultimate source of legitimacy of all rational claims,” and this holds for 
ontological knowledge no less than empirical knowledge (Id 36). Relations of 
compatibility, incompatibility, and necessary co-instantiation among universals are 
																																																																																																																																																																					
supposed to be something without differentiation, it becomes differentiated only according to its contents. 
But then what happens with the differences between perceptual presentation, phantasy presentation, and 
symbolic presentation? Between intuitive and noninuititve presentation, categorial and sensuous 
presentation, and so on? How are these supposed to be reduced to differences in bare content?” (PICM 9). 
24 Husserl’s full taxonomy of features of intentional acts is incredibly sophisticated. Husserl distinguishes 
between empty and intuitive, originary and non-originary, direct and indirect, and positing and non-positing 
(with gradations in between) acts. He further distinguishes acts in terms of their proprietary regions of 
objects.   
25 See LI V §14. The content-interpretation model is exemplified in Husserl’s example of perceiving a wax 
figure in the Panopticum Waxworks that initially appears to be a woman (LI V §27). Walter Hopp, 
“Husserl on Sensation,” has doubts about the coherence of the model, and he offers an alternative account 





discovered through the method of eidetic variation. Husserl’s most extensive discussions 
of the method occur in two late-career works, Formal and Transcendental Logic and 
Experience and Judgment. Essential seeing 
 ...is based on the modification of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into 
an arbitrary example which, at the same time, receives its character of a guiding ‘model’, 
a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants. It is 
based, therefore on a variation... by an act of volition we produce free variants... It then 
becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in 
such free variations... an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, 
without which an object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would not be 
thinkable at all. While what differentiates the variants remains indifferent to us, this form 
stands out in the practice of voluntary variation, and as an absolutely identical content, an 
invariable what, according to which all the variants coincide: a general essence. (EJ 340-
1) 
 
Husserl employs the method of eidetic variation throughout his career. In his 1894 essay 
“Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic,” Husserl draws the important distinction 
between dependent parts (moments) and independent parts (pieces) in terms of variability 
in phantasy. Eidetic variation is employed in Investigation VI §§1-5 to show that the 
contents of perception and judgment are distinct by showing that they are independently 
variable. Ideas II traces the constitution of material and animal nature and the spiritual 
world by varying out the “horizonal intentions” essential to acts that afford objects of 
various types. Finally, the thought experiment of the destruction of the world in Ideas 
employs eidetic variation to reveal the essential modes of givenness of transcendent and 
immanent objects (Id 88).  
 Phenomenology is an eidetic science—namely, a “doctrine of the essences of the 
transcendentally purified consciousness” (Id 109). As a science, it consists in an 
evidentially grounded “interconnection of truths” (LI v.1 144). Husserl flags a number of 




‘sensation’, ‘perception’, and ‘presentation’ and the tendency to interpret meaning, 
experience, and knowledge in naturalistic terms (LI v.1 170-1). Yet while he recognizes 
these difficulties, he is clear that they do not stand in the way of the possibility of stating 
and communicating self-evident truths that can be independently confirmed by properly 
trained specialists.  
 Many interpreters regard Heidegger’s hermeneutical refinement of 
phenomenology as entailing a rejection of Husserl’s scientific conception of 
phenomenology as (a) eidetic, (b) intuitive, and (c) propositionally articulated. Moreover, 
some of these interpreters see Heidegger’s incorporation of hermeneutical themes into 
phenomenology as entailing the kind of relativist or expressivist construal of 
philosophical claims suggested by Dilthey’s theory of worldviews. In the next section, I 
survey four such “anti-scientific” interpretations of Being and Time. I suggest that an 
evaluation of their merits and shortcomings requires a fresh analysis of Heidegger’s 
notions of the understanding of being, the hermeneutical situation, and phenomenological 
destruction. 
§3 Anti-Scientific Interpretations of Being and Time 
 3.1 Lafont: Hermeneutic Idealism 
As I have done above, Lafont situates Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of 
phenomenology in the context of the clash between scientific and worldview conceptions 
of philosophy. The neo-Kantians and Dilthey alike were faced with the “unprecedented 
difficulty” of how to “reconcile the transcendental and the historical without sacrificing 




manages this reconciliation by (i) rethinking the empirical/transcendental distinction in 
terms of the ‘ontological difference’ and (ii) by rejecting a traditional subject/object 
model of experience in favor of a picture of human beings as self-interpreting  creatures 
in a symbolically structured world. These two innovations bring some heavy baggage in 
tow: “a commitment to conceptual pluralism and a strong incommensurability thesis” 
that entail an “opposition to any kind of metaphysical realism” (“Hermeneutics,” 269) 
and, ultimately, a denial of the coherence of “objective knowledge of the empirical 
world” (“Hermeneutics,” 282). Signaling the transformation that Kant’s transcendental 
idealism undergoes in virtue of Heidegger’s hermeneutics, Lafont calls Heidegger a 
“hermeneutic idealist” (“Hermeneutics,” 269). 
 Lafont understands the roles of the understanding of being and the hermeneutical 
situation in terms of the slogan “meaning determines reference.” Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical notion of world is introduced to answer a question about how multiple 
individuals can attain reference to the same object. In order for common reference to be 
secured, interlocutors must possess some criteria for distinguishing the entity in question 
from other entities, and to do this they must share a linguistically articulated world 
including meanings like, e.g., table, door, carriage, and bridge (“Hermeneutics,” 275). 
The hermeneutical notion of world is distinguished from the traditional conception 
because “[w]hereas the former is supposed to refer to a single objective world… the latter 
admits of a plurality of worlds” (“Hermeneutics,” 273). But since different 
understandings of being give rise to reference to different objects, no sense can be made 




incommensurable. Heidegger thus manages to reconcile the transcendental and the 
historical by reinterpreting the Kantian synthetic a priori as “contingent, historically 
variable, plural” (“Hermeneutics,” 269). For Lafont, the resulting incommensurability 
thesis is too costly, and she argues that it could be avoided with the resources of direct 
reference theory (Putnam, Donnellan, Kripke) (see Lafont, Heidegger, Language, and 
World-Disclosure).  
 Lafont reads Heidegger as endorsing the kind of historical relativism Husserl 
finds objectionable in Dilthey. Her interpretation turns on understanding Heidegger’s 
notions of the understanding of being and the hermeneutical situation in terms of a 
historical a priori and the slogan “meaning determines reference.” In §4 I offer 
alternative interpretations of these hermeneutical concepts that don’t have the relativistic 
consequences Lafont draws from them.  
 3.2 Philipse: Applicative Interpretation and the ‘Pascalian Grand Strategy’ 
Philipse’s Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being offers a unified interpretation of the 
“question of being” throughout Heidegger’s career. Philipse identifies five “leitmotifs” 
that run through Heidegger’s work: (i) the meta-Aristotelian theme, (ii) the 
phenomenologico-hermeneutical theme, (iii) the transcendental theme, (iv) the Neo-
Hegelian theme, and (v) the postmonotheist theme. He distinguishes his approach to 
unifying these leitmotifs from unitarian interpretations and patchwork interpretations. 
Unitarian interpretations identify “one more or less precise meaning of Heidegger’s 
question of being throughout his philosophical career” (Philipse, Philosophy of Being, 




proposal for interpreting the first Critique) deny that there is any substantial unity to the 
competing threads in Heidegger’s thought. Against these styles of interpretation, Philipse 
argues that the five leitmotifs are unified by a “common grammar” of nine formal 
features (Philosophy of Being, 76). In addition to this “common grammar,” Philipse 
claims to uncover a “hidden religious agenda” behind Heidegger’s entire oeuvre.  
 Before spelling out more details of Philipse’s proposal, I should note that whereas 
his interpretation spans Heidegger’s entire career, mine is restricted to the works 
surrounding Being and Time. Nevertheless, there is still a serious question about how to 
unify the various philosophical themes of Being and Time. As Philipse points out, given 
the rushed publication of Being and Time one might be inclined to regard it as “a 
patchwork made out of many different materials that Heidegger borrowed from others 
and transformed to suit his purposes, materials that do not fit together very well” 
(Philosophy of Being, 71). Given my aims in this chapter, my focus on the incoherence 
Philipse claims lies at the heart of Heidegger’s combination of hermeneutics and 
phenomenology, viz. Heidegger’s theory of interpretation. 
 Philipse argues that though “Heidegger often uses Husserl’s rhetoric of 
objectivity, of things themselves, of phenomena that show themselves, and of 
phenomenology as the method of letting us see beings as they are… his conception of 
hermeneutics and of the hermeneutical circle undermines the justification for using this 
rhetoric” (Philosophy of Being, 120). More precisely, Philipse sees a tension between 
Heidegger’s “projective theory of interpretation” and his assumption that “there must be a 




projects” (Philosophy of Being, 57). Philipse distinguishes between “theoretical” and 
“applicative” interpretations.  
While theoretical, historical interpretations aim at discovering what a text meant in the 
historical circumstances in which it was written, applicative interpretations purport to 
apply texts in order to do specific things in present situations, that is, to carry out 
‘projects’, or in order to illuminate our present existence. (Philosophy of Being, 59) 
 
Heidegger supposedly fails to recognize this distinction: “Heidegger’s projective theory 
of interpretation, then, shows an applicative bias because he generalizes to all 
interpretations a theory of interpretation that is correct for applicative interpretations 
only” (Philosophy of Being, 59). Moreover, the projective theory of interpretation is self-
contradictory. The self-contradiction comes out most clearly, on Philipse’s reading, in 
Heidegger’s claim that all interpretations are “violent” (BT §63): “Either some 
interpretations may be called violent, if measured by the standard of more objective and 
historically adequate interpretations, or, if all interpretations are ‘projective,’ it simply 
does not make sense to speak of violent interpretations” (Philosophy of Being, 58).  
 If Philipse is correct in his analysis of Heidegger’s theory of interpretation, then 
what is the “project” or “ontic ideal” (Philosophy of Being, 56-7, 119) in terms of which 
Heidegger interprets human existence? This is where Philipse’s theory of the “Pascalian 
Grand Strategy” comes into play.  
First, by a purely secular analysis of the human condition he had to convince his readers 
that everyday life is inauthentic, and that authenticity consists in anticipating death with 
dread, in facing up to existential guilt, and in many other unpleasant things. The 
ontological analysis of Dasein had to be secular in order to convince the unbeliever, and 
it had to paint life in this world in dark and gloomy colors in order to arouse the craving 
for religion. The second phase was to satisfy this religious craving by explicitly 
metaphysical writings such as Was ist Metaphysik? (Philipse 1998, 372) 
 
Philipse in effect applies the expressivist analysis of metaphysics alluded to in §1 to 




simply an expression of his basic attitude toward life hidden under a pretense to 
objectivity, and Being and Time is just an instance of Heidegger taking his own corner for 
the whole world.  
 Philipse’s reading turns upon the claim that Heidegger’s denial of the possibility 
of a presuppositionless description, embodied in his theory of interpretation, is 
incompatible with the rhetoric of objectivity and essentialism that he draws from Husserl. 
In §4 I show how Heidegger’s theory of the hermeneutical situation is actually applied to 
his ontological interpretation and argue that it is perfectly compatible with Heidegger’s 
scientific aspirations.  
 3.3 Blattner: An Aporia in Being and Time 
Like the other views I’ve been discussing, Blattner identifies a prima facie tension 
between two themes in Heidegger’s early thought: a pragmatist theme and a 
transcendental theme. On the one hand, Heidegger endorses a “primacy of practice 
claim,” according to which “the intelligence and intelligibility of human life resides 
primarily in precognitive practice, and… cognition is derivative of such practice” 
(“Primacy of Practice,” 17). Blattner spells out this claim in terms of Heidegger’s 
contrast between understanding, i.e., pre-conceptual “absorbed coping,” and 
interpretation, i.e., explicit and conceptually articulate taking-as. On the other hand, 
Heidegger follows Kant in investigating a priori temporal structures that make our 
experience of objects possible. Blattner claims that the appearance of incompatibility 
between the pragmatist and transcendental themes is actually due to a third theme: the 




 In particular, Blattner claims that the primacy of practice claim, the transcendental 
investigation of a priori structures, and the conception of phenomenological ontology as 
conceptually articulated form an inconsistent triad. He explains: 
If phenomenological ontology is conceptually articulated and propositionally expressed, 
what does this tell us about the understanding of being to which it gives voice? It entails 
that the understanding of being can be captured in propositions… However, if the 
understanding of being can be captured in propositions, then it is… not understanding at 
all, but interpretation. Put the other way around, whatever it is that ontology puts into 
words, into cannot be an understanding of anything. (“Primacy of Practice,” 23) 
 
On Blattner’s reading, Heidegger resolves this inconsistency by abandoning a scientific 
conception of ontology in favor of an engagement with poetry after Being and Time. 
 Blattner reads Heidegger as forced to abandon the third component of Husserl’s 
scientific conception of phenomenology, viz. that it is propositionally articulated. His 
reading turns on a contrast between understanding and interpretation that supposedly 
makes the idea of propositionally articulating the understanding of being incoherent. In 
the course of developing my analysis of the understanding of being in §4 I will argue that 
the appearance of incoherence is based on a confusion.  
 3.4 Ricoeur: The Hermeneutical Presupposition of Phenomenology 
While Ricoeur presents his reflection on the relationship between phenomenology and 
hermeneutics as a statement of his own philosophical program, rather than a historical 
interpretation of Heidegger, he clearly believes that Heidegger introduced certain motives 
into phenomenology that require a rejection of some element of the scientific conception. 
More precisely, he understands the hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology as a 
rejection of “Husserlian idealism,” which comprises five theses: (1) Phenomenology aims 




justification is discovered through intuition; (3) Transcendence is dubitable and 
immanence is indubitable; (4) Transcendental subjectivity is not the object of 
psychology; and (5) Phenomenology has an ethical dimension in the notion of “self-
responsibility.” Given my aims here, my focus will be on the first two theses. 
 On Ricoeur’s view, the ideal of a “return to intuition is opposed by the necessity 
for all comprehension to be mediated by an interpretation” (“Phenomenology and 
Hermeneutics,” 89). Ricoeur understands ontological interpretation on the models of the 
interpretation of speech in conversation and the interpretation of a literary text. These 
modes of interpretation require, on the one hand, a recognition of the “polysemic value of 
words,” and on the other, the necessity of situating a speech act or text in the context of a 
historical tradition (“Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” 90). The ideal of an intuitive 
foundation supposedly requires, per impossible, an interpretation that although situated in 
a perspective can attain a “total vision” (“Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” 91).  
 This gloss of Ricoeur’s brief programmatic report can hardly do justice to his 
broader project of carrying the torch of hermeneutical phenomenology. Even limiting my 
attention to this short essay, I have been unable to explore his suggestion that, against the 
Husserlian conception of the transcendental subject, hermeneutical phenomenology must 
draw on the resources of psychoanalysis and ideology critique. My purpose in drawing on 
Ricoeur’s reflections on hermeneutical phenomenology is to raise the question of what 
role intuition plays in Heidegger’s method in Being and Time, and thus to what extent 




an answer to this question in my discussions of the hermeneutical situation and the 
phenomenological destruction in §4, to which I now turn. 
§4 The Hermeneutical Transformation of Phenomenology 
So far, I have articulated Husserl’s scientific conception of phenomenology as (a) eidetic, 
(b) intuitive, and (c) propositionally articulated and summarized four interpretations on 
which Heidegger’s injection of hermeneutical themes into phenomenology threatens one 
or more of these components. On Lafont and Philipse’s readings, the conception of 
phenomenology as eidetic is at least strained, and Heidegger is committed to the kind of 
relativism that Husserl found objectionable in Dilthey. On Blattner’s reading, an 
inconsistent triad of commitments in Being and Time forced Heidegger to abandon his 
conception of phenomenological ontology as scientific, i.e., propositionally articulated. 
Finally, on Ricoeur’s understanding of hermeneutical phenomenology, the interpretive 
nature of phenomenology requires an abandonment of the Husserlian goal of justifying 
one’s findings in intuition.  
 I have suggested that these anti-scientific interpretations rest on mistaken 
interpretations of Heidegger’s notions of the understanding of being and the 
hermeneutical situation. We will get a clearer vision of Heidegger’s novel blending of 
hermeneutical and phenomenological themes if we see how these notions are connected 
to a third: the phenomenological destruction. I now analyze these three hermeneutical 
concepts with the aim of showing the consistency of Heidegger’s method with the 
scientific conception of phenomenology.  




The understanding of being plays a dual role in the economy of Being and Time. On the 
one hand, a central result of the existential analytic is an analysis of the understanding of 
being as an essential feature of the entity under investigation, viz. Dasein. On the other 
hand, the understanding of being plays a central methodological role. We are said to 
possess a “vague average understanding of being” that guides our inquiry but that can 
also be “infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about being” (BT 25). In the 
following I elaborate on this dual role. First, the understanding of being has a 
transcendental status like that emphasized by Lafont and Blattner. Against these readers, I 
contend that this transcendental status is neither historical and contingent nor 
conceptually inexpressible. Second, the understanding of being is meant to undergird the 
kind of modal intuition Husserl appeals to in his method of eidetic variation. However, 
because the understanding of being can be “infiltrated,” a corrective to this eidetic 
method is required: phenomenological destruction. 
 Heidegger’s claim that “the understanding of being precedes all factual 
experience of entities” (BPP 11) is transcendental in that “it is occupied not so much with 
objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a 
priori” (A11/B25). Heidegger understands the claim as the true meaning of the 
Copernican turn: “The Copernican revolution states simply that ontic knowledge of 
beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge” (PIK 38). As is well known, 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant gives pride of place to the Schematism chapter. 
Indeed, he identifies the transcendental power of imagination, which is responsible for 




clue will show how Heidegger can assign a transcendental function to the understanding 
of being without endorsing hermeneutic idealism. 
 The Schematism chapter is the first chapter of the Analytic of Principles, 
following a short introduction on the power of judgment. In that introduction, Kant 
introduces a puzzle that is perhaps more familiar from Wittgenstein’s “rule-following 
consideration.” The power of judgment is the “faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of 
determining whether something stands under a given rule or not” (A132/B171). The 
power of judgment cannot itself involve the application of a rule, lest an infinite regress 
commence. Judgment, Kant concludes, “is a special talent that cannot be taught but only 
practiced” (A133/B172) and that ultimately rests on a “blind though indispensable 
function of the soul” (A79/B103), viz. the imagination.  
 The purpose of the Schematism chapter, then, is to shed some light on this 
mysterious faculty. Kant’s ultimate aim here is to explain how the categories can be 
applied to appearances, as the Transcendental Deduction argued they must. However, he 
first explains how subsumption is possible in the case of sensible concepts, both 
empirical and pure sensible (mathematical). Consider the empirical concept dog, for 
example. The ability to recognize a dachshund, a French bulldog, or a Great Dane as a 
dog cannot be explained by comparing what one sees with a mental image or a 
photograph. This is because an image lacks the generality of a concept. Mediating 
between the general concept and the particular, Kant concludes, is a “representation of a 
general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image,” i.e., a 




 This kind of recognition, however, presupposes that experience is structured such 
as to afford continuants. The categories, as pure concepts, cannot be represented in an 
image. The transcendental schemata, then, concern only the form of inner sense, viz. 
time. Transcendental schemata are “a priori time-determinations” (A145/B184). The 
thought here is that cognition of objects is only possible if  
the productive imagination can discover in the diversity of sensory experience a formal 
unity that is not grounded in rules, that cannot be explained by appeal to objects, images, 
or other determinate particulars, but that is a subjective yet universal condition of the 
applicability of the concept of an object in general—and hence a necessary condition of 
the objectivity and rationality of judgement (Bell 1987, 230).  
 
Only in virtue of a temporal synthesis that structures experience in terms of continuants 
(substances) is the more mundane kind of judgment involved in the application of the 
concept dog possible.  
 Schemata thus serve two functions in Kant’s project: first, they explain how one 
can subsume particulars under general, sensible concepts; second, they explain how 
experience attains the structure necessary for such judgments to be possible. Now while 
Heidegger is impressed by the doctrine of the schematism, especially by how it recasts 
“ontological knowledge” in a pre-conceptual, temporal form, he also thinks that Kant’s 
account only lays out the conditions of the possibility of experience of nature. It’s worth 
sketching, then, how Heidegger extends the doctrine of the schematism to account for 
experience of objects that are in a broad sense cultural.  
 Heidegger explicitly uses the term ‘schema’ in discussion of the “as-structure” of 
experience. All experience for Heidegger involves taking something as something, but 
this taking-as need not be explicit predication. In addition to the “apophantical ‘as’” of 




201). My suggestion is that whereas the first component of Kant’s doctrine of the 
schematism concerns the apophantical ‘as’ (predication), Heidegger’s notion of the 
understanding of being also encompasses the hermeneutical ‘as’. Moreover, I suggest that 
this component corresponds to Blattner’s “primacy of practice claim.” Following Hubert 
Dreyfus, Blattner interprets the understanding of being as a kind of “know-how” that 
undergirds our ability to respond contextually to solicitations in our environment without 
explicit, reflective thought. To follow out the analogy, the kinds of “absorbed coping” 
Dreyfus describes, including habitual activities like driving and skilled activities like 
playing basketball or chess, correspond in Heidegger’s treatment to the power of 
judgment in Kant’s. Like the power of judgment, engaging in these kinds of purposive 
activities cannot consist entirely in the application of rules, but must involve some kind 
of spontaneous capacity for recognizing gestalts in experience. 
 If this parallel holds up, we should expect Heidegger to extend Kant’s account of 
transcendental schemata to the experience of cultural objects. While the details of this 
appropriation are too complex to handle in detail here, I think it’s clear that Heidegger 
does in fact do this. Heidegger claims that “the existential-temporal condition for the 
possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality… has something like a horizon” 
(BT 416). He goes on to lay out three “horizonal schemata” that interpret components of 
the phenomenon of world in temporal terms: the “for-the-sake-of-which” in terms of the 
future, the “for-which” in terms of the past, and the “in-order-to” in terms of the present. 
Of course, Heidegger understands these modalities of time in non-standard ways. 




analysis, as well as the authentic and inauthentic modifications of primordial time, we 
can see the formal parallel between Kant’s account of transcendental schemata and 
Heidegger’s account of horizonal schemata. Transcendental schemata are pure “time-
determinations” in virtue of which objects can appear as continuants as such. Horizonal 
schemata are likewise pure “time-determinations” in virtue of which objects can so much 
as appear as worldly as such. The emphasis on ‘as such’ here indicates that these 
schemata do not account for objects appearing as any determinate kind, but only under 
formal categories like substance or ready-to-hand. Very crudely put, for Heidegger the 
possibility of entities showing up as involved in a world at all depends on the fact that we 
are the kinds of beings that project and retain an “ability-to-be” (Seinkönnen). This 
parallels Kant’s claim that the possibility of entities showing up as continuants at all 
depends on the form of inner sense, viz. time.  
 With this sketch of the transcendental role of the understanding of being in place, 
we can see where Lafont’s interpretation goes wrong. In its function as the analogue of an 
empirical schema, the understanding of being undergirds the hermeneutical ‘as’ of 
“absorbed coping” as a pre-conceptual, spontaneous recognition of gestalts in experience. 
The only “relativity” this implies is that whether a cultural object offers me solicitations 
for action and how fine-grained those solicitations are depend on whether I possesses the 
relevant practical skills. In its function as the analogue of the transcendental schemata, 
the understanding of being explains the fact that anything shows up for me as involved in 
a world at all, quite independently of whether I know how to handle it, or indeed what it 




without having the slightest clue what the thing is or what to do with it. (Of course, even 
if she did know what it was, she shouldn’t pick it up and start using it.) The archaeologist 
may lack the schemata for both the hermeneutical ‘as’ of circumspective concern and the 
apophantic ‘as’ of predicative judgment while still recognizing the artifact as something 
worldly (though presumably even this formal ‘as’ could misfire). But again, the fact that 
one is unfamiliar with the world in terms of which the artifact’s nature is defined doesn’t 
imply any kind of “conceptual pluralism,” “strong incommensurability thesis,” or denial 
of metaphysical realism.  
 I said above that, in addition to its transcendental role, the understanding of being 
plays a methodological role. This role can be brought out by analyzing the claim that 
“[e]ven the phenomenological ‘intuition of essences’ is grounded in existential 
understanding” (BT 187). As Martin points out, Being and Time is full of “modally 
qualified” claims, i.e., claims about necessary or essential features of Dasein and other 
entities (“Semantics of ‘Dasein’,” 102). Martin investigates how Heidegger might justify 
modally qualified claims on the basis of descriptions without incurring the heavy 
epistemological and metaphysical costs of Husserl’s theory of eidetic intuition. I am 
sympathetic to Martin’s suggestion that Heidegger wants to justify modal claims without 
appealing to “modal objects” that we intuit through a special kind of act. It’s clear, 
however, that he does find something appealing, though in need of further elaboration, in 
Husserl’s theory of eidetic intuition: 
Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any 
genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. ‘A-priorism’ 
is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself. There is nothing 




phenomenal basis be properly prepared. The horizon which is closest to us, and which 
must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness. (BT 75n) 
 
In §4.3 I will unpack the idea that “the phenomenal basis” for a priori research has to be 
prepared in terms of the method of phenomenological destruction. In this subsection I 
will spell out why Heidegger thinks that Husserlian eidetic intuition is founded in 
existential understanding.  
 John Scanlon raises a version of Meno’s paradox against Husserl’s theory of 
eidetic variation:  
If the method is meant to achieve knowledge of eide, how can anyone be asked, in 
advance, to select an instance of an eidos and then to imagine a series of arbitrarily varied 
instances of the same eidos?  If I do not know what green is, I cannot be expected to 
select an instance of green and then to vary additional instances arbitrarily, while 
remaining steadfastly in the scope of green.  On the other hand if I already know what 
green is, I do not require a cumbersome method to acquire the knowledge I already enjoy. 
(“Eidetic Method,” 169) 
 
David Kasmier (2010) defends Heidegger’s method by distinguishing between the 
capacity to recognize instances of F and recognizing lawful interconnections between 
Fness and other universals. Now one might push Scanlon’s objection further and argue 
that the capacity to recognize instances of F presupposes knowledge of what Fness is, and 
thus knowledge of these kinds of lawful interconnections. The theory of recollection 
emerges in the Meno as a way to explain this antecedent capacity.  
What is interesting in this connection is that Heidegger seems to analogize his 
own method to the theory of recollection in the lectures on Plato’s Sophist from WS 
1924-5: 
If one liberates this interpretation from everything mythical and presentifies the genuine 
meaning, then it can only signify that the basic accomplishment of synagogē [bringing 
together] is not at all obvious, not given immediately to man, but instead that it requires 
an overcoming of definite resistances residing in the very being of man himself, precisely 





The Phaedo describes these definite resistances as stemming from our embodiment: “The 
lovers of learning know that when philosophy gets hold of their soul, it is imprisoned in 
and clinging to the body, and that it is forced to examine other things through it as 
through a cage and not by itself, and that it wallows in every kind of ignorance” (82e). 
Heidegger’s demythologized appropriation of the Platonic theory points back to the 
claims, mentioned above, that the understanding of being both guides phenomenological 
inquiry and smuggles in potentially distortive theories and opinions about being.  
 Amie Thomasson defends a deflationary interpretation of Husserl’s theory of 
eidetic variation that puts it into close proximity with ordinary language philosophy. On 
this view, the business of philosophy is a kind of conceptual analysis that is “a priori—in 
the sense that we are concerned only with whether or not the concept would be properly 
applied or refused in various imagined cases…” Conceptual analysis in turn “relies on a 
prior ability to apply and refuse these concepts, but need not involve laying out a strict set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for their application” (Thomasson, “Conceptual 
Analysis,” 281). Whatever the merits of Thomasson’s interpretation of Husserl, her 
account has clear affinities with Heidegger’s. Indeed, Heidegger too notes that relying on 
a prior understanding of being does not require having an explicit concept of being, and 
thus his method is not viciously circular in the way Scanlon worries Husserl’s is (BT 27). 
Now there is surely a lot of philosophical work needed to fully spell out and defend this 
Heideggerian account of the a priori method of ontology. One question with a venerable 
historical lineage is why we should be confident that we have the right concepts, and thus 




Locke’s contrast between nominal and real essence.) That Heidegger is not moved by this 
form of skepticism (like other forms of skepticism) is, I think, indicated by his 
characterization of Dasein as “the clearing” or “the lighting” (die Lichtung). Heidegger 
explicitly links die Lichtung to Descartes’s lumen naturale, and in light of the 
Augustinian background of both Descartes’s and Heidegger’s thought I think we can also 
hear resonances of divine illumination. Heidegger’s claim that Dasein “is itself the 
clearing” may suggest a denial that our a priori knowledge requires a divine origin or 
guarantee, as it does for Descartes and proponents of divine illumination (BT 171). In the 
present context these will have to remain mere suggestions.  
 My interpretation of the understanding of being has the merits of undermining 
Lafont’s case for relativism and shedding some provisional light on Heidegger’s take on 
the eidetic and intuitive components of Husserl’s scientific conception of 
phenomenology. It also introduces a new interpretive burden, viz. to make sense of the 
claim that while the understanding of being guides ontological inquiry, it can also be 
“infiltrated.” I return to this claim in §4.3. Before turning to the next hermeneutical 
concept that plays a central role in anti-scientific readings of Being and Time, viz. the 
hermeneutical situation, let me address Blattner’s claim to have discovered an 
incompatible triad of philosophical commitments in Heidegger’s early work.  
 Recall that on Blattner’s diagnosis Heidegger runs into trouble in claiming that his 
phenomenological ontology can be scientific in the sense of conceptually articulated. 
This is because the transcendental structures Heidegger investigates are, in line with his 




“captured” in propositions, because otherwise it would be interpretation and not 
understanding. This argument relies on a number of conflations. First, there is a 
conflation between two questions Heidegger is trying to answer. On the one hand, he 
wants to distinguish various modes of being and determine how, while distinct, they are 
nonetheless unified. On the other hand, he wants to show how it’s even possible for us to 
answer the first question, i.e., he wants to show how ontology is possible.  
 Now given the methodological role of the understanding of being, to “capture” 
the understanding of being in propositions as an answer to the first question is to 
articulate propositions about what the understanding of being is of or about, viz. being. 
And there doesn’t seem to be anything self-stultifying about claims about the modes of 
being like the following: “Equipment is essentially ‘something in-order-to’” (BT 97). To 
“capture” the understanding of being as an answer to the second question is to articulate 
claims about the transcendental and methodological status of the understanding of being, 
as I have been doing. Blattner seems to assume that for a proposition to “capture” the 
understanding of being, grasping the proposition must suffice for possessing the 
understanding. Consider an analogy with perception. The possibility of phenomenology 
as a description of perception should not depend, I take it, on whether conceptualism or 
non-conceptualism about the content of perception is true. Whether or not perception has 
conceptual or propositional content, for instance, seems orthogonal to Husserl’s 
investigations of the horizonal structure of perception; its “doxic modalities”; its 
difference from mere thought, imagination, memory, and image consciousness; and so 




that perception is non-conceptual, it cannot be “captured” by propositions in a way that 
undermines the possibility of phenomenology. Perhaps Blattner would be happy with this 
conclusion, but it strikes me as trading on an equivocation or excessive vagueness in the 
notion of “capturing” understanding. I conclude that Blattner has not given us reason to 
think that Heidegger’s conception of his phenomenology as a science is unstable. 
 4.2 The Hermeneutical Situation  
The phrase ‘hermeneutical situation’ refers to the set of “presuppositions” of an 
interpretation, which comprises three components: a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-
conception (BT 275). Following Dilthey, Heidegger applies concepts originally at home 
in the theory of the interpretation of texts to account for our more general commerce in 
the world. On this broader understanding of hermeneutics, “[o]ntological knowledge is a 
possible kind of interpreting” and thus implicates a hermeneutical situation or “fore-
structure” (BT 275). As noted above, Philipse interprets Heidegger’s theory of 
interpretation as the view that all interpretations are “applicative,” interpreting their 
object only in the light of one’s “projects” or “projections.” This reading allows Philipse 
to search for the “project” underlying Heidegger’s interpretation of human existence, 
which he claims to locate in the so-called “Pascalian Grand Strategy.” 
 Philipse’s suspicious interpretation can be undermined first, by reflecting on the 
analogy between textual and ontological interpretation Heidegger draws, and second, by 
examining how the machinery of the fore-structure actually works in the ontological 
interpretation of Being and Time. Lafont glosses the theory of the hermeneutical situation 




vocabulary…” (“Hermeneutics,” 277). Consider how the hermeneutical situation might 
function in the interpretation of philosophical texts—Kierkegaard’s, say. Kierkegaard’s 
richly allusive and playful texts can be read and enjoyed by someone uninitiated to the 
practice of careful historical analysis of philosophical texts. Yet a certain set of 
“presuppositions” is a necessary condition for unlocking much of the meaning of the 
texts. For instance, an untrained reader is likely to draw little from Kierkegaard’s use of 
the term ‘mediation’ or his polemical references to “the system” without knowledge of a 
certain context, viz. Denmark in the 1840s, with Hegelianism waning in popularity but 
still exercising a considerable influence, and set of concepts, viz. those of Hegel’s 
system. Moreover, the notion of “subjective truth” is apt to strike such a reader as nothing 
more than a naïve (or heroic) gesture of irrationalism. The fore-structure of this 
interpretation clearly has nothing to do with “projecting” something into the text, and 
Heidegger is quite clear that one’s presuppositions are beholden to their object: 
“Philosophy will never seek to deny its ‘presuppositions,’ but neither may it simply admit 
them. It conceives them, and it unfolds with more and more penetration both the 
presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions” (BT 358, my 
emphasis). To return to my example, suppose that an interpreter has brought the Hegelian 
fore-structure to bear on the interpretation of Kierkegaard’s texts, only to find that so 
conceived, Kierkegaard appears to be misunderstanding Hegel, or reading him 
uncharitably, or changing the subject. One then sets out to tweak one’s fore-structure: 
perhaps Kierkegaard is not responding to Hegel himself, but to Danish Hegelians like 




Hegel, 2003). One then tests how well this fore-structure illuminates what is obscure in 
the text, and continues to modify it when the text throws up resistance.  
 To bring the point even closer to home, consider the knowledge of Heidegger’s 
historical context, his lectures throughout the 1920s, and the conceptual machinery of his 
many philosophical influences that I have brought to bear on the interpretation of Being 
and Time. I think no one would deny that reading Being and Time is enriched by having 
some background knowledge of Husserl, for example. Yet reasonable commentators can 
disagree with me either about the fore-structure I bring to bear on interpreting Being and 
Time—perhaps I have misunderstood Husserl on some crucial point—or whether the 
meaning I take my fore-structure to have unlocked is really there—perhaps the text is 
recalcitrant in response to my attempt to too neatly assimilate Heidegger’s conception of 
phenomenology to Husserl’s. While I believe that my interpretation is correct, it is not 
correct by fiat. These reflections suggest that Heidegger’s theory of interpretation does 
not efface the distinction between theoretical and applicative interpretations, as Philipse 
suggests. Moreover, they suggest a response to Philipse’s objection that Heidegger’s 
view that all interpretation is “violent” is self-contradictory. The meaning of Being and 
Time does not lie open for any unprejudiced observer to see; in Heidegger’s suggestive 
phrase, the meaning has to be “wrested” from the text (BT 61, 265, 359). But the 
meaning is there—if it is there—quite independently of my “projects.” 
 Even if the theory of the hermeneutical situation can be shown to be sensible in 
the case of the interpretation of a historical philosophical text, work still needs to be done 




consequences Philipse draws from it. Fortunately, this task can be fairly easily discharged 
by looking at Heidegger’s explicit comments on the fore-structures of various 
components of his analysis in Being and Time. The existential analytic moves through 
three hermeneutical situations. The fore-having of Division I is average everydayness. By 
approaching Dasein from this perspective various essential features (existentials) of 
Dasein are revealed: understanding, attunement, discourse, and falling. At the beginning 
of Division II, Heidegger worries that by approaching Dasein only from the perspective 
of everydayness, the ontological interpretation up to that point cannot claim 
“primordiality” (Ursprünglichkeit). The fore-having of everydayness confines the 
interpretation to “such existing as is either undifferentiated or inauthentic.” Division II 
has to be carried out with an eye to “the being of Dasein in its possibilities of authenticity 
and totality,” or to “Dasein as a whole” (BT 276).  
 Adopting this new fore-having reveals a host of new existential concepts: being-
toward-death, conscience, guilt, anticipatory resoluteness, and so on. Whereas the 
analysis of Division I revealed certain “modally undifferentiated” features of Dasein, i.e., 
features common to both inauthentic and authentic Dasein, as well as specifically 
inauthentic features (idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, etc.), Heidegger understands Division 
II as offering something like a theory of personal identity (BT 369). He later worries, 
however, that even the orientation toward authenticity has left out important features of 
Dasein. More specifically, he admits that the emphasis on Dasein’s relation to its death 
has been one-sided, making an analysis of the “connectedness of life” impossible (BT 




“death,” but also its “beginning” or “birth.” Heidegger turns to the analysis of 
historicality to fill in this omission.     
 Given my present aims, my overview of the shifting hermeneutical situation of 
the existential analytic has had to remain purely structural. That is, I haven’t been able to 
flesh out Heidegger’s theories of “self-constancy,” “the connectedness of life,” and so on. 
However, even this structural account goes a long way toward dispelling Philipse’s 
suspicious rendering of Heidegger’s theory of interpretation. Most crucially, the fore-
having of the existential analytic has to shift in the way outlined above in order to 
adequately capture its object: “our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular 
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-
structures in terms of the things themselves” (BT 195, my emphasis).  
 An alternative to Philipse’s rendering of Heidegger’s theory of interpretation still 
has to meet three desiderata. First, my account so far has focused only on the changing 
fore-having of the existential analytic. A fuller account needs to spell out the fore-
conception guiding Heidegger’s ontological interpretation. Second, I have not yet 
explained how the understanding of being or the hermeneutical situation guiding an 
ontological interpretation can be “infiltrated” by “fancies and popular conceptions,” and 
moreover how this danger can be avoided. Third, I have not offered an interpretation of 
Heidegger’s claim that Division II is guided by “a definite ontical way of taking 
existence, a factical ideal of Dasein” (BT 358). Even if I have replied satisfactorily to the 




theoretical and applicative interpretations, this puzzling admission leaves a lingering 
worry that Being and Time is a mere “projection” of a specific “worldview.”  I now begin 
to fill in these gaps through an interpretation of one more of the central hermeneutical 
concepts of Heidegger’s early project: phenomenological destruction. 
 4.3 Phenomenological Destruction  
The destruction of the history of ontology was to occupy the entirety of Part Two of 
Being and Time, and it was to be divided into three divisions on Kant’s doctrine of the 
schematism, the ontological foundations of Descartes’s cogito, and Aristotle’s discussion 
of time in Book IV of the Physics. Significant portions of the historical destruction are 
strewn throughout the 1920s: in the first Marburg lectures in WS 1923, the SS 1927 
lectures, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, and elsewhere. We’re given little 
guidance in Being and Time on how the phenomenological destruction is supposed to 
work. Heidegger introduces the method with an allusion to Kant’s quaestio facti, calling 
it “an investigation in which their ‘birth certificate’ is displayed” (BT 44, A86/B119). An 
investigation of the historical origins of ontological concepts, he adds, “has nothing to do 
with a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints”—a likely reference to the (possibly 
caricatured) Dilthey of Husserl’s “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (BT 44).  
 Heidegger’s most detailed discussion of phenomenological destruction occurs in 
the SS 1920 lectures Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression. Despite the winding 
path leading from this early lecture to Being and Time, there are clear echoes of this early 
account in the existential analytic. Indeed, while the historical destruction was planned 




paradigm for various conceptual destructions that are carried out in the published portion. 
These conceptual destructions shed considerable light on the first question raised above, 
viz. What fore-conception guides Heidegger’s ontological interpretation?  
 The SS 1920 lectures offer a “theory of philosophical concept formation.” As in 
Being and Time, Heidegger understands a central task of philosophy to be a clarification 
of “basic concepts” (Grundbegriffe), which “determine the way in which we get an 
understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a 
science takes as a theme” (BT 30). In Being and Time Heidegger analogizes this project 
to various foundational crises in mathematics, physics, biology, history, and theology, 
which are tantamount to crises in basic concepts like matter, life, organism, and faith. 
(No specific concepts are mentioned in the cases of mathematics and history, though 
Heidegger has in mind the formalist/intuitionist debate in the former case and Rickert and 
Windelband’s philosophies of history in latter case. See Chapter 3 for elaboration.)  
 A new method of philosophical concept formation is called for on Heidegger’s 
view because central philosophical concepts—presentation (Vorstellung), life, and 
history are his examples—are ambiguous, or better, polysemous.  
...meanings are clarified because they are unclear, because different meanings run 
confusedly through one another, that is because the word itself is ‘ambiguous’. In the 
‘ambiguity’, which is always at the same time also afflicted with an indistinctness of 
meanings, a multiplicity of meaning-directions is indicated, different meaning-complexes 
within different logical structure complications are pointed out. The latter themselves 
carry within them an expressive sense-relation to object areas which, according to their 
what-character, are more or less genuinely experienced and comprehended. (PIE 24) 
 
The notion of a “meaning-complex” is, I suggest, an ancestor to the hermeneutical 
situation. On Heidegger’s early account, one and the same philosophical term may, 




direction,” moreover, is fulfilled by a different basic experience (Grunderfahrung) (PIE 
25). In the SS 1920 lectures, Heidegger distinguishes six senses of ‘history’ that occur in 
ordinary language, anticipating the important distinction in Being and Time between 
history as a science (Historie), history as an occurrence (Geschichte), and Dasein’s 
historicality (Geschichtlichkeit or Historizität) (PIE 33-4). Already in KNS 1919, too, 
Heidegger notes the polysemy of ‘there is’ (es gibt), clearly anticipating the guiding 
question of Being and Time.26 
 What I’m calling the ‘conceptual destruction’, then, has four components: (1) 
exposing the polysemy of basic philosophical concepts (2) by recourse to ordinary 
language and (3) tracing the distinct senses attached to the word to the basic experiences 
that fulfill them by (4) letting different “object areas” be given. Note first that the phrase 
‘basic experience’ occurs once in Being and Time, when Heidegger claims that the 
hermeneutical situation of an ontological interpretation “needs to be clarified and made 
secure beforehand, both in a basic experience of the ‘object’ to be disclosed, and in terms 
of such an experience” (BT 275). Though there is no explicit elaboration in Being and 
Time on how this is supposed to work, the framework introduced in SS 1920 illuminates 
the multiple “conceptual destructions” that are central to the argumentative structure of 
the book. I will illustrate the method in action with four basic concepts: world, being-in, 
death, and birth.  
																																																								
26 “What does ‘there is’ mean? There are numbers, there are triangles, there are Rembrandt paintings, there 
are submarines.  I say ‘there is’ still rain today, that tomorrow ‘there is’ roast veal. A multiplicity of ‘there 
is’, each time with a different meaning, but in each case with an identical moment of meaning. Also this 
utterly flaccid meaning of ‘there is’, so to speak emptied of particular meanings, has precisely on account 
of its simplicity its manifold puzzles. Where can we find the meaningful motive for the meaning of ‘there 




 Heidegger famously (1) distinguishes four senses of ‘world’: (i) the totality of 
present-at-hand entities; (ii) the being of the entities in (i) or regions thereof (the “world 
of mathematics,” for instance); (iii) “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein can as such be said 
to ‘live’,” including “the ‘public’ we-world” and “one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) 
environment”; and (iv) the structure of worldhood in general (BT 93). It’s important to 
note that in distinguishing these senses of ‘world’, (2) Heidegger is not stretching the 
literal sense of the word. Rather, he’s trying to uncover a connotation that ‘world’ has in 
ordinary language, as when we speak of a “man of the world” or “the aristocratic world” 
(EG 120). Next, (3) Heidegger describes two “basic experiences” through which the third 
and fourth senses of ‘world’ are fulfilled: tool breakdown (BT §16) and responding to a 
car’s turn signal (BT §17). Finally, (4) the senses of ‘world’ are distinguished in terms of 
the entities to which they apply—the present-at-hand in the first two senses, and artifacts 
and persons (to give a somewhat contentious gloss to Heidegger’s term of art ‘Dasein’) in 
the last two senses. 
 The characterization of Dasein’s being as “being-in-the-world” requires a 
conceptual destruction not only of ‘world’, but also of ‘in’. Heidegger (1) distinguishes 
the sense of ‘in’ in ‘The water is in the glass’ from a sense that indicates dwelling, 
familiarity, and involvement (BT 79-80). Heidegger (2) offers a series of etymological 
connections to substantiate the latter sense of ‘in’, but it could perhaps be brought out 
more clearly by examples like ‘He is in love’ or ‘She is in a cult’. (3) The experience of 
anxiety has the peculiar function of exposing one’s existential involvement by omission, 




spatial containment sense of ‘in’ applies primarily to present-at-hand entities, while the 
involvement sense applies primarily to persons. 
 Finally, Heidegger (1) distinguishes the existential senses of ‘death’ and ‘birth’ 
from their biological senses. (2) The emphasis on ordinary language is less apparent in 
these cases, but we might think of examples like ‘He is dead to me’, ‘I feel dead inside’, 
and the Christian notion of rebirth. (3) Existential death and birth are experienced through 
the trio of basic experiences Heidegger (with clear debts to Kierkegaard) calls 
‘anticipatory resoluteness’, ‘repetition’, and ‘the moment of vision’. Finally, (4) the 
existential senses of ‘death’ and ‘birth’ apply primarily to persons or selves, rather than 
organisms. 
 What is important about these examples is first, that they help to clarify the fore-
conception of the existential analytic and second, that they bring to light the important 
role of some kind of experience or intuition in grounding Heidegger’s claims. First, 
consider that, in trying to bring out the inadequacy of traditional accounts of the mode of 
being of the subject, Heidegger contrasts the existentials that characterize Dasein from 
the categories that characterize other entities, connecting the latter to “the ontology of the 
ancients” (BT 70). It seems plausible, then, to identify at least part of the fore-conception 
of those approaches to the ontology of the subject Heidegger rejects with Aristotle’s 
categories. This doesn’t mean that Heidegger refuses to use terms like ‘substance’, 
‘essence’, ‘place’, ‘time’, and so on to characterize Dasein. On the contrary, these terms 
can be appropriately applied to Dasein once their polysemy has been teased out by 




substance (BT 255) and essence (BT 67) in terms of Dasein’s existence (Existenz), the 
analyses of space and place in BT §22-3, and the various kinds of time analyzed in 
Division II. Or even consider Heidegger’s chief term of art, ‘Dasein’, which under a 
different fore-having is at home on Kant’s table of the categories (A80/B106), but which 
in Heidegger’s use indicates the fact that the subject “brings its ‘there’ with it” (BT 171). 
As this last example suggests, Heidegger’s conceptual destructions sometimes rely on the 
peculiarities of the German language. Yet the examples of world, being-in, death, and 
birth plausibly show that the fore-conception of Heidegger’s analysis is meant to be 
drawn from more general features of ordinary language. By highlighting the everyday 
resonances of concepts employed by a tradition exclusively oriented toward the present-
at-hand, phenomenological destruction functions to “preserve the force of the most 
elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself” (BT 262). 
 Second, phenomenological destruction makes intuition, in the guise of basic 
experiences, the final tribunal for ontological claims. Against Ricoeur, then, Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology does not involve a rejection of the 
Husserlian return to intuition. On the contrary, Heidegger adopts Husserl’s eidetic and 
intuitive conception of phenomenology, with the caveat that the “phenomenal basis” for a 
priori research must be “properly prepared” by phenomenological destruction (BT 75n). 
Moreover, Heidegger sees a need to supplement Husserl’s method for reasons Husserl 
himself recognizes: basic philosophical concepts are ambiguous, and philosophers have 




170-1). Basic experiences like tool breakdown and anxiety, I suggest, do duty for eidetic 
intuition in Being and Time.27 
 Without the hermeneutical correction of phenomenological destruction, 
Heidegger claims that “one can... wind up actually intending the object in some manner, 
but a kind of surrogate will, without further explanation, have been inserted into one’s 
intuitions and concepts” (PW 9). Recall the dual methodological role assigned to the 
understanding of being: on the one hand, ontological interpretation is guided by a prior 
understanding of being, and on the other, this understanding may be “infiltrated with 
traditional theories and opinions about being” (BT 25). This raises a puzzle: if different 
hermeneutical situations allow us to intend different “object areas,” how can an 
ontological interpretation intend both its target object and a surrogate? On my preferred 
reading, the puzzle is resolved as follows. In Chapter 1, I suggested that the relation 
holding between an artifact and its matter or a person and its organism is not identity, but 
material constitution. Following Lynne Rudder Baker’s account of material constitution, 
constituting and constituted entities engage in two-way property sharing with one 
another. Each entity has nonderivative properties in virtue of its primary kind (e.g. 
person, artifact, organism, material object), as well as derivative properties in virtue of 
whatever entity it stands in a relationship of material constitution with. An interpretation 
that approaches artifacts or persons with the fore-conception of the Aristotelian or 
																																																								
27 This connection has been recognized by Kris McDaniel and Joseph Schear. McDaniel claims that 
“Heidegger follows Husserl in believing that essential features are given” and interprets tool breakdown as 
revealing that present-at-hand and ready-to-hand entities have different modal properties (“Heidegger’s 
Metaphysics of Material Beings,” 343). Similarly, Schear claims that ‘[b]reakdown… functions as an 





Kantian category schemes may well intend artifacts and persons, but the nonderivative 
properties of the target object will be passed over in favor of surrogate, derivative 
properties.  
 As an example, consider the analyses of death and birth. As I’ve shown, ‘death’ is 
polysemous for Heidegger, expressing different properties in different hermeneutical 
situations. Biological death and existential death are not only not identical, they are 
plausibly not even coextensional. Biological death is a property of organisms, and we can 
easily imagine a scenario where an organism is still biologically alive, yet the “possibility 
of the impossibility of any existence at all,” i.e., the impossibility of any projection of 
possibilities, has been realized (BT 307). Similarly, biological birth and existential birth 
are not only not identical, they are plausibly not even coextensional. Existential birth 
signifies a person’s inheritance of a tradition, and this clearly postdates biological birth. 
Nonetheless, due to what Heidegger sees as a traditional bias in favor of the present-at-
hand, a philosopher may set out to give an ontology of the person or self, but wind up 
cataloguing only its derivative properties, i.e., the properties it has in virtue of standing in 
a relation of material constitution to an organism.  
 So far in this subsection I have offered answers to two of the three questions I 
posed at the end of §4.2. The last question concerns Heidegger’s puzzling admission that 
his analysis of authenticity is guided “a definite ontical way of taking existence, a factical 
ideal of Dasein” (BT 358). This admission seems like grist to Philipse’s mill, as there is a 
longstanding impression among interpreters of Heidegger that the analysis of authentic 




and Kierkegaard. The worry this raises is that Heidegger’s analysis of authentic existence 
is nothing but a “disguised theology,”28 and Heidegger is overreaching by “modally 
qualifying” his findings as he does. 
 The ontic ideal does not expose Heidegger as advancing a hidden religious 
agenda. Rather, it is another instance of the method of phenomenological destruction 
quietly at work. Heidegger sees religious and mythical “worldviews,” like ordinary 
language, as more faithful expressions of existential facts than any preceding ontology of 
the subject. In his 1927-8 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology,” Heidegger discusses 
the relationship between the positive science of theology and philosophy as ontology. 
Theology’s task is to “grasp the substantive content and specific mode of being of the 
Christian occurrence, and to grasp it solely as it is testified to in faith and for faith” (PT 
47). While basic theological concepts can only be fully grasped through the existentiell 
commitment involved in faith, these concepts “include a content that is indeed 
existentielly powerless, i.e., ontically sublated, they are ontologically determined by a 
content that is pre-Christian and that can thus be grasped purely rationally” (PT 51). One 
of philosophy’s tasks is to uncover the existential, pre-Christian content of basic 
theological concepts. Heidegger’s example is sin, whose existential content is the concept 
of guilt analyzed in BT §58. Notice that in the section immediately following the 
admission of the ontic ideal, Heidegger repeatedly claims that this ideal “is not binding 
from an existentiell point of view” (BT 361). Philosophy applies “violence” in order to 
free “Dasein’s undisguised phenomenal content” (BT 360).  
																																																								





 Similarly, Heidegger claims that phenomenological ontology can benefit from a 
study of ethnological findings: “To orient the analysis of Dasein toward the ‘life of 
primitive peoples’ can have a positive significance as a method because ‘primitive 
phenomena’ are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation 
on the part of the Dasein in question” (BT 76). He makes the same point in the analysis 
of the fable of Cura, which is supposed to confirm that the interpretation of Dasein’s 
mode of being as care is part of its pre-ontological self-understanding (BT §42). Finally, 
in his review of the second volume of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms on 
Mythical Thought, Heidegger interprets the “mana-representation” as an expression of 
“the understanding of being that belongs to every Dasein as such” (KPM 188, second 
emphasis mine). In particular, mythical thought foregrounds Dasein’s thrownness.  
 Religious and mythical thought are, on Heidegger’s view, expressions of Dasein’s 
self-understanding unclouded by restrictive category schemes like Aristotle’s. Since a 
person or self is essentially something that exists, in Heidegger’s distinctive sense of that 
term, philosophy cannot help but begin by analyzing concrete modes of existence, 
religious modes of existence included. But that doesn’t mean that Heidegger’s philosophy 
is a mere expression of a religious worldview, as Philipse claims. Like the conceptual 
destructions outlined above, Heidegger is applying the method of phenomenological 
destruction to basic theological concepts without much methodological fanfare. The 
existential content of these concepts is, like the existential content of concepts like world, 
supposed to be capable of independent confirmation through some kind of basic 




been drawn to his vision of human existence is perhaps confirmation enough that 
Heidegger’s ontology is not, as he repeatedly insists, a mere Weltanschauung. 
§5 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by asking what the kind and source of cognition of Heidegger’s 
“science of being” are. I’ve argued that Heidegger adopts Husserl’s scientific conception 
of phenomenology as eidetic, intuitive, and propositionally articulated. I’ve considered 
four readings on which Heidegger is forced to reject one or more component of the 
scientific conception due to his hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology. Against 
Lafont, I argued that the transcendental role of the understanding of being does not imply 
relativism in any interesting sense. Against Blattner, I argued that the pre-conceptual 
nature of the understanding of being does not prevent us from “capturing” it in 
propositions. Against Philipse, I argued that Heidegger’s theory of interpretation provides 
a sensible model for the interpretation of historical philosophical texts. Moreover, I 
argued that neither Heidegger’s recognition of the presuppositional nature of ontological 
interpretation nor his admission of an ontic ideal underlying his analysis of authenticity 
warrant attributing to him a hidden religious agenda or “Pascalian Grand Strategy.” 
Against Ricoeur, I argued that Heidegger retains a crucial role for intuition in the 
justification of his claims. 
 Interpretive charity demands that an interpretation of Being and Time makes sense 
of it, to the greatest extent possible, as a unified whole of phenomenological, ontological, 
hermeneutical, and existential threads, rather than a disconnected heap of Heidegger’s 




through the notions of the understanding of being, the hermeneutical situation, and 
phenomenological destruction—as a necessary component of an intuitively grounded 
description (the phenomenological thread) of the essences of various regions of objects 
(the ontological thread), especially of persons or selves (the existential thread). If this 
account is correct, it goes some way toward showing that Heidegger’s early “science of 
being” is a reconciliatory response to the identity-crisis of philosophy that is both 




Chapter Three: The Truth of Existence: Husserl and Heidegger on Authenticity and 
Science 
In the first two chapters, I gave an account of what Heidegger’s “science of being” 
consists in—first in terms of its subject matter and then in terms of its method. Even if 
this account is plausible, it leaves a lot of questions about Heidegger’s “science” 
unanswered. In particular: If “Being and Time... is above all a metaphysical treatise” 
(Schear, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’, 270), what role does the existentialist study 
of authenticity play in its metaphysical project of determining what ‘being’ means? 
Heidegger’s puzzling answer is that authenticity is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for doing fundamental ontology: “The ontological ‘truth’ of the existential 
analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth [i.e. authenticity]. 
However, the latter does not necessarily need the former” (BT 364). As Charles Guignon 
glosses the point, “what Heidegger wants to show is that the goal of understanding the 
meaning of Being—that is, the job of ‘fundamental ontology’—is something that can be 
achieved only by a person who is, or at least fully understands what it is to be, authentic” 
(“Authenticity and the Question of Being,” 9). 
 Following Husserl, Heidegger also claims that ontology plays a foundational role 
with respect to the positive sciences. Both thinkers situate their philosophies against the 
background of the widespread crises in the foundations of the sciences in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Husserl’s diagnosis of this climate of crisis is that only 
phenomenology can save the positive sciences: 
 In most recent times the defectiveness of all positive sciences has been disclosed by the 




 as well as by the battle over the “paradoxes,” over the either genuine or merely apparent 
 evidentiality of the traditional basic concepts and principles in arithmetic, chronology, 
 and so forth. In light of the whole character of their method, the positive sciences can no 
 longer be considered genuine sciences—sciences that can completely understand and 
 justify themselves and that can sketch out sure paths for themselves with comprehensive 
 insight. Modern science can be liberated from this intolerable situation only by a 
 phenomenological reform. (EB 100, my emphasis) 
 
Following Husserl, Heidegger claims that each positive science has its foundations in a 
regional ontology that “can never in principle be developed by this science” (PIK 25). 
The working scientist, at least, is likely to find this kind of philosophical hubris comical. 
 In this chapter, I elucidate the foundational roles Husserl and Heidegger envision 
for phenomenology. As Lee Hardy points out, Husserl sees phenomenology as providing 
two kinds of foundation: first, a “phenomenological clarification of the conceptual 
foundations of the sciences,” and second, an investigation of the “transcendental ground” 
of the sciences (Nature’s Suit, 62). Heidegger marches in lockstep with Husserl on this 
score. My account begins in §1 with Husserl’s first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic, 
which not only investigates the basic concepts of arithmetic, but also introduces or 
anticipates important concepts of his phenomenology. In particular, Philosophy of 
Arithmetic employs a contrast between authentic and inauthentic cognition. In §2 I argue 
that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is, despite appearances, indebted to Husserl’s, 
and I elucidate the methodological role it plays in the broader Being and Time project. In 
§3 I turn to Heidegger’s attempt to clarify the conceptual foundations of the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), contrasting it with similar attempts made by his neo-
Kantian mentors. While my account may not entirely domesticate the somewhat heroic 
purpose Husserl and Heidegger envision for phenomenology, I will suggest some ways in 




§1 Husserl’s Analyses of Number, Knowledge, and Perception  
Husserl’s early works introduce three distinctions that remain central to his 
phenomenology throughout his career: (i) the distinction between two kinds of parts: 
dependent parts (moments) and independent parts (pieces); (ii) the distinction between 
the real and the ideal; and (iii) the distinction between empty (signitive, symbolic, 
inauthentic) intentional acts and filled (intuitive, authentic) intentional acts. These 
fundamental distinctions figure into the intentional schema of act, content, and object 
introduced in the Logical Investigations: Husserl analyzes intentional acts into their real 
(reell) moments of matter, quality, and fullness, distinguishes these moments from their 
ideal correlates, and rejects accounts of intentionality (like Brentano’s) that make the 
object of an act into an “inexistent” or real component of the act. The grave errors of 
naturalism are said to arise from the “extraordinarily widespread tendency to 
psychologize the eidetic,” that is, to fail to draw a distinction between realities and 
idealities (Id §61). The third distinction is the fundamental epistemic distinction in 
Husserl’s thought—indeed, the distinction that gives sense to the phenomenological 
injunction to “go back to the ‘things themselves’”’ (LI v.1 168). It occurs first in 
connection with the study of mathematics and logic in his 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic 
and 1894 “Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic,” after which it takes on a 
progressively more expansive role in his theories of knowledge and perception.  
Philosophy of Arithmetic is divided into two parts: the first concerns the 
psychological origins of the authentic concepts of multiplicity and number; the second 




our intuitive capacities. An account of the psychological origins of the concept of number 
is not, or at least not obviously, an early attempt to “psychologize the eidetic,” much less 
one that Husserl only recognized the errors in due to Frege’s scathing 1894 review.29 It is 
rather an exercise in what Husserl would later call the ‘phenomenology of constitution’—
an account of the essential features a mental act must possess in order to put us into 
direct, intuitive contact with its object. Husserl’s claim in the Philosophy of Arithmetic is 
that we can only be intuitively acquainted with—and thus possess authentic concepts 
of—the first twelve natural numbers, and this is in virtue of a process of collective 
combination and abstraction. Arithmetical thought beyond these numbers proceeds purely 
symbolically through the manipulation of numerals according to fixed rules. Dallas 
Willard argues that the symbolic nature of most arithmetical cognition led Husserl to an 
epistemological puzzle: “What is it about the order in the activities of the working 
mathematician, focused almost entirely upon things other than numbers and number 
relations, that nevertheless allows those processes to eventuate in a grasp of truths about 
numbers and number relations?” (Willard, Logic and Objectivity, 4). As we’ll see later, 
similar worries about the epistemic and ontological foundations of mathematics, 
culminating in the Grundlagenstreit between L.E.J. Brouwer and David Hilbert, were 
influential—if only by analogy—for Heidegger’s way of posing the guiding question of 
Being and Time.   
 Authentic number concepts arise from the representation of multiplicity through a 
complex act called ‘collective combination’. Husserl begins by noting that collective 
																																																								




combination can unite objects of any kind: ‘For example, certain trees, the Sun, the 
Moon, Earth and Mars; or a feeling, an angel, the Moon, and Italy, etc.’ Representation of 
a multiplicity requires a higher-order act built upon the individual representation of the 
members of the totality, and Husserl devotes considerable attention to criticizing accounts 
of this act in terms of the recognition of temporal succession, spatial relation, or 
difference and identity. On Husserl’s account, collective combination is a sui generis act 
that “plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole”—not only in the 
representation of number, but in the representation of parts and wholes and in higher-
order (founded) judgmental and emotional acts (PA 78). The concept of multiplicity 
arises from the act of collective combination by a process of abstraction, whereby we 
disregard the particularities of the members of a totality so that they are “considered and 
attended to only as some contents in general, each one as a certain something, a certain 
one” (PA 83). A multiplicity is then represented as the conjunction of these mere 
somethings—“a certain something and a certain something and a certain something, etc.; 
or, some one and some one and some one thing, etc.; or, more briefly, one and one and 
one, etc.” (PA 84). Specific number concepts, finally, are determinations of the general 
concept of multiplicity. The concepts of something and number belong to what Husserl 
would later call ‘formal ontology’: “We can with full justification designate the concepts 
something and one, multiplicity and cardinal number... as form concepts or categories. 




determinate genus, but rather in a certain manner take in any and every content” (PA 
89).30  
 Part Two of the Philosophy of Arithmetic begins with the recognition that our 
authentic grasp of numbers is severely limited: 
 If we had authentic representations of all numbers, as we do of the first ones in the series, 
 then there would be no arithmetic, for it would then be completely superfluous. The most 
 complicated of relations between numbers which now are discovered only laboriously, 
 through intricate  calculations, would then along with the number representations be 
 simultaneously present to us with that same intuitive evidence we have, say, with 
 propositions such as 2+3=5. To those who know what “2,” “3,” “5,” and the signs “+” 
 and “=” signify, this proposition is immediately clear and evident. But in fact we are 
 extremely limited in our representational capacities. That some sort of limits are imposed 
 upon us here lies in the finitude of human nature. Only from an infinite understanding can 
 we expect the authentic representation of all numbers...” (PA 201-2) 
 
This recognition gives rise to the following puzzle: “...how can one speak of concepts 
which one does not authentically have? And how is it not absurd that upon such concepts 
the most secure of all sciences, arithmetic, should be grounded?” (PA 203). To answer 
this question, Husserl launches into an analysis of our symbolic representations of 
multiplicity and number. A symbolic or inauthentic representation is defined as follows: 
“If a content is not directly given to us as that which it is, but rather only indirectly 
through signs which univocally characterize it, then we have a symbolic representation of 
it instead of an authentic one” (PA 205). For example, we have “an authentic 
representation of the outer appearance of a house when we actually look at the house; and 
we have a symbolic representation when someone gives us the indirect characterization: 
the corner house on such and such side of such and such street” (Ibid.).   
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 Symbolic cognition plays a role even in the representation of large multiplicities, 
i.e., multiplicities that we grasp as totalities without individually enumerating each 
member of the group. Husserl explains our ability to grasp such totalities “in one glance” 
through the notion of a figural moment. Figural moments are “quasi-qualitative 
moments” that are referred to when we speak of “a file of soldiers, of a heap of apples, of 
a row of trees, of a covey of hens, of a flight of birds, of a gaggle of geese, and so on” 
(PA 216).31 A large multiplicity is then symbolically represented as the totality unified by 
a figural moment. Another type of symbolic cognition is involved in our representation of 
infinite groups: “In each case where we speak of an infinite group, we come upon the 
symbolic representation of a process of concept formation that can be continued without 
limit” (PA 231). Finally, arithmetic calculation proceeds symbolically through the 
manipulation of a numeral system that is designed to run parallel to the numbers 
themselves. 
 The distinction between authentic and symbolic representations reappears in the 
first Logical Investigation as the distinction between empty (signitive) and filled 
(intuitive) intentions. Correcting ambiguities that still marred his psychological analysis 
of number a decade earlier, Husserl distinguishes between three senses of ‘content’ 
(Inhalt): content as object, content as meaning simpliciter, and content as fulfilling sense 
(LI I §14). The distinction between empty and filled intentions later plays a central role in 
the analysis of knowledge in Investigation VI. Husserl analyzes knowledge in terms of 
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the higher-order act of fulfillment (Erfüllung). The language of authenticity returns in the 
definition of fulfillment: “What the intention means, but presents only in more or less 
inauthentic and inadequate manner, the fulfillment... sets directly before us, or at least 
more directly than the intention does. In fulfillment our experience is represented by the 
worlds: ‘This is the thing itself’” (LI VI 226-7). 
 Fulfillment is a species of intuitive illustration, which comes in both inauthentic 
and authentic forms. There are two types of inauthentic intuitive illustration: image 
consciousness and conceptual clarification. Image consciousness is a kind of intuitive re-
presentation (Vergegewärtigung) that in Logical Investigations Husserl calls a ‘mediate 
presentation’: “What is common to all mediate presentations, whether intuitive or 
signitive, may be put by saying that they are presentations which do not present their 
objects straightforwardly, but by way of presentations built upon other presentations... To 
put it more pointedly, they are presentations which present their objects as objects of 
other presentations...” (LI VI 230). An empty intention may be mediately fulfilled 
through the consciousness of an image, but such a fulfillment always points to an 
immediate fulfillment: “The matter of the presentation here also prescribes a prime 
fulfillment, which puts the primary image ‘itself’ before our eyes, but to this intention a 
new intention pertains, whose fulfillment leads on to the thing itself” (Ibid.). Husserl 
gives a mathematical example of conceptual clarification, which is said to “give 
epistemic fullness to the content of one’s thought”: 
We clarify the concept (53)4 by having recourse to the definitory presentation: Number 
which arises when one forms the product  53 · 53 · 53 · 53. If we wish to clarify this latter 
concept, we must go back to the sense of 53, i.e., to the formation 5 · 5 · 5. Going back 




2 + 1, 2 = 1 + 1. After each step we should have to make a substitution in the preceding 
complex expression or thought and, were this proceeding indefinitely repeatable—it is 
certainly so in itself, just as it is certainly not so for us—we should at last come to the 
completely explicated sum of ones of which we should say: “This is the number  (53)4 
‘itself.’” (LI VI 228-9) 
Again we see, in the distinction between what is possible in itself and what is possible for 
us, the claim from the Philosophy of Arithmetic that “all number presentations that we 
possess, beyond the first few in the number series, are symbolic, and can only be 
symbolic” (PA 200). In contrast to inauthentic intuitive illustrations, in authentic intuitive 
illustration—“fulfillment in the pregnant sense of the word”—the object itself, rather than 
a mere sign or image, is presented. In the language of Ideas I, the intuitive act in a case of 
fulfillment is originary (originär).  
Unlike empty thought or intuitive re-presentations like phantasy, memory, and 
image consciousness, an originary act presents its object “as it is itself ‘in person’” (in 
seiner »leibhaftigen« Selbstheit). According to the Principle of All Principles, originary 
intuitions have a privileged epistemic status: “...each intuition affording [something] in an 
originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge... whatever presents itself to us in 
‘Intuition’ in an originary way (so to speak, in its actuality in person) is to be taken 
simply as what it affords itself as, but only within the limitations in which it affords itself 
there” (Id 44). Perception is a paradigm case of originary intuition, but Husserl believes 
that mental states and essences are also given originarily by reflection and ideation or 
eidetic intuition, respectively. The famous phenomenological call to return to the things 
themselves is ultimately a call to develop authentic basic concepts from originary 




intuitions at all—are not enough: we must go back to the ‘things themselves’” (LI v.1 
168).   
Husserl draws a close connection between fulfillment and truth. In §39 of the 
sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl lays out four senses of ‘truth’: 
1. …truth as the correlate of an identifying act is a state of affairs, as the correlate of a 
coincident identity it is an identity: the full agreement of what is meant with what is 
given as such… 
2. …the ideal relationship which obtains in the unity of coincidence which we defined 
as self-evidence, among the epistemic essences of the coinciding acts… 
3. We also experience in self-evidence… the object given in the manner meant: so 
given, the object is fullness itself. This object can also be called being, truth, the 
“truth” insofar as it is here experienced…as that which makes an intention true… 
4. …truth as the rightness of our intention… (LI VI 263-4) 
 
Evidence (Evidenz) is the experience of truth, either in the sense of the experience of the 
object or state of affairs that makes an intention true (sense 3) or the experience of the 
identity of the given and the meant (sense 1). 
 Syntheses of fulfillment occur not only in acts of recognition or knowing, but also 
in the unfolding of perception itself: “Each individual percept is a mixture of fulfilled and 
unfulfilled intentions” (LI VI 221). Perception of transcendent objects, i.e., objects that 
are not proper parts of the stream of consciousness, is of necessity inadequate. That is, 
transcendent objects are necessarily given in profiles or appearances that enter into 
“syntheses of identification.” Husserl analyzes this perceptual synthesis in terms of 
horizonal intentions: “...everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by 
virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by 
virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to appearance” (PAS 42). 
For instance, as I view a table from one of its sides, it appears to have other sides that can 




passes into emptiness) by moving around the table: “Original consciousness is only 
possible in the form of an actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a 
co-conscious-having of other sides that are precisely not originally there. I say co-
conscious, since the non-visible sides are certainly also there somehow for consciousness, 
‘co-meant’ as co-present. But they do not appear as such, genuinely” (PAS 40).  
 The concept of a horizon is the centerpiece of Husserl’s phenomenology of 
constitution. In works like Ideas II, Husserl analyzes the various intentional rays required 
for various regions of objects to come to originary givenness: material nature, animal 
nature, and the spiritual world. The chief claim of the phenomenology of constitution, 
which dates back to Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of intuitive re-presentation in 
1904-5, is that any account of our mental lives that explains all forms of consciousness 
only in terms of sensation is bound to be radically impoverished. First, purely 
sensationalist accounts cannot do justice to phenomenologically accessible differences in 
kind between different species of intuition: perception, memory, image consciousness, 
phantasy, and so on. A taxonomy of mental acts that is faithful to the testimony of inner 
experience must recognize considerable structure in the immanent sphere in order to 
account for such essential distinctions as those between empty and intuitive 
consciousness; originary and non-originary intuition; positing and non-positing acts and 
the intermediary modalities of doubt, probability, and possibility; and immediate (direct) 
and mediate (indirect) presentation. Second, the sensationalist cannot account for the 
unity of consciousness; consider, for instance, how Hume is led to deny that perception 




objects of our perception (T 1.4.2). Horizonal intentions and the “syntheses of 
identification” they make possible account for this unity. Husserl’s phenomenology of 
constitution involves rich analyses of various kinds of horizonal intentions or 
“apperceptions”: empty intentions directed at the hidden sides (inner horizon) of physical 
objects, intentions toward background objects and the world as a whole (external 
horizon), apperception of lighting conditions and the state of one’s body, anticipation of 
the causal powers of an object, apperception of other possible perceivers, and at the most 
basic level, time-consciousness. 
 Persistent objects are constituted by—that is, they attain originary givenness in 
virtue of—a surplus of intentionality beyond the “primal impression” of the present: 
“...an act claiming to give a temporal object itself must contain in itself ‘apprehensions of 
the now’, ‘apprehensions of the past’, and so on...” (PCIT 41). Husserl introduces two 
kinds of horizonal intentions: retention and protention. These are intentions toward the 
past and future, respectively, that differ from memory and intuitive expectation in that (i) 
they are empty intentions, rather than intuitive re-presentations, and (ii) they are intrinsic 
to perception itself. As the tone from a violin passes away, it is retained emptily in 
consciousness: “the whole extent of the tone’s duration... then stands before me as 
something dead, so to speak—something no longer being vitally generated, a formation 
no longer animated by the generalize point of the now but continuously modified and 
sinking back into ‘emptiness’” (PCIT 26). The crucial claim here is that it is only in 




succession of disconnected tones. In the same way, a house is constituted as a temporally 
enduring object through a multiplicity of “appearances” as I perceive it through time.    
 In this section, I have summarized Husserl’s analysis of number in Philosophy of 
Arithmetic and showed how its contrast between authentic and inauthentic cognition of 
number anticipates his later theories of fulfillment and truth. In the next section, I show 
that, despite its existentialist dimensions, Heidegger’s account of authenticity retains 
important elements of Husserl’s epistemic concept of authenticity that help account for its 
methodological role in Being and Time. 
§2 Heidegger on Truth, Disclosedness, and Authenticity 
In Being and Time §44, Heidegger argues that the ordinary conception of truth as 
correspondence (adaequatio intellectus et rei) is derivative of two more basic forms of 
truth: (a) the sense of truth expressed in the Greek word aletheia, which Heidegger calls 
‘discoveredness’ (Entdecktheit) and (b) the essential structure of Dasein that Heidegger 
calls ‘disclosedness’ (Erschlossenheit). Heidegger’s discussion of (a) is clearly indebted 
to Husserl’s account of evidence as the experience of truth. In this section I trace a series 
of connections that lead Heidegger to a characterize authenticity as “the truth of 
existence.”  
 Heidegger’s discussion of truth as discoveredness begins with an example of 
fulfillment; in a note to this example he approvingly cites Husserl’s discussion of 
fulfillment as the experience of truth in Investigation VI.  
 Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that 
 “the picture on the wall is hanging askew.” This assertion demonstrates itself when 
 the man who makes it turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the 




 to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion 
 as being—just as it gets discovered as being. (BT 261) 
 
Heidegger identifies two ways in which entities are discovered: in circumspective 
concern and in lingering to look at something (das verweilend hinsehende Besorgen). 
Both kinds of discovery, he claims, are grounded in Dasein’s disclosedness, which 
therefore “must necessarily be called ‘true’ in a still more primordial sense’ (BT 263). 
 John Haugeland helpfully spells out Heidegger’s distinction between 
disclosedness and discoveredness:  
1. Intrawordly entities can be discovered only because of or in terms of a prior 
disclosedness... 
2. What is disclosed is not the same as the entities that are discovered in terms of it. 
According to some passages, what is disclosed is the being of those entities... but 
according to others, it is dasein... or even the world... 
3. Disclosedness is primordial truth, and, as such, it is the condition of the possibility of the 
truth of assertions... 
4. Publicness and resoluteness are modes of disclosedness... 
5. The basic structure of makeup of disclosedness is this: findingness [Befindlichkeit], 
telling [Rede], and understanding... (Dasein Disclosed, 17-8) 
 
The existential analytic is an analysis of the structure of disclosedness, which is repeated 
in temporal terms in Division II. I’d like to suggest here that the function of disclosedness 
in the existential analytic parallels that of horizonal intentions in Husserl’s 
phenomenology of constitution: disclosedness is (i) a structural feature of “being of the 
intentional” (HCT 106) that (ii) makes originary givenness (discovery) possible, (iii) is 
directed at an entity’s horizons, and (iv) is, at bottom, temporal.  
 First, note that disclosedness is an essential feature of Dasein; indeed, “Dasein is 
its disclosedness” (BT 171). Now Heidegger is clear in an earlier draft of Being and Time 
that, as important as Husserl’s “fundamental discoveries” of intentionality, categorial 




which is defined by the structure of intentionality” as immanent, absolute, and pure is 
“not derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves…” (HCT 106-
7). This immanent critique notwithstanding, Heidegger shares Husserl’s project of 
describing the essential features of intentionality. Part of Heidegger’s reason for widening 
the scope of analysis beyond the intentional act to Dasein, I suggest, is that the subject as 
a whole, and not any isolated intentional act, is the bearer of the kind of horizonal 
intentionality required to make sense of our discovery, through circumspective concern, 
of ready-to-hand entities and, crucially, of the self. The “perfect tense a priori” of 
understanding worldhood—the referential totality of significance that constitutes the 
essences of ready-to-hand entities—is a condition of the possibility of any leibhaftig 
encounter with tools (BT 117). This reading makes good sense of the different ways of 
characterizing the object of disclosedness that Haugeland notes in his (2): to understand 
the being of at least some entities just is to understand worldhood, including Dasein as 
the ultimate “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worumwillen) human artifacts have the 
significance they do. Finally, Division II is devoted to showing that disclosedness 
comprises a temporal retention and projection (protention) of possibilities (including, in 
the authentic case, the possibility of the impossibility of existence, i.e., death).  
 What does all of this have to do with authenticity? Heidegger understands 
authenticity as somehow choosing one’s self—what is one’s own (eigen). He calls the 
existential structure of this choice ‘resoluteness’ (Entschlossenheit). Resoluteness is the 
authentic mode of disclosedness, and since disclosedness is primordial truth, resoluteness 




(Existenz) is another name for the essential structure of Dasein (the structure analyzed 
into various Existenzialien in the existential analytic): “The essence of Dasein lies in its 
existence” (BT 67). Given my analysis of disclosedness above, we may expect 
resoluteness to be a condition of the possibility of the originary givenness of existence 
that has a horizonal and temporal structure. That is, we might expect that when Dasein is 
resolute (and thus authentic), it is given to itself “in the flesh.” And this is precisely what 
Heidegger says: “As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical 
potentiality-for-being” (BT 355, my emphasis).   
 In his lectures immediately after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger 
asks, “In what way is the Dasein, in existing, itself, its own, or by strict literalness 
‘ownly’ or authentic?” (BPP 158). This question, he seems to indicate, is equivalent to 
another: “In what way is the self given?” (Ibid.). His answer involves a rethinking of the 
notion of phenomenological reflection: 
The way in which the self is unveiled to itself in the factical Dasein can… be fittingly 
called reflection, except that we must not take this expression to mean what is commonly 
meant by it—the ego bent around backward and staring at itself… To reflect means… to 
show itself in a reflection from something… The Dasein does not need a special kind of 
observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have 
the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world 
itself, its own self is reflected to it from things. (BPP 159).32 
 
On Heidegger’s sense of ‘reflection’, the objects with which one is engaged reflect one’s 
self back like a mirror. In his discussion of das Man, however, Heidegger claims that 
“[w]hen one is absorbed in the world of its concern... it is not itself” (BT 163). The self 
revealed in everyday absorption is the “they-self,” rather than the “authentic self” (BT 
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167). Not just any kind of immediate absorption in the world, then, is revelatory of the 
individuated self.  
 Getting clear on how the individuated self is given requires a distinction between 
two types of “situation.” Before drawing this distinction, let’s remind ourselves of the 
major ontological claims Heidegger makes about persons or selves. The main negative 
thesis of Being and Time is that “Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs to 
something merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it” (BT 68). 
This apparently rules out accounts on which the referent of ‘I’ is a rational animal, a res 
cogitans, or the transcendental unity of apperception; even “personalist” accounts like 
those of Husserl and Max Scheler, despite their claims that “the person is not a thing, not 
a substance, not an object,” are apparently tainted by residues of “the anthropology of 
Christianity and the ancient world” (BT 73-4). The main positive thesis, as I explained in 
Chapter 1, is that selves are essentially relational entities, i.e., entities whose existence 
and nature depend on some system of social roles, practices, and artifacts (“world”). 
Since what it is to be a self is to occupy some position in a world, self-knowledge or self-
disclosure involves finding oneself, for example, as a teacher, in and through one’s 
teaching, among one’s students, teaching tools, and educational institution—in short, in a 
situation. Finding oneself in a situation is not unique to authentic Dasein—a fact that 
Heidegger marks with the distinction between the general situation (allgemeine Lage) of 
das Man and the situation (Situation) of resolute Dasein.  
 The difference between the allgemeine Lage and the Situation is not, or at least 




does not become another one, nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one” 
(BT 344). Instead, the elements of one’s world take on a new significance in terms of 
one’s resolute choice: ‘…both one’s being towards the available understandingly and 
concernfully, and one’s solicitous being with others, are now given a definite character in 
terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves’ (Ibid.). The situation, finally, 
involves solicitations to action: “Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a situation 
and put that situation before itself; it has put itself into that situation already. As resolute, 
Dasein is already taking action” (BT 347). The thought here is that whether my situation 
addresses me as an individual self depends on the extent to which I have integrated my 
disposedness—my individual sense of what is meaningful and worth pursuing—and my 
projection—my future-oriented commitment to a particular role or practice (Wrathall, 
“Autonomy, Authenticity, Self,” 207). In this respect, in resoluteness I do not choose my 
self, as though I could determine who I am from the ground up; as Denis McManus 
nicely puts it, I choose myself by “choosing to be guided by my own fundamental 
commitments rather than those of others” (“Anxiety, Choice, Responsibility,” 178).  
 In lieu of going into more details of Heidegger’s rich analysis of authenticity—
especially the notions of guilt and anxiety—let’s turn back to the issue of authenticity’s 
methodological role. I have so far shown how resoluteness, “the truth of existence,” 
brings the individuated self to givenness.  Authenticity will be a necessary condition of 
fundamental ontology, then, to the extent that the latter requires the self to be given. Here 
a comparison with Husserl is once again appropriate. Recall that, in addition to clarifying 




This methodological role comes out most clearly in the contrast in the Crisis between the 
“life of the plane” and the “life of depth”: 
 It is not the case that this is a matter of merely turning our gaze toward a sphere which up 
 to now has simply not been noticed but which is accessible without further effort to 
 theoretical experience and experiential knowledge. Everything experienceable in this way 
 is the object and domain of possible positive knowledge; it lies on the “plane,” in the 
 world of actual and possible experience, experience in the natural sense of the word. We 
 shall soon understand what extraordinary difficulties—grounded in the essence of the 
 matters involved—greeted the methodical efforts actually to approach the depth-sphere, 
 to approach first of all the possibility of its pure grasp of itself in the manner of 
 experiencing proper to it; and it will become clear thereby how great the antagonism is 
 between the “patent” life of the plane and the “latent” life of depth. (Crisis 120) 
 
For both Husserl and Heidegger, the subject that makes experience, knowledge, and 
science possible is not “accessible without further effort.” Heidegger makes this point by 
calling Dasein an Abgrund, which Wrathall proposes we translate as ‘withdrawing 
ground’ rather than ‘abyss’ (“Autonomy, Authenticity, Self,” 208-9). For Heidegger in 
particular, the self is only adequately given in virtue of resoluteness.  
 Now Heidegger’s primary aim in Being and Time is not edification. That is, what 
is important about authenticity is not that I come to self-knowledge, but that it reveals 
structures of selves as such. The fundamental ontologist studies the existential structures 
instantiated in and revealed to the authentic self, with the ultimate aim of showing how 
these structures ground the possibility of ontology. Correlatively, authenticity (“the 
primordial existentiell truth”) is not sufficient for fundamental ontology—indeed, most 
people who attain the ideal of “a consistent, coherent, and well-integrated disposedness 





 We now have some sense of the methodological role of authenticity in 
fundamental ontology. But if authenticity is a kind of norm governing the investigation of 
the “transcendental ground” of the positive sciences, what kind of role does it play in 
those positive sciences? As I noted at the beginning, the suggestion that the positive 
sciences need phenomenology to be genuine sciences is at best quaint and at worst 
absurd. In the remainder of this section, I will attempt to domesticate this foundational 
role a bit. First, Husserl’s radical claim that the sciences of his day were not genuine 
sciences is more reasonable when read in the light of a certain response to the Cartesian 
Circle. Second, Heidegger suggests that science “has its source in authentic existence,” 
but declines to elaborate (BT 415). I will make some suggestions about what he may have 
in mind here, drawing on his early remarks on university reform and his “existential 
conception of science” in Being and Time. 
 Let’s remind ourselves of the circularity objection to Descartes’s attempt to 
justify the veracity of clear and distinct perception. In Meditation III Descartes gives a 
proof of God’s existence that relies on a causal principle: an idea can only arise from a 
cause with at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. The existence 
of an idea with infinite objective reality (the idea of God) then necessitates the existence 
of a cause with infinite formal reality, which is guaranteed to be unique. Descartes can 
then show in Meditation IV that, insofar as God is perfect and thus not a deceiver, we can 
know that our clear and distinct perceptions are true, though we may err when we judge 
on the basis of unclear or indistinct perception. The circularity objection asks what 




Presumably the source of justification for this premise is clear and distinct perception (“it 
is indeed evident by the light of nature”). But then Descartes’s proof relies on the very 
conclusion—the veracity of clear and distinct perception—he intends to prove. 
 The literature on the Cartesian Circle is voluminous, especially in light of 
Descartes’s so-called “memory gambit” in Meditation V.  The solution I draw on here is 
due to Keith DeRose. Consider Descartes’s discussion of the atheist geometer in his reply 
to the Second Set of Objections.  
 However, I do not deny that an atheist could know clearly that the three angles of a 
 triangle are equal to two right angles; I am simply affirming that his knowledge is not 
 true scientific knowledge, since no knowledge that can be rendered doubtful seems to 
 deserve to be called scientific knowledge. (Meditations, 83) 
 
What is striking about this passage is that Descartes admits that the atheist geometer has 
knowledge (cognotionem), given his claim that even mathematics is not immune from 
doubt. As Harry Frankfurt argues, however, the kind of mathematical beliefs called into 
question by the evil genius thought experiment are only believed confusedly, not on the 
basis of clear and distinct perception (Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, 84-92). On 
DeRose’s reading, Descartes’s goal is to attain a higher grade of knowledge than that 
available to the atheist geometer: scientific knowledge (scientia). Scientia requires not 
only clear and distinct perception, but also knowledge of the epistemic principle that 
guarantees its veracity.  
 Husserl seems to endorse the Scholastic conception of scientia in the Logical 
Investigations. On this conception, a science consists of propositions all of which are 
deductively grounded in a set of indemonstrable axioms. Since the propositions of 




examples of scientia. Note, too, the stringent demand that Descartes places on scientia: it 
must be indubitable. Now if Husserl’s complaint were that the empirical sciences are not 
genuine sciences because they are not instances of scientia, there would clearly be 
nothing for phenomenology to do about this. But as Lee Hardy argues, Husserl considers 
empirical sciences to be sciences, though sciences unified not by deductive links to 
indemonstrable axioms, but rather by their method (Nature’s Suit, 28-31). Insofar as the 
task of phenomenology is to clarify the essences of experience, meaning, and knowledge, 
it has to study the essences of probability and explanation.   
 Following the model provided by DeRose’s interpretation of the Cartesian Circle, 
Husserl can be read as claiming that, while the positive sciences do produce knowledge, 
they lack the kind of epistemic clarification that it’s the task of phenomenology to 
provide. There may be some plausibility to this idea. The kinds of foundational projects 
undertaken by L.E.J Brouwer and David Hilbert, which I’ll discuss in the next section, 
emerged from the worry that the mathematical sciences had become like “ancient cities 
which have gradually grown from mere villages into large towns” and are thus “ill-
proportioned, compared with those orderly towns which planners lay out as they fancy on 
level ground” (Descartes, Philosophical Writings, 116). Insofar as phenomenological 
philosophy encompasses formal logic and formal ontology, fields like proof theory, set 
theory, and group theory arguably fall within its scope. Yet while these kinds of pure 
eidetic science are part of Husserl’s overall vision, they belong at best to 




investigations into the “life of depth” or the “transcendental ground” of the sciences 
would give them any kind of epistemic boost.33  
 Having indicated a possible way to render Husserl’s extravagant claims on the 
behalf of phenomenology more plausible, I now turn from Husserl’s “logical conception 
of science” to Heidegger’s “existential conception of science.” An existential conception 
of science “understands science as a way of existence and thus as a mode of being-in-the-
world, which discovers or discloses either entities or being” (BT 408). Part of the 
existential conception of science, Heidegger suggests, is showing how “science has its 
source in authentic existence” (BT 415). In particular, the natural sciences are 
characterized by an “awaiting of discoveredness” that “has its existentiell basis in a 
resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-being in the 
‘truth’” (Ibid.).  
 Serious scientific study in physics requires a resolute commitment to developing 
mastery of various kinds of praxis (BT 409), including the “mathematical projection” 
(BT 414) that make the discovery of scientific facts possible. This mastery constitutes a 
distinctive mode of disclosedness, and with it, a “distinctive mode of making-present”: 
“Only ‘in the light’ of a nature which has been projected in this fashion can anything like 
a ‘fact’ be found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited in terms of this 
projection... In the mathematical projection of nature, moreover, what is decisive... is that 
this projection discloses something that is a priori” (Ibid.). Mathematics is not projected 
in the sense of “gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from 
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internal sentiment” (Hume, Principles of Morals, 294). Rather, Heidegger’s point is that 
quantitative facts about the present-at-hand—facts about ‘motion, force, location, and 
time’ (BT 414)—are only given in virtue of the cultivation of a particular stance and 
conceptual apparatus—what Heidegger calls a “hermeneutical situation” (BT 275). 
Interestingly, Heidegger describes the change-over to theoretical discovery as a Situation 
(BT 412). 
 Heidegger discusses the situation of authentic science in his preliminary remarks 
on “Science and University Reform” to his KNS 1919 lecture course “The Idea of 
Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview.” Science, he claims, “means a transforming 
intervention in the immediate consciousness of life; it involves a transition to a new 
attitude of consciousness, and thus its own form of the movement of spiritual life” (TDP 
3). Though this transformation only occurs “in a primordial and radical sense” in 
“primordial science” (Urwissenschaft), “it can also be found in every genuine science in a 
derivative way” (Ibid.). In Being and Time, Heidegger notes that a primordial 
interpretation of Dasein is oriented toward its authenticity and totality (BT 276). 
Phenomenology is more primordial than the positive sciences because it takes the self as 
an explicit theme; nonetheless, authentic scientific existence involves a modification of 
everyday being-in-the-world that gives not only the self, but the environment and other 




which is implemented through “a community of similarly striving researchers with its 
rich relations to students,” can thrive (TDP 4).34 
 In this section I offered an interpretation of Heidegger’s claim that authenticity is 
necessary for fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology studies the self as the 
“transcendental ground” of experience and knowledge. Insofar as phenomenology strives 
to justify its findings on the basis of intuition, fundamental ontology requires that the self 
be given. The individuated self, however, is for the most part hidden from view. Only 
through resoluteness, “the truth of existence,” is the self revealed, and because of its 
ontological structure it is always revealed in terms of its situation. This kind of 
authenticity is not sufficient for ontology, however, because the ontologist performs a 
kind of eidetic abstraction on the “primordial existentiell truth” of the authentic self. For 
both Husserl and Heidegger, then, authenticity is required by phenomenology because 
phenomenology must draw its results from a leibhaftig encounter with its subject 
matter—namely, the subject as the “transcendental ground” of knowledge and science.  
Finally, I sketched interpretations of the roles of phenomenology and authenticity with 
respect to the positive sciences. In the next section, I turn to the other foundational role 
Husserl and Heidegger accord to phenomenology: the clarification of basic concepts. 
§3 Grounding the Human Sciences 
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Heidegger follows Husserl in identifying two foundational roles for phenomenology: a 
“phenomenological clarification of the conceptual foundations of the sciences” and an 
investigation of the “transcendental ground” of the sciences (Nature’s Suit, 62). He 
makes this distinction clearly in the following passage: 
 The question of being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for 
 the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a 
 type... but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior  to the 
 ontical sciences and which provide  their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter 
 how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind 
 and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it  has not first adequately clarified the 
 meaning of being, and conceived of this clarification as its fundamental task.” (BT 31) 
 
I argued in Chapter 1 that Heidegger’s project of clarifying the meaning of being parallels 
Husserl’s attempt to clarify how a priori knowledge, including ontology, is possible by 
studying the essences of experience, meaning, and knowledge. The question of the 
meaning of being therefore corresponds to the second kind of foundation phenomenology 
provides. I argue in this section that, though the meaning of being is the primary focus of 
Being and Time, Heidegger also sees the existential analytic as the proper way to carry 
out the grounding of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).  
 It’s unsurprising that Heidegger should have some stake in the debate over the 
foundations of the human sciences, which occupied his teacher Heinrich Rickert, 
Rickert’s comrade in the Baden school of neo-Kantianism, Wilhelm Windelband, and 
Wilhelm Dilthey, to whose work Heidegger devotes his 1925 Kassel lecture and a late 
section of Being and Time. Indeed, Being and Time is explicitly framed against the 
backdrop of various crises in the foundations of the sciences: 
 Mathematics, which is seemingly the most rigorous and most firmly constructed of the 
 sciences, has reached a crisis in its “foundations.” In the controversy between the 
 formalists and the intuitionists, the issue is one of obtaining and securing the primary way 




 physics arises from the tendency to exhibit the interconnectedness of nature as it is “in 
 itself.” As a theory of the conditions under which we have access to nature itself, it seeks 
 to preserve the changelessness of the laws of motion by ascertaining all relativities, and 
 thus comes up against the question of the structure of its own given area of study—the 
 problem of matter. In biology there is an awakening tendency to inquire beyond the 
 definitions which mechanism and vitalism have given for “life” and “organism,” and to 
 define anew the kind of being which belongs to the living as such. In those historical 
 human sciences, the urge towards historical actuality itself has been strengthened in the 
 course of time by tradition and by the way tradition has been presented and handed down: 
 the history of literature is to become the history of problems. Theology is seeking more 
 primordial interpretations of man’s being towards God, prescribed by the meaning 
 of faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once more 
 Luther’s insight that the “foundation” on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen 
 from an inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this “foundation” not 
 only is inadequate for the problematics of theology, but conceals and distorts it. (BT 29-
 30)35 
 
These crises in mathematics, physics, biology, history, and theology are attempts to 
clarify the “basic concepts” of these sciences. Heidegger distinguishes two ways of 
carrying out this clarificatory task. The first, inadequate form is “the kind of ‘logic’ 
which limps along after, investigating the status of some science as it chances to find it, 
in order to discover its ‘method’” (BT 30). The second is a “productive logic—in the 
sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of being, discloses it for the first time 
in the constitution of its being, and, after arriving at the structures within it, makes these 
available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry” (BT 30-1). 
 Heidegger gives two examples of logics that limp behind, and both are products 
of neo-Kantianism. First, a foundation for history should not take the form of “a theory of 
the concept-formation of historiology nor the theory of historiological knowledge, nor yet 
the theory of history as the object of historiology” (BT 31). Heidegger later mentions 
Georg Simmel and Rickert as exemplars of this inadequate approach (BT 427). Second, 
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Heidegger interprets the Critique of Pure Reason as a regional ontology of nature, and 
contrasts this interpretation with the neo-Kantian reading of the first Critique as a theory 
of knowledge. This interpretive debate was the focus of the infamous Davos dispute 
between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in 1929.36 I take up Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant in Chapter 4. My aim in the remainder of this chapter is to identify the 
distinguishing features of a productive logic by means of some plausible examples, 
identify what is inadequate about the neo-Kantian attempts to ground the human sciences, 
and sketch the productive logic Heidegger envisions for them.  
 For a foundational dispute that exemplifies the features Heidegger will require of 
his own foundational project, consider the Grundlagenstreit between L.E.J. Brouwer’s 
intuitionism and David Hilbert’s formalism. In the long passage cited above, Heidegger 
says that the issue in this dispute is “one of obtaining and securing the primary way of 
access to what are supposedly the objects of this science” (BT 29-30). The project of 
clarifying the basic concepts of a science is “an interpretation of those entities [i.e. the 
domain of the science] with regard to their basic state of being” (BT 30).  Finally, 
Heidegger suggests that a productive logic has the potential to be revisionary, since it 
makes its results available to the positive sciences as guides to their inquiry. Each of 
these components, which we can call the “epistemological,” “ontological,” and 
“revisionary” criteria for a productive logic, are present in the clash between Brouwer 
and Hilbert. 
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 Brouwer’s intuitionistic conceptions of the real numbers and sets and the 
intuitionistic logic later axiomatized by Brouwer’s student Arend Heyting are motivated 
by a deeply revisionary conception of the nature of mathematical objects. For Brouwer, 
mathematical objects are constructed by abstraction from the temporal awareness of “the 
falling apart of a moment of life into two qualitatively different things of which one is 
experienced as giving way to the other and yet is retained by an act of memory” 
(Brouwer, “Mathematics, Science, and Language,” 45). When the resulting “two-ity” is 
stripped of content, the “Primordial Intuition of Mathematics” results, “which in its self-
unfolding also introduces the infinite as a thought-reality and produces the collection of 
natural numbers... as well as the real numbers, and finally the whole of pure 
mathematics” (Brouwer, “Mathematics, Science, and Language,” 46). Brouwer takes this 
understanding of the nature of mathematical objects to call for a radical revision in logic: 
the principle of excluded middle is not a logical truth, for example. For a mathematical 
statement to be true is just for a proof to have been constructed for it; for a mathematical 
statement to be false is just for a proof of its absurdity to have been constructed; and there 
is no guarantee that either kind of proof can be constructed for every mathematical 
statement. 
 For Hilbert, the revisions to classical mathematics required by the intuitionist are 
unacceptable: “...they seek to ground mathematics by throwing overboard all phenomena 
that make them uneasy and by establishing a dictatorship of prohibitions... But this means 
to dismember and mutilate our science, and if we follow such reformers, we run the 




Grounding of Mathematics,” 200). While Hilbert rejects some of Brouwer’s revisionary 
proposals, his project of grounding mathematics involves what might be called 
ontological considerations. Because “abstract operations with general concept-scopes and 
contents has proved to be inadequate and uncertain” by Russell’s paradox, a foundation 
of mathematics has to begin with “certain extra-logical discrete objects, which exist 
intuitively as immediate experience before all thought” (Hilbert, “New Grounding of 
Mathematics,” 202). For Hilbert the objects of number theory are “the signs themselves, 
whose shape can be generally recognized by us—independently of space and time, of the 
special conditions of the production of the sign, and of insignificant differences in the 
finished product.” In a slogan: ‘In the beginning was the sign’ (Ibid.). A foundation for 
the higher stretches of mathematics requires the development of a “metamathematics,” in 
which “axioms, formulae, and proofs of the mathematical theory are themselves the 
objects of a contentual investigation” (Hilbert, “New Grounding of Mathematics,” 204). 
Finally, Hilbert places restrictions on what kinds of reasoning can be securely employed 
in metamathematics; these restrictions comprise the finitistic point of view (der finite 
Standpunkt). 
 Both Brouwer’s and Hilbert’s foundational projects meet the three criteria on a 
productive logic. First, they both give epistemological accounts of our access to the 
objects of mathematics. For Brouwer, mathematics is based on a kind of basic temporal 
awareness, while for Hilbert, it is based on an intuition of mathematical signs like 
numerals. Second, they both give ontological accounts of the nature of mathematical 




Hilbert, the objects of mathematical investigation are signs, formulae, and proofs. Third, 
both projects have revisionary implications. Brouwer’s intuitionism requires limiting the 
principle of excluded middle and outlawing non-constructive proofs based on reductio ad 
absurdum, while Hilbert’s formalism initiated modern proof theory and placed finistic 
restrictions on admissible methods of proof.  
 Before considering how Heidegger’s productive logic of the human sciences 
might meet these criteria, let’s consider two examples of logics that limp behind. In his 
Presidential Address at the University of Strasbourg in 1894, Windelband develops a 
taxonomy of the sciences based on differences in method. 
 In their quest for knowledge of reality, the empirical sciences either seek the general in 
 the form of the law of nature or the particular in the form of the historically defined 
 structure. On the one hand, they are concerned with the form which invariably remains 
 constant. On the other hand, they are concerned with the unique, immanently defined 
 content of the real event. The former disciplines are nomological sciences. The latter 
 disciplines are sciences of process or sciences of the event. The nomological sciences are 
 concerned with what is invariably the case. The sciences of process are concerned with 
 what was once the case. If I may be permitted to introduce some new technical terms, 
 scientific thought is nomothetic in the former case and idiographic in the latter case. 
 (“History and Natural Science,” 291) 
 
For Windelband, the distinction between the nomothetic and idiographic methods does 
not correspond to an ontological distinction between body and mind or Natur and Geist. 
First, one and the same object can be studied either in terms of laws or in terms of 
individual occurrences. Second, according to the methodological distinction, psychology 
is a natural science, even though it is concerned with mental phenomena. Rickert 
develops Windelband’s methodological distinction in his work on concept formation in 
the natural and historical sciences. The historical sciences treat the individual, but not 




historical sciences aim to subject the extensive and intensive manifold of experience to 
order; historical science carves its objects—historical individuals—out of these manifolds 
in terms of their “value-relevance.” This is not to say that the historian engages in 
valuation of historical individuals, but rather that “he simply would not concern himself 
with the unique and individual processes called the renaissance or the romantic school if 
they did not stand in a relation to political, aesthetic, or other generally acknowledged 
values by virtue of their individuality” (Rickert, “Concept Formation in History,” 354-5). 
 Heidegger characterizes logics that limp behind as taking the results of a science 
as finished products in order to inquire into its method. This characterization captures a 
general method among neo-Kantians, which Paul Natorp describes as comprising two 
parts: (a) “...the secure reference back to current, historically verifiable facts of science, 
morals, art and religion...” and (b) “verifying the basis of the “possibility” of the fact and 
therewith its ‘warrant,’ i.e., to show that law’s foundation, to show the unity of logos or 
reason in all constructive acts of culture, and to uncover its pure form” (Natorp, “Kant 
and the Marburg School,” 182). The Neo-Kantians, then, adopted the “analytic” approach 
of the Prolegomena, which starts from the “fact of science” and regresses to its 
conditions of possibility, rather than the “synthetic” approach of the first Critique (Kant, 
Prolegomena, 8). 
 There is one neo-Kantian thinker, however, whose philosophical engagement with 
the human sciences Heidegger deems at least a relative success: Ernst Cassirer. In the 
second volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms on Mythical Thought, Cassirer 




rejects allegorical interpretations of myth as a poetic expression of speculative, scientific, 
or ethical truths (Mythical Thought, 2). He then distinguishes subjective from objective 
accounts of myth. Subjective accounts of myth fall into three types: metaphysical, 
psychological, and critical. Metaphysical (Schelling) and psychological (Feuerbach) 
subjective accounts try to explain the cross-cultural similarities in myth in terms of 
Hegelian dialectic and a constant human nature, respectively. Objective accounts try to 
account for the unity of myth in terms of some focal object. Cassirer’s critical approach 
to myth sees it as an expression of the mind’s ability to bring form to experience. More 
specifically, Cassirer interprets myth as governed by a system of symbolic forms whose 
“quality” corresponds to Kant’s forms of sensibility and understanding, but whose 
“modality” or “tonality” differs from other kinds of symbolic form, such as language, 
religion, art, and science.  
 I discuss Cassirer’s account of myth in more detail in Chapter 5. What is 
important for present purposes is that Heidegger deems Cassirer’s work a “fruitful 
success” considered as a guide for the positive sciences of ethnology and the history of 
religion (KPM 186). In particular, he applauds Cassirer’s critique of “naturalistic, 
totemistic, animistic, and sociological” forms of the objective approach to myth (Ibid.). In 
Being and Time Heidegger is clear that ethnology is in need of philosophical clarification. 
Ethnology, he says, “presupposes... an inadequate analysis of Dasein,” and philosophy is 
tasked with “recapitulating what has already been ontically discovered” and “purifying it 
in a way which is ontologically more transparent” (BT 76). An ethnological report that 




interpreted as though the sign “has been experienced as a mere thing and misplaced into 
the same realm of being of the present-at-hand as what it indicates” (BT 113). 
 Consider Wittgenstein’s similar diagnosis of the errors in James Frazer’s The 
Golden Bough: 
 Frazer’s account of the magical and religious views of mankind is unsatisfactory: it 
 makes these views look like errors.  
 
 Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every page of the 
 Confessions? 
 
 But—one might say—if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist holy man was—or 
 anyone else—whose religion gives expression to completely different views. But none of 
 them was in error, except when he set forth a theory. (Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer,” 
 119)  
 
For Wittgenstein, in order to understand the rituals Frazer describes, one must not 
understand magic as “false physics or, as the case may be, false medicine, technology, 
etc.” (“Remarks on Frazer,” 129). Instead, we come to understand a ritual by constructing 
a “perspicuous representation” that exhibits the “connecting links” between a rite and our 
own practices, language, and instincts (“Remarks on Frazer,” 133): “Once such a 
phenomenon is brought into connection with an instinct which I myself possess, this is 
precisely the explanation wished for...” (“Remarks on Frazer,” 139). 37  Similarly, 
Heidegger remarks that mythical thought can have be “positively helpful in bringing out 
the ontological structure of phenomena in a genuine way” because it “is often less 
concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation...” (BT 76).  
																																																								
37 The concept of a perspicuous representation also occurs in Philosophical Investigations 122. In both 
Philosophical Investigations and ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, Wittgenstein parenthetically notes 
a connection between perspicuous representation and worldview (Weltanschauung), mentioning in the 
latter case Oswald Spengler. Spengler’s The Decline of the West was hugely popular during Heidegger’s 
first decade of mature philosophical work, and he is highly critical of the work and its popularity in a 
number of lectures from the early Freiburg period. This critical attitude extends in general to the 




 How, then, do Heidegger’s brief remarks on ethnology bear on the project of 
grounding the human sciences? Recall the three criteria on a productive logic: 
epistemological, ontological, and revisionary. Starting in reverse order, Heidegger clearly 
thinks that the ethnology of his day stands in need of correction. The ontological 
dimension of a grounding of the human sciences is given more elaboration in the 
discussion of history in Division II. There Heidegger distinguishes three kinds of 
historical object: historical artifacts, the “world-historical,” and Dasein. An authentic 
understanding of history, he claims, sees its object as possibilities. In Wittgenstein’s 
phrase, we might say that history studies “forms of life.” How Heidegger’s sketch of a 
grounding of the human sciences satisfies the epistemological criterion is less clear, 
though presumably it centers around the method of phenomenological destruction 
discussed in Chapter 2.   
 The grounding of the human sciences takes a backseat to the investigation of 
Dasein as the “transcendental ground” in Being and Time. This is part of why Heidegger 
insists that the aim of the book is not to develop a philosophical anthropology (BT 170). 
For this reason, my account of the kind of productive logic Heidegger has in mind has of 
necessity been sketchy. Nevertheless, I have suggested three criteria that a productive 
logic must satisfy, identified plausible exemplars of logics that limp behind, and pointed 
to one human science that Heidegger thinks needs philosophical intervention. In the WS 
1929-30 lectures, which I examine in more detail in the final chapter, Heidegger appears 
to “recapitulate” various biological findings by way of investigating the essences of 




philosophically intervene in the positive sciences in this way will have to remain an open 
question.  
§4 Conclusion 
Heidegger calls his philosophy a “science of being.” Previous chapters have analyzed the 
subject matter and method of this science. In this chapter, I described the two 
foundational roles Husserl and Heidegger envision for phenomenology, articulated the 
role of authenticity both in fundamental ontology and as a source of scientific research, 
and drew out elements of the productive logic Heidegger demands for the human 
sciences. I return to some of these themes in the final chapter, which addresses a period in 
which Heidegger begins to intermingle anthropological and biological elements into his 

















Chapter Four: Phenomenology, Idealism, and the Legacy of Kant 
 
Heidegger closes his WS 1927-28 lecture course “Phenomenological Interpretation of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” by signaling his affinity with both Kant and Husserl: 
When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, 
against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became 
for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search. (PIK 
292) 
 
This remark raises the following question: What elements of Kant’s philosophy show up 
in Being and Time, and how did the background of Husserl’s phenomenology open 
Heidegger’s eyes to these elements? William Blattner (1994, 1999, 2004) answers: 
Heidegger adopts a modified version of Kantian idealism that corrects inconsistencies in 
the original account. 
 In what follows, I develop a realist alternative to Blattner’s reading. I argue that 
Heidegger found the seeds of a realist phenomenology in the Critique of Pure Reason and 
that he did so by reading it through the lens of Husserl’s phenomenology. I show this by 
tracing a unified philosophical problematic through three crucial, but puzzling, passages: 
the Schematism chapter of the first Critique, the thought experiment of the destruction of 
the world in Ideas I, and the passage in Being and Time that Blattner makes central in his 
defense of the idealist interpretation. In §1 I lay out Blattner’s reading. In §2 I draw a 
connection between the schematism and Husserl’s thought experiment and piece together 
a critique of Kant from Husserl’s scattered remarks on the critical project. In §3 I turn to 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. I argue that Heidegger’s objections to neo-Kantian 




adopts a form of realism. I close by considering Heidegger’s proposal for moving beyond 
Kant. 
 Before moving forward, I need to get clear on what I mean by ‘idealism’ and 
‘realism’. Denying that Husserl and Heidegger are idealists in the sense defined below is 
compatible with recognizing that they belong to a loosely unified Kantian and post-
Kantian idealist tradition. We can only make headway on the question of whether Husserl 
and Heidegger were idealists or realists by connecting precise definitions to these terms. 
Such definitions should not be ad hoc—it would be a defect of a definition of ‘idealism’ 
that it implies that Berkeley is not an idealist, for example—but they need not capture 
some commitments shared by everyone who has ever rallied around the ‘idealist’ banner. 
My definition is saved from arbitrariness by three features: first, it implies that Blattner’s 
‘temporal idealist’ Heidegger is an idealist; second, it implies that some interpreters of 
Husserl read him as an idealist; and third, it captures the core idealist idea that the mind 
makes the world the way it is.  
 I understand idealism as the view that the existence or nature of physical objects 
stands in a relation of generic modal dependence on conscious subjects. More precisely, 
it is the view that for all x, necessarily: if x exists and is a physical object, then some 
conscious subject exists. This definition rules out possible worlds in which physical 
objects exist and have the natures they do but no conscious subjects exist. The kind of 
dependence is generic, not rigid—that is, physical objects depend on there being some 
mind or other, not a specific mind. I understand realism as the denial of idealism—that is, 




on any mind (Devitt, Realism and Truth, 13-5). Realism requires only that some physical 
objects are modally independent of minds. It is thus compatible with the obvious fact that 
some physical objects, like baseballs and skyscrapers, causally depend on us. Finally, by 
the “natures” of physical objects I have in mind not only their intrinsic properties, but 
also those features that Kant (on one reading, though not on Heidegger’s) argues are 
dependent on the structure of the mind: spatiality, temporality, persistence, causality, and 
so on.   
 In addition to this claim of generic modal dependence, an idealist may endorse a 
further grounding claim: the existence or nature of physical objects is grounded in the 
structure of some subject. Grounding is an explanatory, non-causal form of ontological 
determination that captures the core idea that the mind makes the world the way it is—it 
is because or in virtue of the structure of the mind that physical objects exist and have the 
natures they do. This grounding formulation plausibly entails the generic modal 
dependence formulation and serves to explain the modal correlation it expresses (Rosen, 
“Metaphysical Dependence,” 118).  
 It is important to distinguish idealism in either its dependence or its grounding 
formulation from what A.D. Smith calls Husserl’s “ideal verificationism.” Ideal 
verificationism is the view that everything that exists is in principle intuitable. More 
precisely, it is the view that for all x, necessarily: if x exists, then possibly: there exists a 
mind that intuits x. Ideal verificationism does not immediately entail idealism. Indeed, 




the argument for idealism he reconstructs on Husserl’s behalf (Smith, Husserl and the 
Cartesian Meditations, 183-8).  
 It may seem natural to characterize ideal verificationism as a kind of ontological 
dependence—namely, the dependence of all entities on possible consciousness. But I 
think this is misleading. ‘Dependence on possible consciousness’ could mean one of two 
things. First, it could mean dependence on potential intuitive consciousness: for all x, 
necessarily: if x exists, then there exists a y such that possibly: y is intuitively conscious 
of x. This is an idealist thesis, which might contrast with another idealist view on which 
entities depend on actual (i.e., occurrent) consciousness. Second, it could mean 
“dependence” on the possibility of intuitive consciousness. But this is dependence in 
name only. This claim simply doesn’t have the right logical form to be a claim of 
ontological dependence. Indeed, it is misleading to use the ontological language of 
dependence to characterize what is essentially an epistemological thesis. Finally, note 
that grounding is usually taken to be factive, which rules out grounding a fact on a merely 
possible fact.  
 Even if ideal verificationism has historically been associated with the idealist 
tradition and its denial with the realist tradition, it is distinct from idealism as I construe 
it. Moreover, my formulation of idealism is not unduly narrow, since it implies that 
Berkeley, Blattner’s Heidegger, and Kant and Husserl on various interpretations are 
idealists. Blattner reads Heidegger as endorsing “temporal idealism,” the view that the 
temporal features of entities depend on us. Moreover, he claims that Dasein’s temporality 




Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 19). Complexities of Blattner’s changing views aside, 
this suffices to make Blattner’s Heidegger an idealist: the natures (viz. temporal features) 
of physical objects are explained by (i.e. grounded in) structures of the subject.   
§1 Blattner’s Idealist Interpretation  
Blattner’s interpretation is motivated primarily by the following passage from §43 of 
Being and Time: 
Of course only as long as Dasein is... ‘is there’ [gibt es] being. When Dasein does not 
exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of 
thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-
the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that 
entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an 
understanding of being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can be said 
that in this case entities will still continue to be. (BT 255) 
 
On Blattner’s 1994 interpretation, in this passage (call it ‘the dependence passage’) 
Heidegger is following Kant in distinguishing between two standpoints: the human or 
empirical standpoint and the transcendental standpoint. From the empirical standpoint 
(‘now’, ‘in this case’) we can say that some entities—present-at-hand (vorhanden) 
entities—are causally independent of human beings, and thus could continue to exist if 
humans disappeared. From the transcendental standpoint (‘in such a case’), on the other 
hand, the “ontological framework” within which existence questions make sense is 
suspended. From the transcendental standpoint, it cannot be said of a situation in which 
there were no Dasein that entities would exist, nor that they would not exist. This is 
because being—the “ontological framework” in virtue of which existence questions are 
meaningful—depends on Dasein.  
 Blattner rejects interpretations on which Heidegger is led to ontological idealism 




substantive conclusion of an argument that’s developed in Division II of Being and Time 
and that mirrors the B-Deduction of the first Critique. The form of this argument, 
according to Blattner, is the following: 
a. The understanding of being (Kant: the concept of an object) discloses (Kant: refers to) the 
temporal structure of things.  
b. Time, and thus the temporal structure of things, depends on us... 
c. That in virtue of which an entity is an entity (Kant: an object is an object) depends on us. 
(‘Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?’, 191-2) 
 
(a) and (b), which Blattner calls ‘the temporality of being’ and ‘temporal idealism’, 
respectively, imply (c), ‘ontological idealism’. 
 A plausible realist reading of Being and Time has to satisfy two criteria. First, it 
has to show that, for Heidegger, the above argument is unsound. The premise I intend to 
reject as an interpretation of Heidegger is (b), temporal idealism. Second, it has to explain 
away what seems to be a bald statement of idealism in the dependence passage. Those 
who interpret ‘being’ as intelligibility or meaning have an easy way to satisfy this second 
criterion. My task is made more difficult, however, by the fact that in Chapter 1 I 
followed Blattner in rejecting such interpretations. My strategy for satisfying these two 
criteria is to understand the dependence passage in terms of the Schematism chapter, 
which Heidegger considers the “central core” of the first Critique (KPM 63). To see why 
Heidegger’s appropriation of the doctrine of the schematism is compatible with realism, 
though, I begin by showing how Husserl’s phenomenology revolves around a similar 
project. Heidegger claims that Kant’s method was, at least in its innermost intentions, 




transcendental phenomenology is realist despite appearances illuminates the 
“background” against which Heidegger developed his reading of Kant (PIK 292). 
§2 Husserl’s Transcendental Aesthetic 
Widely diverging interpretations of Husserl’s transcendental idealism have emerged in 
the literature. Scholars have interpreted him as claiming that the physical supervenes on 
consciousness (A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations; Meixner, “Husserls 
Idealismus”); as a phenomenalist in Ideas I (Gurwitsch, “Husserl in Perspective”) or even 
already in the Logical Investigations (Philipse, “Transcendental Idealism”); as attempting 
to “conceive of the real world and its elements as purely intentional objectivities which 
have their ontic and determining basis in the depths of the pure consciousness that 
constitutes them” (Ingarden, Literary Work of Art, lxxii; Ingarden, On the Motives); as 
concerned only to map the “space of meaning” that “cannot be approached with the 
resources of traditional metaphysical (ancient) or epistemological (modern) philosophical 
paradigms” (Crowell, The Space of Meaning, 182); and as a “correlationist” and thereby 
“well beyond both metaphysical neutrality and metaphysical realism” (Zahavi, Husserl’s 
Legacy, 114). Still others contend that he never abandons realism but simply tries “to 
clarify and describe the sense of... existence as it is manifested in consciousness” (Carr, 
The Paradox of Subjectivity, 82) and that he speaks of “idealism” only to emphasize the 
indispensable role of idealities in phenomenology (Willard, “Realism Sustained?”; D.W. 
Smith, Husserl). For present purposes, my aim is to show (following Ameriks, “Husserl’s 
Realism”) that a central passage in the case for an idealist reading of Ideas I—the thought 




suggest that at least as late as 1924, in a lecture commemorating the bicentennial of 
Kant’s birth, Husserl sees realism as a component of the natural attitude not to be 
challenged by the transcendental turn. 
 As with Heidegger, the prospects for a realist reading of Husserl initially look 
dim. In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes that “[o]nly those who misunderstand the 
most profound sense of the intentional method or of the transcendental reduction or even 
of both, may want to separate phenomenology from transcendental idealism” (CM 86). 
He is clear that his idealism is not Kantian (CM 86; Id §43) or Berkeleyan (Id §55) and 
that “transcendental idealism is nothing more than... an explication of my ego as subject 
of every possible cognition” (CM 86). While this caveat may seem to open up some 
space for a realist reading in the sense defined above, other texts suggest that Husserl 
intends to make a stronger dependence claim. 
 In Ideas I Husserl performs the thought experiment of the destruction of the 
world. 
It is conceivable that experience is teeming with irresolvable conflicts, conflicts that are 
irresolvable not only for us but in themselves; that experience in a fit of obstinacy shows 
itself all at once to be opposed to the presumption that it coherently sustains its positing 
of things.  In sum, it is conceivable that the connectedness of experience loses the fixed, 
regulated order of profiles, construals, appearances – that there is no longer a world.  It 
may be the case thereby that rough formations of unity would come to be constituted to 
some extent, fleeting stopovers for intuitions, that would be mere analogues of intuitions 
of a thing since such analogues are entirely incapable of constituting sustained “realities,” 
enduring unities that “exist in themselves, whether they are perceived or not.” (Id 88) 
 
The striking conclusion of this thought experiment is as follows: “The immanent being is, 
therefore, without doubt absolute being in the sense that, in principle, nulla “re” indiget 




transcendent “res” is utterly dependent upon consciousness, and, indeed, not some 
logically thought up consciousness, but a currently actual consciousness” (Id 89). 
 In what follows, my strategy is to interpret the thought experiment of the 
destruction of the world as addressing a philosophical problematic similar to that of 
Kant’s Schematism chapter. I argue that Husserl modifies this problematic in a realist 
direction through a rethinking of what Sacha Golob helpfully calls “the ‘form’ of 
intentionality” (Golob, “‘Form’ of Intentionality”). Based on the importance Heidegger 
attaches to the Schematism chapter, as well as the influence of Husserl on his reading of 
the first Critique, I offer a reading of the dependence passage on which Heidegger is 
making a similar point about the necessity of intentional form.  
 As Aron Gurwitsch remarks, “[t]hough he was not a historian, either by 
temperament or by training, Husserl repeatedly and most emphatically insisted upon the 
continuity of his endeavors with the great tradition of Western philosophy, especially 
modern philosophy...” (“Husserl in Perspective,” 25). Both aspects of this remark are 
evident in the case of Kant. On the one hand, Husserl recognizes a deep commonality 
between Kant’s project and his own: “...the essential affinity of the problem of the 
evident structure of the world of possible experience with the problems of Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetic and analytic, and even his dialectic, is unmistakable” (PP 71). He 
claims, too, that the A-Deduction “is actually already moving on phenomenological 
ground” (Id 114), although he (i) worries that Kant falls prey to “psychologism of the 
mental faculties” (LI 65n), (ii) seeks to replace Kant’s “half-mythical concept of the a 




sense of the word, ‘metaphysical’ stock elements of the critique of reason” (KITP 13). On 
the other hand, even Husserl’s most sustained discussion of Kant—the 1924 bicentennial 
lecture—“keep[s] Kant at a certain distance” (KITP 16). Indeed, this lecture serves more 
as an overview of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology than as an interpretation and 
criticism of Kant’s critical philosophy. For this reason, a considerable amount of 
reconstruction is required to trace the points of convergence and divergence between 
these two thinkers. In the following, I suggest that Husserl is drawn to Kant’s account of 
synthesis, particularly the imaginative synthesis studied in the Schematism chapter, 
though he reinterprets it to do away with the idealistic consequences Kant draws from it. 
  Let’s begin by rehearsing the trajectory of the first Critique up to the Schematism 
chapter, in particular the Transcendental Deduction and the beginning of the Analytic of 
Principles. The task of the Transcendental Deduction is to secure the objective validity of 
the pure a priori concepts of the understanding (the categories) for experience. This task 
is made pressing by the threat of Humean scepticism about the application of certain non-
empirical concepts to experience. For Hume, we cannot be rationally justified in 
attributing causal relations (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding §4) or a distinct 
and continued existence to objects (Treatise 1.4.2); we are simply subjectively disposed 
via custom to associate perceptions in regular ways that give rise to a sentiment of belief 
in persisting, causally related, and mind-independent objects. Kant’s strategy in the 
Transcendental Deduction is to show that certain uncontroversial features of 
experience—the transcendental unity of apperception in the ‘argument from above’ and 




associationist picture. Instead, experience must be unified via a process of synthesis 
through the categories (Pereboom, “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments,” 6). These forms 
of unity are, moreover, conditions for our experiencing objects at all. 
Kant begins the Analytic of Principles by posing a puzzle about the power of 
judgment. Judgment is “the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing 
whether something does or does not stand under a given rule” (A132/B171). Kant argues 
that this faculty can’t be explained in terms of further rules—this would give rise to an 
infinite regress. He concludes that “judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practiced 
only, and cannot be taught” (Ibid.). However, more can be said than this. The 
Schematism chapter asks how intuitions can be subsumed under concepts. The results of 
the Deduction require in particular a story about how intuitions can be subsumed under 
the categories, but Kant begins the account with a discussion of empirical and pure 
sensible (mathematical) concepts. Mediating between a concept and an intuition is a 
schema, which is a “representation of a universal procedure of the imagination in 
providing an image for a concept” (A140/B179-80). The schema of a concept—dog, 
say—is not itself an image, since images lack the generality of concepts. Rather, 
schemata make images possible. The general point is that the ability to subsume an 
intuition under a concept (the power of judgment) is accounted for by an ability to 
produce images of the various ways in which a dog, say, might appear to intuition.  
The ability to subsume an intuition under a concept presupposes that intuition has 
a certain structure: in particular, that it affords persisting objects that can be given as 




schemata. David Bell describes their function as follows: “To schematize... is to discover 
in the diversity of sensory experience a felt unity, coherence, or order, which is non-
cognitive and non-conceptual, but which is a necessary condition of the possibility of all 
rule-governed thought and judgment” (Bell, “The Art of Judgement,” 238-9). 
Transcendental schemata, moreover, are “a priori determinations of time” (A145/B184); 
the schema of substance, for instance, “is permanence of the real in time” (A143/B183). 
The ability to perceive an enduring object like a dog involves “tacitly connecting the 
intuition with other actual and possible dog-like intuitions in such a way that it becomes 
part of a coherent system of past, present, and future intuitions which collectively 
represent a single, persisting dog” (Pendlebury, “Making Sense of Kant’s Schematism,” 
790). 
 For Kant, schematizing is a synthetic activity of the productive imagination. Kant 
distinguishes between two types of synthesis: figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa), 
which is the work of the productive imagination, and intellectual synthesis (synthesis 
intellectualis), which occurs “without any imagination merely through the understanding” 
(B151-2). Figurative synthesis is the ‘synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition’, that 
is, the synthetic activity through which experience attains the structure necessary for 
judgment to be made on its basis (B151). Intellectual synthesis, on the other hand, is the 
synthesis of concepts involved in mere thought.  
 This distinction is crucial for both Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl follows Kant 
in calling the study of figurative synthesis a “transcendental aesthetics,” though he claims 




constitution of the constitution of a thing” in natural science (Id II 22n; FTL 265, 291-2). 
He also sees Kant as anticipating what he calls the “genealogy of logic”—the project of 
tracing back various levels of spontaneity back to their origins in receptivity: “When 
Kant in his great work speaks of an analytic [i.e. intellectual] synthesis, he means 
cognition deployed there in explicit forms of concepts and judgments, and this points 
back, for him, to a productive [i.e. figurative] synthesis” (PAS 410). For Heidegger, the 
productive imagination is the “common but to us unknown root” from which the two 
stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, arise, which Kant swallowed back 
into the understanding in the second edition (A15/B2; KPM 113). Husserl’s appropriation 
of Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis emerges in his analyses of passive synthesis and 
the various levels of activity built off of it. I now turn to a summary of these analyses, 
which provide the resources for a realist reading of the thought experiment of the 
destruction of the world.  
 Productive or passive synthesis produces “syntheses of identification” in virtue of 
which one object can be given through changing appearances: “...the same object is 
perceived, perceived differently again and again, namely according to its different sides, 
aspects, etc.” (PAS 486). Husserl’s “phenomenology of constitution” studies the 
immanent intentional structures in virtue of which persisting unities can be given with a 
consciousness of identity despite changes in how they appear. Central to constitutional 
analysis is the claim that sensuous content alone is insufficient to account for the way in 
which perceptual acts give or afford their objects. Indeed, the first part of Ideas II traces 




causally related, and intersubjectively perceivable object. In addition to sensuous content 
(“hyletic data”), Husserl recognizes various forms of “apperception” and “horizonal 
intentionality.” As Walter Hopp puts the point: “To accommodate the phenomenology of 
perceptual experience, we must acknowledge a surplus of intentionality beyond that 
supplied by mere sensation” (Hopp, Perception and Knowledge, 43). 
 Husserl assigns a central role in his phenomenology of constitution to horizons 
(CM  48). There are both internal and external horizons; the former are the hidden sides 
and features of the object, while the latter are the backgrounds against which an object is 
perceptually foregrounded. Describing the intentions toward internal horizons essentially 
involved in the perception of spatial objects, Husserl writes: 
When we view the table, we view it from some particular side, and this side is thereby 
what is genuinely seen. Yet the table has still other sides. It has a non-visible back side, it 
has a non-visible interior... Original consciousness is only possible in the form of an 
actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a co-conscious-having of 
other sides that are precisely not originally there. (PAS 40) 
 
Some basic distinctions from the Logical Investigations are useful here. Husserl 
distinguishes between empty (signitive, symbolic) and filled (intuitive) intentions. One 
type of empty intention is mere thought; I can merely think about the table without 
having it intuitively (perceptually, imaginatively, memorially) presented to me. But non-
conceptual empty intentions are also involved in the perception of a spatial object. Only 
one side of the table is intuitively present to me at a time, but it nevertheless appears to 
have more to it.  
 The distinction between these two types of empty intentions corresponds to a 
distinction between two types of fulfillment. In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl 




“filled” by a corresponding intuition: “What the intention means, but presents only in a 
more or less inauthentic and inadequate manner, the fulfillment... sets directly before us... 
In fulfillment our experience is represented by the words: ‘This is the thing itself’” (LI VI 
226-7). But fulfillment is also involved in perception itself. As I move around a table, 
empty intentions directed at its hidden sides are filled, as previously filled intentions pass 
into emptiness. In general, perception has a more or less determinate anticipatory 
structure; objects are perceived according to an “empty horizon of familiar unfamiliarity” 
or “prescriptions of a style of explications to be realized” (EJ 38). Just as conceptual 
fulfillment is a synthesis of identity—the identity of the given and the meant—so too is 
perceptual fulfillment—the identity of the emptily anticipated and the intuitively 
presented.  
 The most basic level of horizonal intentionality is time-consciousness. 
Temporally extended objects can only be given in virtue of empty intentions directed 
toward the past (retentions) and future (protentions). Take a melody for example.  The 
perception of a melody involves retentions of previous notes and protentions of future 
notes, which account for the perception of the melody as a unity, rather than a mere 
succession of disconnected notes. A similar analysis applies to the perception of 
substances, i.e., objects that persist through time and qualitative change. A consciousness 
of unity is constituted by retentions and protentions; the object of my present intention 
appears as one that was just seen (or existed before I turned my attention to it) and will 




 With these Husserlian concepts in hand, we can now see why the thought 
experiment of the destruction of the world is compatible with realism. In a famous letter 
to Marcus Herz dated February 21, 1772, Kant announces the guiding question of his 
critical project: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 
‘representation’ to the object?” (Kant, Correspondence, 133). In his breakthrough to 
transcendental phenomenology in his 1907 lectures, Husserl poses the same question: 
“One can ask: how can knowledge reach out beyond itself, how can it make contact with 
a being that is not to be found within the confines of consciousness?” (IP 62). For both 
Kant and Husserl, objectivity—in the sense of reference to an object—is only possible if 
experience attains a kind of unity: “Objectivity presupposes consciousness of unity, 
consciousness of identity” (PCIT 70). Without such unity, “it would be possible for a 
swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from 
it,” and “in that case all relation of cognition to objects would disappear” (A111). The 
resemblance of this passage to the thought experiment of the destruction of the world is 
striking. For reference beyond the immanent sphere to be possible, experience must be 
structured such that it affords persisting unities; for both Kant and Husserl, this structure 
is at bottom due to temporal synthesis. The lesson that Husserl draws from the thought 
experiment of the destruction of the world, I submit, is that objects transcendent to 
consciousness can only be given in virtue of harmonious interconnections of perceptual 
adumbrations that constitute a consciousness of identity. Consciousness of identity is 
constituted at the pre-predicative level due to horizonal intentions, including the 




 The fact remains that Husserl seems to make two stronger claims here: that 
consciousness is “absolute” and that the world depends on consciousness. Moreover, 
even if the straightforward readings of these claims can be explained away, the 
interpretation of the thought experiment that I’ve offered is merely compatible with 
realism; it rules out neither an idealist understanding of objects nor the kind of 
metaphysical neutrality supposedly advocated in the Logical Investigations (see Zahavi, 
Husserl’s Legacy, Chapter 2). Husserl makes clear, nonetheless, that the natural attitude 
contains realism as a presupposition that is not challenged by the transcendental turn. 
Judgment on the basis of harmonious experience is said to constitute “the norm of truth 
for the world itself, as it is in and for itself, whether we live or die, whether we cognize it 
or not” (KITP 21). In bracketing the natural attitude in order to attend to the constitutive 
accomplishments of consciousness, “no damage of any kind is supposed to be done by 
that to the proper legitimacy of this life” (KITP 22). If this is right, Husserl should be 
interpreted as claiming only that consciousness is absolute in that it can exist without 
constituting any transcendent objects (see Zahavi, Husserl’s Legacy, 103) and that the 
world is dependent only for its givenness on the structure of consciousness (see Hardy, 
Nature’s Suit, 168-80). As Lee Hardy emphasizes, Husserl’s phenomenological claims 
occur in a justification-theoretic, rather than metaphysical, context (Nature’s Suit, 179). I 
argue in the next section that the dependence passage should likewise be read as a claim 
about givenness, rather than ontological dependence. 
 A natural objection may arise at this point: the text I’ve just cited is compatible 




empirical realism. According to Kant, “the transcendental idealist is an empirical realist, 
and grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which need not be inferred, but is 
immediately perceived” (A371). Husserl could be read as endorsing this pair of claims in 
the Encyclopedia Britannica article: “Phenomenology’s transcendental idealism harbors 
natural realism entirely within itself...” (EB 102). While a full response to this objection 
exceeds the scope of this chapter, a close consideration of Husserl’s primary objections to 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy demonstrates, I submit, the plausibility of a reading of 
Husserl’s phenomenology as not only compatible with empirical realism, but fully realist 
in the sense defined above.  
 In the Logical Investigations, Husserl claims that Kant, despite his best intentions, 
fell prey to “psychologism of the mental faculties” (LI 65n). Even after taking his own 
transcendental turn, Husserl continues to accuse Kant of “transcendental psychologism.” 
In the 1929 Formal and Transcendental Logic, for instance, Husserl argues that Kant’s 
critical philosophy, while an improvement on Hume’s fictionalism, was still too beholden 
to the Lockean-Humean sensationalistic psychology. Not only that: Kant failed to 
distinguish pure psychology from transcendental phenomenology, and thereby could not 
get beyond psychologism (FTL 258). Both objections point to Husserl’s rethinking of the 
form of intentionality. Max Scheler gives forceful expression to the phenomenological 
objection to Kant’s residual sensationalism. If one accepts the Humean picture, as Kant 
apparently does (FTL 257), 
one must conclude that all such given contents of experience which go beyond the 
elements of its “sensible content” and are not congruent with them are something added 
by us or are results of our “activity,” a “forming,” a “treatment,” etc. Consequently, 




thingness, unity, multiplicity, truth, causality, the physical, the psychic, etc., must all, 
without exception, be reduced to a “forming” or “feeling into” or some other kind of 
subjective “activity.” For these are supposedly not contained in the “sensible content,” 
which alone “can” be given to us, and which alone therefore… “is” given. (Scheler, 
Formalism in Ethics, 55) 
 
Husserl’s objection to the Kantian understanding of form as “forming” was alluded to 
above in terms of Kant’s “half-mythical concept of the a priori” (KITP 13). In the Thing 
and Space lectures of 1907, Husserl warns against a Kantian understanding of form: 
“‘Form of intuition’ is a fundamentally false expression and implies, even in Kant, a 
fatally erroneous position” (TS 35). While experience must have a certain form—namely, 
that of horizonal intentionality—in order to afford spatial objects, this should not be read, 
as it may be on at least one reading of Kant, as denying that “[s]pace is a necessary form 
of things and is not a form of lived experience...” (TS 35). Indeed, despite his praise for 
Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis, Husserl notes that “Kant was not in the position to 
recognize the essence of passive production as intentional constitution” and thereby 
“missed the problem of evidence” (PAS 410). For Husserl an object is given with 
evidence (Evidenz) when it is apprehended “‘in an originary way,’ as it is in itself ‘in 
person’” (Id 13). These remarks suggest that that a mistaken understanding of 
intentionality led Kant, in Husserl’s view, to endorse the idealist notion that the natures of 
material objects, and not simply their being given, are grounded in the structure of 
consciousness. 
 Why might Kant’s failure to distinguish pure, intentional psychology from 
transcendental phenomenology commit him to transcendental psychologism? Pure 
psychology is an a priori, eidetic discipline that seeks to “establish whatever is 




utterly inconceivable, contrary to sense” (PP 31). Transcendental phenomenology is 
supposed to differ from pure psychology by virtue of “an inquiry into the various 
categories of ‘objects’—but purely as objects of possible consciousness” (Id II 425). 
Indeed, the thought experiment of the destruction of the world is designed to disclose an 
essential feature of transcendent objects—namely, that they are necessarily only given 
inadequately, in one-sided adumbrations.  
 Husserl expresses this point by contrast to the Kantian view according to which 
divine intuition (intellectus archetypus) can grasp objects without the mediation of the 
forms of sensibility, and thus in themselves: “On this supposition, God, the subject of 
absolutely perfect knowledge and thus of every possible adequate perception, naturally 
possesses what we finite creatures are denied: knowledge of the thing in itself... But this 
view is absurd” (Id 76). On my reading, Kant can be said to endorse a form of 
transcendental psychologism because, while he does investigate the necessary features of 
(finite, receptive) consciousness rather than the contingent features of human 
consciousness, his account is not grounded in the essential features of the things 
themselves. The charge that Kant falls prey to transcendental psychologism suggests that 
Husserl seeks to invert Kant’s idealistic grounding of the natures of objects in the 
structure of consciousness, claiming instead that acts affording a particular type of object 
must be structured in a particular way because of the nature of the object. 
 In this section I have argued that one of the most ostensibly idealistic passages in 
Husserl’s work—the thought experiment of the destruction of the world—is intended to 




ultimately temporal) intentionality, in order to afford material objects. In this respect, the 
thought experiment parallels Kant’s Schematism chapter, which shows that the unity 
required for reference to an object is due to the time-determinations of the transcendental 
schemata. Husserl’s charge that Kant commits the errors of transcendental psychologism, 
however, shows that Husserl not only disavows the idealistic consequences Kant draws 
from his theory of synthesis, but also that he modifies this theory in a realist direction. In 
the next section, I argue that Heidegger adopts this Husserlian understanding of 
intentional form and that this adoption provides the resources to reject Blattner’s 
temporal idealist reading. 
§3 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant 
In his 2004 article, Blattner appeals to a passage from the WS 1927-28 lectures where 
Heidegger rejects the thing in itself: 
Along with the assumption of an absolute intuition... the concept of a thing in itself also 
dies away... For appearances are the things themselves, and they are the things that they 
are without these things having to be thought as things in themselves on the basis of an 
untenable concept of being and on the basis of the assumption of a representing God, 
additionally as object for this God. (PIK 68-9) 
 
Blattner takes this passage as evidence that Heidegger adopts a more consistent idealist 
position than Kant. Specifically, he sees Heidegger’s position as an improvement upon 
Kant’s because it avoids the problem of employing one of the categories—existence—
transcendentally, i.e., beyond the scope of possible experience. Since existence claims are 
only meaningful when the transcendental constraints of the understanding of being are in 
place, Blattner concludes that “Heidegger argues that nature neither does nor does not 
exist, if the understanding of being is not granted” (Blattner, “Kantian Idealism 




interpreting the above passage opens up: it doesn’t express Heidegger’s commitment to a 
more consistent version of Kantian idealism, but rather a commitment to realism.  
 In the WS 1927-28 lecture courses quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
Heidegger proposes a phenomenological interpretation of the first Critique. Heidegger 
means a few things by designating his interpretation ‘phenomenological’. First, he claims 
that the method of the first Critique is proto-phenomenological: “In its basic posture the 
method of the Critique is what we, since Husserl, understand, carry out, and learn to 
ground more radically as phenomenological method” (PIK 49). This means in part that 
the investigation of the subject “is neither anthropology nor psychology” (PIK 49). 
Second, a phenomenological interpretation emphasizes that “all thinking stands in service 
to intuition” (PIK 57). Third, and in connection with the second point, a 
phenomenological interpretation is posed against the interpretation of the Marburg school 
of neo-Kantianism (PIK 54). The Marburg school, led by Hermann Cohen and Paul 
Natorp, held that “‘intuition’ no longer remains a cognitive factor which stands across 
from or is opposed to thinking” (Natorp, “Kant and the Marburg School,” 186). 
Heidegger seeks to determine how the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental 
Logic hang together, not by giving pride of place to the latter, but instead by tracing them 
back to the productive imagination. Heidegger is particularly critical of the Marburg 
interpretation of two elements of the first Critique: the Copernican revolution and the 
quaestio juris (PIK 206). In the following, I argue that Heidegger’s criticisms of the neo-
Kantians suggest that he objects to the idealistic consequences they draw from Kant’s 




 The Copernican revolution, recall, is the methodological shift Kant deems 
necessary to establish the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge:  
 Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all 
 attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them 
 a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must 
 therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, 
 if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. (Bxvi)  
 
In particular, the thesis is that objects must conform to the forms of our sensibility and 
understanding. Heidegger argues that the notion of form easily leads to 
misunderstandings that are endemic to the neo-Kantian interpretation. He proposes to 
clear away these misunderstandings by “phenomenologically interpreting what it means 
that space and time are pure forms of intuition” (PIK 84).  
 Heidegger rejects the interpretation of form as forming discussed in the last 
section: “This characterization of ‘form’ easily leads to an irrelevant view—and the 
ensuing misunderstanding becomes more fatal—if one takes the concept which is 
opposed to ‘form,’ i.e., matter, in such an irrelevant way as ‘stuff’ or ‘dough’ which is 
formed in the form of a cake” (PIK 85). In rejecting this “irrelevant” view, Heidegger is 
clear that he is targeting the Marburg interpretation and not Kant himself, though he 
admits that Kant’s text invites misinterpretation. Indeed, like Husserl, Heidegger sees in 
Kant both glimpses of his own phenomenology and lapses into transcendental 
psychologism: “To be sure, there are significant obscurities in Kant which 
understandably give rise to misinterpretations of his Copernican revolution. However, 
Kant never meant that, in grasping some object that we come across, for example this 




myself” (PIK 38). The lesson of the Copernican revolution, Heidegger says, is that “ontic 
knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge” (PIK 38). 
Unpacking this thesis will illuminate how Heidegger follows Husserl in rethinking the 
form of intentionality along realist lines.  
 Heidegger disavows any interpretation of the Copernican revolution according to 
which the existence or natures of the objects of perception are grounded in the structure 
of the subject—that is to say, any idealist interpretation of the thesis that “ontic 
knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge.” Instead, he 
claims that the “philosophically fruitful” sense of the a priori is that according to which it 
“means ‘enabling’” (PIK 73). What is enabled by the a priori structure of the subject is 
“the standing-over-against as ob-ject [Gegen-stand]” of the object of perception (PIK 
217). In this connection, recall the guiding question of Kant’s critical project that he 
announced in his letter to Marcus Herz: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us 
which we call ‘representation’ to the object?” (Kant, Correspondence, 133). The 
phenomenological question that Husserl and Heidegger draw from Kant is this: How 
must the subject (whether consciousness or Dasein) be structured such that transcendent 
entities can “stand over against” it as objects? By emphasizing that these structures are 
enabling, I suggest, Heidegger intends to reject the understanding of form that leads to 
idealism by emphasizing that intentional form allows spatial and temporal objects to be 
given without thereby contributing or grounding their spatial and temporal natures. 
Indeed, he notes that space, as the form of sensibility, “is not something freely invented, 




237). By this he means that both coexistence and succession, i.e., space and time, must be 
“in objects themselves” (PIK 237). Recall here Husserl’s warning from Thing and Space 
about the dangers inherent in the phrase ‘form of sensibility’. Like Husserl, Heidegger 
understands a particular kind of intentional form—namely, horizonal intentionality—as 
an essential feature of any subject capable of having spatial and temporal objects afforded 
to it. As Daniel Dahlstrom notes, Heidegger finds in Kant a kind of phenomenological 
realism on which “the object…is the thing in itself as it appears against a horizon (world) 
co-constituted by the subject’s activity of turning toward entities on hand in a way that 
allows them to stand opposite it” (“Heidegger’s Interpretation of Transcendental 
Imagination,” 399).  
  Despite his appreciation of much of the critical project, Heidegger is harshly 
critical of the centerpiece of the Transcendental Analytic: “Viewed as a quaestio juris, 
the transcendental deduction is the most disastrous segment of teaching in Kantian 
philosophy to which one can refer. The transcendental deduction is almost without 
exception untenable” (PIK 209). Kant presents the Transcendental Deduction as an 
answer to the question “quid juris?”—that is, by what right do we ascribe objective 
validity to our pure concepts, rather than seeing them as products of mere custom or 
attributing their success to a pre-established harmony? He contrasts this question with the 
quaestio facti, which traces concepts back to their empirical origins as in Locke’s 
“physiology of the human understanding” (Aix). Heidegger claims that the quaestio juris 
is motivated by an interpretation of the a priori as “what resides in the isolated subject” 




around the question “What justifies taking this subjective element for something ob-
jective, which basically it is not?” (PIK 213). In contrast to Kant’s juridicial inquiry, 
Heidegger claims that the true transcendental question is a quaestio facti, though not an 
empirical one. Rather, transcendental phenomenology is concerned with “a fact in the 
sense of the ontological and essential structure of Dasein, the transcendental constitution 
of the subject” (PIK 224). More precisely, Heidegger understands the transcendental 
question to be about Dasein’s “ontological transcendence,” that is, the relation to being 
that makes all directedness toward particular entities (“ontic transcendence”) possible 
(PIK 226). Scheler nicely sums up what I take to be a unified phenomenological 
conception of the a priori in contrast to the Kantian conception. The realm of the a priori 
comprises three realms of essential interconnections: “(1) the essences (and their 
interconnections) of the qualities and other thing-contents given in acts (thing-
phenomenology); (2) the essences of acts themselves and their interconnections and 
relations of foundation (phenomenology of acts or foundational orders); and (3) the 
essential interconnections between the essences of acts and those of things…” 
(Formalism, 72). For Heidegger, as for Husserl and Scheler, phenomenology is a study of 
the a priori features of the subject (“the ontological and essential structure of Dasein”) in 
virtue of which objects of various kinds can appear, but the existence or natures of these 
appearing objects are not dependent upon or grounded in features of the subject, as they 
are on a subjectivist understanding of the a priori. 
My account of Heidegger’s interpretations of the Copernican revolution and the 




temporal idealist, i.e., as endorsing the thesis that “[t]ime, and thus the temporal structure 
of things, depends on us” (Blattner, “Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?,” 191). Dasein’s 
temporality is an enabling condition for the appearance of objects that are spatial and 
temporal independently of any contribution from us. If I’m right, this shows that 
Heidegger does not endorse the argument Blattner attributes to him from “the temporality 
of being” and “temporal idealism” to “ontological idealism.” What remains to be shown, 
first, is that the dependence passage is not, as Blattner claims, an endorsement of 
ontological idealism, and second, that it is the continuation of a philosophical problematic 
carried out in the Schematism chapter and the thought experiment of the destruction of 
the world.  
 Blattner rejects “weak” readings of the dependence passage that trivialize its 
claims that without Dasein, nothing would be discovered, understood, or said, nor would 
there be independence from Dasein (Blattner, “Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist?,” 188). 
David Cerbone proposes a weak, non-idealist reading of the passage on which “there is a 
more substantial point lurking just beneath the surface” (Cerbone, “Realism and Truth,” 
258). Heidegger’s aim in the dependence passage, according to Cerbone, is to emphasize 
“the dependence of what can be said about entities (as opposed to the entities themselves) 
on the understanding of being” (Cerbone, “Realism and Truth,” 258). This emphasis is 
the culmination of earlier arguments that express “his opposition to the idea of a 
worldless subject” (Cerbone, “Realism and Truth,” 258). I follow Cerbone in claiming 
that the dependence passage, while ostensibly trivial, stands in for more detailed analyses 




 Notice that a similar charge of triviality could be leveled against one reading of 
Husserl’s “transcendental insight,” i.e., his claim that “this world... with all its objects 
derives its whole sense and existential validity which it has for me from me myself” (CM 
26). Indeed, A.D. Smith considers (and rejects) a “weak” reading of the transcendental 
insight as claiming only that “something can exist ‘for me’… only if I’m around” 
(Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, 32). Yet even on a weak reading, the 
transcendental insight is, to paraphrase a famous letter from Husserl to Natorp, a “large 
banknote” that must be turned into “small change” by detailed constitutional analyses (B 
56). These include the horizonal analyses and analyses of the various levels of receptivity 
and spontaneity discussed in the last section. 
 There are two keys to unpacking the dependence passage along realist lines. First, 
note that when Heidegger claims that being, independence, the “in-itself,” and so on 
depend on Dasein, he is naming an entity with an ontological structure called 
‘disclosedness’. Heidegger distinguishes disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) from 
discoveredness (Entdecktheit), which corresponds to the distinction between ontological 
and ontic transcendence in the Kant lectures. John Haugeland helpfully lays out the 
following features of these concepts: 
6. Intrawordly entities can be discovered only because of or in terms of a prior 
disclosedness... 
7. What is disclosed is not the same as the entities that are discovered in terms of it. 
According to some passages, what is disclosed is the being of those entities... but 
according to others, it is dasein... or even the world... 
8. Disclosedness is primordial truth, and, as such, it is the condition of the possibility of the 
truth of assertions... (Dasein Disclosed, 17-8) 
 
Heidegger gives circumspective concern and lingering to look at something (das 




 On my reading, disclosedness does the work for Heidegger that constitution does 
for Husserl: it makes originary givenness (discovery) possible. This is why Heidegger 
calls disclosedness ‘primordial truth’; following Husserl, Heidegger understands the 
experience of fulfillment—the recognition of the identity of the given and the meant—as 
an experience of truth (BT 260), and disclosedness is a necessary condition of truth as 
discovery. Disclosedness has a horizonal structure; entities are discovered because the 
horizon that Heidegger calls the ‘world’ is first understood. And this horizonal structure 
is at its most basic level temporal; it’s the goal of Division II to demonstrate this. The 
seemingly trivial claim of a weak reading of the dependence passage, then, is turned into 
the “small change” of the analysis of disclosedness into the basic Existenzialien and their 
subsequent reinterpretation into temporal terms. Heidegger is impressed by the 
Schematism chapter precisely because it recasts the categories, as enabling conditions of 
the experience of objects, in temporal terms.  
 The second key to unpacking the dependence passage is to read the German 
phrase ‘es gibt’ with geben in mind (compare Golob, Concepts, Freedom, and 
Normativity, 177-8). The aim of the extant portion of Being and Time is to show how 
ontology is possible through an ontological analysis of the ontological questioner; it aims 
to provide “ontological grounds for ontology” (BT 487) or, in the language of the 
Kantbuch, it is a “laying of the ground for metaphysics” through an “ontological analytic 
of the finite essence of human beings” (KPM 1). Following Husserl, Heidegger believes 
that the a priori claims of ontology must be grounded in intuition (see BT 75n). To claim 




is to claim, I submit, that it is only in virtue of the structure of disclosedness that ontology 
is possible. In this way, Being and Time aims, like Husserl’s work, to develop a 
“genealogy of logic”—an account of how the highest reaches of spontaneity (knowledge 
of essences) arise from the lowest depths of receptivity (pre-predicative experience).   
§4 Beyond Kant 
One of Heidegger’s stated aims in his Kant lectures is to “protect Kant from the 
Kantians” (PIK 210). Part of what this means is protecting Kant from himself. As I have 
shown above, Heidegger by no means thought that Kant had fully realized the promise of 
his critical philosophy; indeed, this is why a so-called “violent” interpretation is called for 
(KPM 141). One of the central theses of Heidegger’s Kant reading is that Kant “shrank 
back” in the B-edition of the first Critique from the discovery of the productive 
imagination as the “unknown root” of the two stems of knowledge, sensibility and 
understanding (KPM 112). On this point Husserl appears to agree: he writes in Ideas I 
that the A-Deduction “is actually already moving on phenomenological ground,” though 
“Kant misinterpreted it as psychological and, thus, gives it up in turn himself” (Id 114). 
To close, I briefly lay out two proposals that Heidegger makes for moving beyond Kant 
to a more expansive form of transcendental philosophy as phenomenological ontology. 
 Heidegger closes his WS 1927-28 lectures by signaling two directions for further 
research: “Universality of being and radicality of time are the two titles which together 
denote the tasks which a further thinking of the possibility of metaphysics calls for” (PIK 
289). First, Kant’s transcendental project is restricted to natural objects; Heidegger calls 




(PIK 289). Second, and corresponding to the first task, Heidegger thinks that such 
analyses call for a move beyond the “ordinary concept of time” to those described in 
Division II of Being and Time. In his bicentennial speech, Husserl echoes Heidegger’s 
first proposal: “...the manifold human socialities and the cultural formations arising in 
their communal life, therefore also the cultural sciences related to them, must be brought 
into the transcendental consideration as ‘objects of possible experience,’ and Kant’s 
‘prejudice for natural science’ must be overcome” (KITP 52). Whether and to what extent 
Husserl and Heidegger’s visions of a universal transcendental philosophy agree in the 
details is another (and a longer) story. 
 I have argued for an alternative to Blattner’s account of Heidegger’s appropriation 
of Kant by situating that appropriation against the backdrop of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
If correct, my reading undercuts Blattner’s case for reading Heidegger as an idealist. This 
is because, for both Husserl and Heidegger, the horizonal form of experience makes it 
possible for objects to be given without thereby contributing or grounding their spatial 
and temporal natures. Their shared rejection of a “half-mythical” and “irrelevant” view of 
intentional form suggests that they want to retain the core insights of Kant’s doctrines of 
synthesis and the schematism without drawing any idealistic consequences from them. 
Insofar as Blattner’s account is the most sophisticated case for an anti-realist reading of 
Heidegger on offer, my alternative readings of the dependence passage and Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant form an important step in the development of a fully realist reading 




Chapter Five: Heidegger’s Anthropological Turn: Kant, Myth, and Metaphysics 
 
“What is the human being? A transition, a direction, a storm sweeping over our planet, a recurrence or a 
vexation for the gods? We do not know. Yet we have seen that in the essence of this mysterious being, 
philosophy happens.” (FCM 7) 
 
“…ontology is an index of finitude. God does not have it.” (KPM 197)  
 
 
Heidegger ends Being and Time on an odd note. After devoting the entire book to what 
he calls “ontological grounds for ontology,” he admits that “our way of exhibiting the 
constitution of Dasein’s being remains only one way which we may take” (BT 487). In 
addition to the existential analytic of Dasein, he suggests, an “ontical foundation” may 
also be required (Ibid.). In the closing sections of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
too, Heidegger argues that fundamental ontology, which investigates “the constitution of 
the being of Dasein... [i]nsofar as the ground for the possibility of metaphysics is found 
therein... is only the first level of the metaphysics of Dasein” (KPM 163). Fundamental 
ontology, we’re told in the 1928 lectures on The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, has 
to be supplemented by a “metaphysical ontic” or “metontology,” which constitutes a 
turn-around (Kehre) or overturning (Umschlag) of the Being and Time project (MFL 
158). During the same period, Heidegger deals increasingly, if ambivalently, with 
biological and anthropological themes. It’s not surprising, then, that Husserl situates 
Heidegger’s philosophy alongside that of his other philosophical “antipode,” Max 
Scheler, as a kind of philosophical anthropology—worse yet, anthropologism—that by 
failing to radically undergo the phenomenological reduction “falls back into the naiveté 
the overcoming of which has... been the whole meaning of modernity” (P&A 499). More 




Schelerian reflections on the human being’s place among “beings as a whole” is 
incompatible with transcendental phenomenology. If Husserl and Crowell are right, and 
if Heidegger is indeed engaged in transcendental phenomenology in Being and Time, 
then the seeds for the destruction of that work lie on its penultimate page. 
At the same time that Heidegger begins to develop his thoughts on ontical 
foundation of ontology, he works out a radical—indeed, “violent”—new interpretation of 
Kant’s first Critique. He takes aim at the dominant neo-Kantian interpretation of the 
Critique as a theory of experience, developed by Hermann Cohen and defended by Ernst 
Cassirer at the famous Davos disputation in 1929. The debate between Heidegger and 
Cassirer—both at Davos and in reviews and remarks on each other’s work—can appear 
as an unbridgeable clash of interpretive strategies, alliances, and worldviews: 
Schematism versus Transcendental Dialectic, thrownness versus spontaneity, finitude 
versus infinity, time versus ought, anxiety versus enlightenment, Kierkegaard versus 
Hegel.38 I want to argue in what follows, though, that some progress can be made in 
assessing the coherence of Heidegger’s thought by highlighting points at which it 
converges with Cassirer’s. In particular, I want to explore how both Heidegger and 
Cassirer come to engage with philosophical anthropology through their studies of Kant’s 
critical project, and in particular how they conceive of the unity that Kant claims for the 
three Critiques under the guiding question of philosophical anthropology: What is the 
human being?  
																																																								
38 For elaboration on these contrasts, see the Davos dispute and Heidegger’s review of Cassirer’s Mythical 
Thought in KPM, Peter Gordon’s Continental Divide, Cassirer’s review of the Kantbuch, and the section 




I begin in §1 by laying out some of the background and details of Heidegger’s 
anthropological turn in works from 1928-30. In §2 I rehearse Husserl and Crowell’s 
objections to Heidegger’s anthropological tendencies. In §3 I present basics of Cassirer’s 
treatment of mythical thought in the second volume of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 
as well as Heidegger’s review of that work. In §4 I show how Heidegger and Cassirer are 
led by their anthropological research to competing answers to Kant’s fourth question, but 
also to conceptions of the necessity of philosophical anthropology for transcendental 
philosophy. This will, I hope, constitute a defense of the compatibility of the 
phenomenological, metaphysical, and anthropological aspects of Heidegger’s project. 
§1 Heidegger’s Anthropological Turn 
 
In the Jäsche Logic Kant famously claims that 
 
 The field of philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following 
questions: 
 
 1. What can I know? 
 2. What ought I to do? 
 3. What may I hope? 
 4. What is the human being? 
 
Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and 
anthropology the fourth.  Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as 
anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one. (Lectures on Logic, 
538) 
 
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger interprets the first Critique is a 
“laying of the ground of metaphysics” in “the finite essence of human beings” (KPM 1). 
In particular, he sees Kant as showing how metaphysica generalis (ontology) is possible. 
Metaphysica generalis is “a general ontology which exists prior to an ontology of nature 
as object of natural science and prior to an ontology of nature as object of psychology” 




general” (PIK 46). The fact that Kant unifies his first three questions under the fourth 
indicates to Heidegger that, for Kant, “the grounding of metaphysics is a questioning with 
regard to the human being, i.e., anthropology” (KPM 144). The investigation into the 
essence of the human being, moreover, lies within what Heidegger, following Kant, calls 
a “metaphysics of metaphysics” (KPM 161-2, 191). Finally, the grounding of 
metaphysics requires a metaphysics of Dasein, only the first level of which is 
fundamental ontology (KPM 163). 
This curious combination of metaphysical and anthropological concerns appears 
in two lectures surrounding the publication of the Kantbuch: Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic of SS 1928 and Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude of WS 1929-30. Yet Heidegger is eager to distance himself from the movements 
of philosophical anthropology and life philosophy. Two major works of philosophical 
anthropology date from this period: Helmuth Plessner’s Die Stufen des Organischen und 
der Mensch (1928) and Max Scheler’s Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1927). On 
the one hand, Heidegger diagnoses philosophical anthropology’s fixation on the clash 
between spirit and life as a recapitulation of Nietzsche’s opposition between the 
Dionysian and the Apollonian that is motivated by contemporary humanity’s boredom 
with itself (FCM §18). Second, he considers Scheler’s thesis that “man is the being who 
unites within himself all the levels of being—physical being, the being of plants and 
animals, and the being specific to spirit” to be a “fundamental error… that must 
inevitably deny him any access to metaphysics” (though, as we’ll see below, Heidegger 




non-human animals). Third, he denies that the metaphysics of Dasein is simply a regional 
ontology of human beings that is “arranged alongside the other ontologies which, along 
with it, spread out over the entire field of beings” (KPM 148). 
The anthropological works lie at the intersection of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological and metaphysical decades (Kisiel, Genesis 59; Crowell, Space of 
Meaning, 225). More precisely, according to the characterizations offered by Kisiel and 
Crowell, the phenomenological decade ends in 1927. I’ll argue against Crowell in the 
following that Heidegger’s phenomenological and metaphysical tendencies coherently 
blend in the years 1928-30. But first it will be useful to see how Heidegger understands 
metaphysics in these years, in particular because his anthropological reflections constitute 
part of metaphysics so understood. 
Following Aristotle, Heidegger characterizes metaphysics (first philosophy) in a 
twofold manner: First, metaphysics is ontology—that is, the science of being qua being. 
Second, metaphysics is theology. For Heidegger, the subject matter of theology is 
“simply beings—the heavens: the encompassing and overpowering, that under and upon 
which we are thrown, that which dazzles us and takes us by surprise, the overwhelming” 
(MFL 11). Metaphysics thus comprises two parts: “knowledge of being and knowledge 
of the overwhelming,” and these parts correspond to the analyses in Being and Time of 
existence and thrownness, respectively (MFL 11). Insofar as theology is concerned with 
entities and not being, it seems natural to identify it with the ontical foundation of 




Fundamental ontology, as the existential analytic of Dasein, is an investigation 
into the mode of being of the ontological questioner. In other words, it’s an account of the 
essential features of the ontological questioner in virtue of which being can become a 
theme of investigation—that is, in virtue of which the question of what ‘being’ means can 
be answered. The central feature described by fundamental ontology goes by many 
names—‘understanding of being’, ‘disclosedness’, ‘existence’, and ‘transcendence’, 
among others. Heidegger claims that the account of Dasein’s transcendence has to be 
supplemented by an investigation into “beings as a whole” that he calls ‘metontology’ 
(MFL 157). Fundamental ontology aspires to neutrality—that is, it aspires to describe 
essential features of the ontological questioner. But the starting point of fundamental 
ontology is never neutral; not only is it entangled in various concrete (existentiell) forms 
of life, but it is “dispersed in a body... disunited in a particular sexuality” (MFL 137). In 
this respect, then, the existential analytic “presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, 
and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature” (MFL 156). The second 
level of the metaphysics of Dasein, then, is an investigation into physis, the “self-forming 
prevailing of beings as a whole,” including the human being’s place “in the midst of, and 
permeated by, the changing of the seasons, in the midst of the alternation of day and 
night, in the midst of the wandering of the stars, of storms and weather and the raging of 
the elements,” as well as the events of “procreation, birth, childhood, maturing, aging, 
[and] death” (FCM 25-6). 
The notion of “beings as a whole” occupies a central place in Heidegger’s WS 




(Grundstimmung) of the contemporary age, viz., boredom, and his account of Dasein as 
“world-forming” in contradistinction to the “world-poor” animal. The latter account 
draws heavily upon the work of the biologist Jakob von Uexküll. Von Uexküll conceived 
of his biological theory as an extension of Kant’s critical project. He draws from Kant the 
idea that “the subject plays the decisive role in constructing the world of appearance,” 
expanding the account of how this happens in two directions: “(1) by considering the part 
played by our body, and especially by our sense-organs and central nervous system, and 
(2) by studying the relations of other subjects (animals) to objects” (von Uexküll, 
Theoretical Biology, xv). The construction of reality varies according to the constitution 
of an organism, so that so that “for each animal... its function-circles constitute a world 
by themselves, within which it leads its existence in complete isolation” (Theoretical 
Biology, 126). Heidegger, drawing upon experimental research on bees, argues that 
animal behavior, in contradistinction to human comportment, is not characterized by an 
“as-structure” (BT §32). That is, non-human animals do not relate to entities “as entities” 
or “as such.” But the sense in which the human being is “world-forming” is not exhausted 
by its apprehension of entities as entities; rather, human beings are distinguished by the 
fact that entities are manifest to them as a whole (FCM §68f.). This concern not only with 
“being as such” but also “beings as a whole” fuels Crowell’s account of the demise of 
Being and Time. 
§2 The Threat of Anthropologism 
 
Though not mentioned by name, Heidegger is surely one of the targets of Husserl’s 1931 




philosophy as a prominent form of philosophical anthropology, he laments that “even the 
so-called ‘phenomenological movement’ has got caught up in this new trend, which 
alleges that the true foundation of philosophy lies in human being alone, and more 
specifically in a doctrine of the essence of human being’s concrete worldly Dasein” 
(P&A 484). Any attempt to found philosophy on a science of the human being is for 
Husserl a form of anthropologism or psychologism—the error submitted to scathing 
criticism in the Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations. Anthropologism, according to 
that work, is the thesis that “all truth has its source in our common human constitution”—
from which it follows that “if there were no such constitution, there would be no truth” 
(LI v.1 80). Anthropologism thus entails the absurd conclusion of the “relativity of 
cosmic existence” (LI v.1 81). It’s worth nothing that Heidegger’s work is peppered with 
what look like bald statements of anthropologism so understood; to take just one 
example, he claims that “Newton’s laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth 
whatever—these are true only as long as Dasein is” (BT 269). Considerable care is called 
for here, however, since Heidegger disavows the implication of the relativity of cosmic 
existence: “To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify 
that before him there were no entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those 
laws” (BT 269).  
Husserl contrasts two conceptions of philosophy: the objectivistic idea deriving 
from antiquity and the subjective-transcendental idea that emerged in the modern period. 
According to the objectivistic idea, philosophy aims at “a universal ontology that is not 




essential form, the pure ratio of the world, including all of its regional spheres of being” 
(P&A 487). The subjective-transcendental idea of philosophy doesn’t so much reject the 
aim of the objectivistic idea as seek to ground it: “It is the problem of cognition or of 
consciousness. It is the problem of the possibility of objectively valid science. It is the 
problem of the possibility of metaphysics...” (P&A 488). This subjective turn has, 
however, taken two forms: the anthropological or psychological and the transcendental. 
What sets the latter apart from the former is the phenomenological reduction, that is, the 
methodological move of bracketing the existence of the world of my experience in order 
to then “interrogate the sources of that world’s meaning and validity for us, the sources 
that comprise the true meaning of its being” (P&A 498). Any project that seeks to ground 
philosophy in the essence of the human being “presupposes the existing world” and so 
“falls back into that naïveté the overcoming of which has... been the whole meaning of 
modernity” (P&A 499). What is worse, contemporary philosophy falls back on the 
objectivistic idea; Scheler is singled out in particular for taking “the renewed justification 
of eidos and of a priori or ontological knowledge” in Husserl’s Logical Investigations as 
“license to pursue a naïve metaphysics” (P&A 499). 
Steven G. Crowell echoes Husserl’s critique of Heidegger’s supposed 
anthropologism in his investigation into the “end” of Being and Time in the threefold 
sense of its closing pages, its goal, and its demise. Crowell sees the introduction as part of 
the reassessment of the Transcendental Dialectic that Heidegger hints at in the Kantbuch. 
Whereas in the Antinomy of Pure Reason Kant argues that reason falls into dialectical 




Heidegger’s turn to metontology as an attempt to revive such investigation into “beings 
as a whole.” Metontology is thus “Heidegger’s attempt to rescue metaphysics from 
Kant’s transcendental dialectic,” an attempt that Crowell argues is incompatible with the 
framework of Being and Time (Space of Meaning, 230).  
Crowell calls the problem for metontology “the problem of double grounding.” 
Crowell identifies two kinds of ground: an ontological or transcendental sense and an 
ontic sense. He sees both at play, for example, in the following passage from Being and 
Time: 
 Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined 
 ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, ‘is there’ 
 anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow... that readiness-to-hand is ontologically  founded 
 upon presence-at-hand? (BT 101) 
 
On Crowell’s reading, when Heidegger denies that the ready-to-hand is ontologically 
grounded in the present-at-hand, he is making a point about “conditions of intelligibility” 
or “the priority of meaning” (Space of Meaning, 234); when he claims that “only by 
reason of something present-at-hand, ‘is there’ anything ready-to-hand,” he is invoking 
some kind of metaphysical grounding relation. This latter kind of grounding, Crowell 
suggests, would be the subject of the investigation into the “ontic foundation” of ontology 
hinted at the end of Being and Time. The equivocation between these two senses of 
‘ground’ in Being and Time is apparently “contained by Heidegger’s Husserlian 
procedure of bracketing all question of ontic ground” (Ibid.). Metontology, on the other 
hand, “implies a shift toward a transcendental realistic perspective that is not 





I argue in §4 that Heidegger does not fall prey to anthropologism, “the problem of 
double grounding,” or dialectical illusion. First, Heidegger is careful to distinguish his 
fundamental ontology from philosophical anthropology. Second, the phenomenological 
reduction need not bar investigation of metaphysical relations like grounding, or better, 
material constitution. Third, Heidegger is clear that metontology does not have the same 
subject matter as dogmatic cosmology. Before elaborating on these objections, I first turn 
to an overview of Cassirer’s investigation of mythical thought. This will allow me in §4 
to give a preliminary, positive account of the subject matter and aim of metontology. It 
will also allow me to bridge the gap between Cassirer and Heidegger’s philosophies.  
§3 Cassirer on Mythical Thought 
 
A central claim of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is that the Kantian forms of 
sensibility and understanding must be understood as invariants under historical 
transformation. The general theory of relativity appeared to empirically refute Kant’s 
claim that space and time are the forms of our sensibility, and quantum mechanics 
appeared to call into question the “causal principle” that proved so important for Kant’s 
response to Hume. If the critical project is committed to the view that “theoretical 
knowledge of nature is built up when the ‘given’ of sensation enters into the a priori 
forms of pure intuition and the pure understanding through a specific place of admission, 
which has been ready and waiting from the beginning,” then it has indeed been 
“progressively refuted in the course of the development of our theoretical knowledge 
since Kant” (Cassirer, Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, 21). The critical project can only 




theoretical signification only in theoretical thought’s living function, only in its work and 
in its achievements” (Ibid.). While the symbolic forms of space, time, and causality 
undergo transformation with the progression of science, they retain their invariant forms 
as principles for imposing order on intuition. 
The historical transformation of symbolic form is not, however, limited to the 
history of the natural sciences. Rather, Cassirer sees language, myth, art, and religion as 
autonomous realms of symbolic form that “are directed toward the one goal of 
transforming the passive world of mere impressions... into a world that is pure expression 
of the human spirit” (Language, 80-1). In language, myth, art, and religion, the invariant 
“quality” of the forms of space, time, and causality take on different “modalities” or 
“tonalities” in virtue of their place in different “formal contexts” of meaning (Language, 
95). So, for instance, time is constitutive of theoretical, aesthetic, and mythical cognition, 
but its meaning differs in each case; the time of the four-dimensional continuum differs 
from the time of musical rhythm, which in turn differs from the sacred time of the 
Sabbath. The very same material can be objectified according to different symbolic 
forms, as Cassirer demonstrates with his example of a curved line: depending on which 
“sphere of vision” we stand in, the line may be perceived according to its geometric 
properties, as a representation of a trigonometric function, as a mythical sign possessing 
“magically compelling and repelling power,” or as an aesthetic ornament 
(Phenomenology of Knowledge, 201).  
Cassirer rejects interpretations of myth that treat it as merely allegorical or an 




immanent standards of objectivity. Nonetheless, Cassirer echoes Hegel in identifying a 
dialectical transition between symbolic forms as they move from an emphasis on the 
sensuous and particular toward the ideal and universal. Religion introduces a distinction 
that is foreign to mythical thought: “...in its use of sensuous images and signs it 
recognizes them as such—a means of expression which, though they reveal a determinate 
meaning, must necessarily remain inadequate to it, which ‘point’ to this meaning but 
never wholly exhaust it” (Mythical Thought, 239). Aesthetic consciousness attains an 
even greater self-consciousness about the spontaneous formative powers of the mind; 
through the symbolic forms of art “there arises a new freedom of consciousness: the 
image... becomes for the spirit a pure expression of its own creative power” (Mythical 
Thought, 261). All of the symbolic forms are “roads by which the spirit proceeds towards 
its objectivization, i.e., its self-revelation” (MT 78).  
On Cassirer’s account, mythical consciousness is characterized by a series of 
identifications: between (a) images and their objects, (b) names and their bearers, and (c) 
parts and their wholes. Regarding (a), for example, Cassirer notes that a sacred rite “is no 
mere imitative portrayal of an event but is the event itself”; the dancer in a mythical 
drama “is the god, he becomes the god” (Mythical Thought, 39). Regarding (b), Cassirer 
describes rites of passage in which a man is given a new name “because what he receives 
in the rite is a new self” (Mythical Thought, 41). Belief in the importance of the divine 
name and the divine word likewise indicate that mythical consciousness does not regard 
meaning as something ideal, but as an efficacious part of reality (Language and Myth, 45; 




(c) “there is a general link, a true causal nexus, between all things whose spatial 
proximity or whose membership in the same material whole designates them...as 
‘belonging together” (Mythical Thought, 51). This identification is evinced, for instance, 
in forms of magic that use parts of a person (his hair, saliva, or excrement) to affect the 
person (Mythical Thought, 52). 
Cassirer next turns from the transcendental analytic of mythical consciousness to 
its transcendental aesthetic. The “formal context” that unifies the mythical forms, 
Cassirer claims, is the “basic opposition” between the sacred and the profane (Mythical 
Thought, 74). For mythical consciousness, space is divided into “two provinces of being: 
a common, generally accessible province and another, sacred, precinct which seems to be 
raised out of its surroundings, hedged around and guarded against them” (Mythical 
Thought, 85). Time, too, is given an “accent” or “rhythmic articulation” through the 
assignment of rites to particular times, the demarcation of holy days, and rites of passage 
(Mythical Thought, 108-9). The “formal contexts” of theoretical and mythical cognition 
are also apparent in their treatments of number; theoretical cognition uses number to 
represent universal lawful relationships between phenomena, while for mythical 
cognition sacred numbers “draw all existing things, all immediate data, everything that is 
merely ‘profane’ into the mythical-religious process of sanctification” (Mythical Thought, 
143). The “formal context” that unifies the forms of theoretical cognition is explanation; 
the “formal context” of mythical cognition is significance (MT 143).  
The “basic opposition” between the sacred and the profane is manifested in the 




or force, but as a form of experience, a “characteristic accent which the magical-mythical 
consciousness places on objects” (Mythical Thought, 77-8). The concept of mana 
represents “the impression of the extraordinary, the unusual, the uncommon” (Mythical 
Thought, 77). In experiences with this accent, mythical consciousness dwells in the 
immediacy of the particular, in “the simple intensity of its presence... the irresistible force 
with which it impresses itself upon consciousness” (Mythical Thought, 74). This sets it 
apart from theoretical consciousness, which seeks to understand phenomena by 
subsuming them under universal laws (Language and Myth, 32). 
The concept of mana is the focus of Heidegger’s review of Mythical Thought, and 
it will prove to be useful for our understanding of his anthropological turn. Heidegger 
distinguishes three tasks of the philosophy of myth: first, “the grounding and guiding of 
the positive sciences of mythical Dasein (ethnology and the history of religion”; second, 
to “examine the foundations and methodological principles that support the philosophical 
analysis of the essence of myth”; and third, to analyze “the constitutive function of myth 
in human Dasein and in the all of beings as such” (KPM 186). In the first task Heidegger 
considers Mythical Thought a resounding success; against “naturalistic, totemistic, 
animistic, and sociological” accounts of myth, Cassirer’s account has the advantage of 
explaining myth not in terms of some determinate sphere of objects to which mythical 
consciousness is directed, but rather in terms of a pervasive form or “how” of spirit 
(KPM 186). Concerning the second task, though, Heidegger has his reservations.  
First, Heidegger objects to Cassirer’s analysis of myth as a “functional form of 




architectonic the mana-representation belongs: is it a form of thought, form of intuition, 
or form of life? This unclarity raises a crucial question: “is this fundamental 
‘representation’ simply present at hand in mythical Dasein, or does it belong to the 
ontological constitution of mythical Dasein?” (KPM 188). Heidegger, predictably 
enough, opts for the latter: “In the mana-representation, what becomes evident is nothing 
other than the understanding of being that belongs to every Dasein as such” (KPM 188). 
What’s significant here is that while the understanding of being “undergoes specific 
transformations according to each basic way of Dasein’s being,” there is an invariant 
understanding of being—one that belongs to Dasein “as such” (KPM 188). What is 
modified in mythical Dasein, Heidegger suggests, is that its thrownness is accentuated.  
In ‘thrownness’ there is a being-delivered-over of Dasein to the world, so that this being-
in-the-world is overwhelmed by that to which it is delivered over. Overpoweringness as 
such is capable on whole of announcing itself only for a being that is delivered over to 
something. In this being referred to the overpowering, Dasein is dazed by it and is 
capable therefore of experiencing itself only as belonging to and affiliated with this 
actuality itself. In thrownness any and all uncovered beings have, accordingly,  the 
being-character of overpoweringness (mana). (KPM 188) 
 
The accentuation of thrownness in mythical Dasein raises a basic question: “which is the 
constitution of the being of human Dasein as such, such that it comes to its own self only 
by way of this detour through the world? What do selfhood and independence [Selbstheit 
und Selbständigkeit] mean?” (KPM 189). 
The analysis of the concept of mana clearly belongs to the second level of the 
metaphysics of Dasein: metontology, the metaphysical ontic, or theology as “knowledge 
of the overwhelming.” The review of Mythical Thought, despite its brevity, gives us two 
more clues to what kind of investigation this might be: first, it concerns the thrownness 




the question of how selfhood and independence are related. In the next and final section I 
spell out in more detail the systematic place of these issues in Heidegger’s early thought. 
§4 The Metaphysics that Belongs to Human Nature 
 
Heidegger writes in the Kant book that the analysis of Dasein “prepare[s] the 
foundation for the metaphysics that ‘belongs to human nature’” (KPM 1). Given Kant’s 
claim that the transcendental illusion that gives rise to the dialectic of pure reason is 
“natural and unavoidable” (A298/B354), it might be natural to understand the 
“metaphysics that belongs to human nature” as metaphysica specialis, i.e., rational 
psychology, cosmology, and theology. Indeed, Crowell reads Heidegger as trying to 
reinstate metaphysica specialis to its previous, pre-critical state through his reflection on 
“beings as a whole.” Part of Crowell’s case is an argument by elimination. He argues, 
first, that metontology cannot be identified with the regional ontologies of history, 
artworks, space, life, and human existence (MFL 151); these ontologies, according to 
Crowell, are already part of fundamental ontology. Second, he argues that metontology 
cannot be the investigation of thrownness “in the sense of demonstrating the natural, 
social, or historical limits of Dasein’s understanding of being,” since, first, this would 
once again be ensnared in the problem of double grounding, and second, Being and Time 
already investigates thrownness through the analysis of, e.g., anxiety (Space of Meaning, 
240). These points, along with the proximity of metontology to Scheler’s cosmology, 
suggest to Crowell that the “overturning” of fundamental ontology is a return to 
something resembling dogmatic metaphysics; indeed, Heidegger calls at the end of the 




is, I believe, mistaken on all three counts: first, the regional ontologies of history, 
artworks, life, and so on are not, strictly speaking, part of fundamental ontology; second, 
metontology is clearly a deepening of the analysis of thrownness; and third, it’s a deep 
misunderstanding to identify Heidegger’s reflection on “beings as a whole” with 
dogmatic cosmology.   
Before elaborating on these points, let me first suggest that Heidegger—and 
Cassirer—were sensitive to the fact that the suggestion that anthropology plays a central 
role in transcendental philosophy naturally raises accusations of psychologism and 
anthropologism. In the midst of discussions of Scheler, Plessner, von Uexküll, Klages, 
Bergson, and others that closely parallels Heidegger’s own treatment of philosophical 
anthropology in his lectures, Cassirer writes 
Do we not, by entering into this sphere of problems, again expose ourselves to all the 
ambiguities and dangers of “psychologism”? Are we not, by raising this very question, 
being untrue to the basic position that Kant worked out for “critical philosophy”? We can 
oppose this objection by pointing out that it was none other than Kant himself who, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, showed the way of the “subjective deduction” as well as of the 
“objective deduction.” He not only asked about the conditions of the possibility of objects 
of experience... he also directed the critical question to this kind of knowledge, to “the 
capacity to think itself.” In fact, the essence of psychologism consists in the fact not that 
one follows the “subjective deduction” at all, but that it is not clearly and sharply 
distinguished from the tasks and method of the “objective deduction.” The actual and true 
victory over psychologism can therefore never consist in avoiding the problems of 
“philosophical anthropology,” but in giving these problems their proper place within the 
system of philosophy. (Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, 55-6)  
 
In the A Preface to the first Critique, Kant notes that the Transcendental Deduction has 
two sides: an objective side, which demonstrates the objective validity of the a priori 
concepts of the understanding, and a subjective side, which “deals with the pure 
understanding itself, concerning its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it 




effect,” and “does not belong essentially” to the chief end of the Critique (Axvi-xvii). In 
the Kantbuch, Heidegger suggests that the downplaying of the subjective deduction goes 
hand in hand both with anthropology and with Kant’s “shrinking back” before his 
discovery of the transcendental power of the imagination.  
Inquiring into the subjectivity of the subject, the “subjective deduction,” leads us into 
darkness. Therefore, Kant does not refer to his anthropology, not just because it is 
empirical and not pure, but rather because in and through the execution of the ground-
laying itself, the manner of questioning regarding human beings becomes questionable. 
(KPM 150) 
 
These remarks of course don’t settle anything in themselves; Cassirer and Heidegger 
could simply be mistaken about the compatibility of philosophical anthropology and 
transcendental philosophy.  
 4.1 Finitude and thrownness 
For Heidegger, the clue to answering the guiding question of philosophical 
anthropology—“What is the human being?”—lies in discerning the unity of the other 
three questions in the fourth. According to Heidegger, these questions are all indexes of 
human finitude.  
Where an ability is questionable and wants to be delimited in terms of its possibilities, it 
already places itself within a disability. An all-powerful entity need not ask: What can I 
do, i.e., What can I not do?... Whosoever comes wholly to be moved by his innermost 
interest in this question reveals a finitude in the depths of his essence.  
 
Where a duty is questionable, the questioning creature hovers between “yes” and “no” 
and worries about what it should not do. A creature that is fundamentally interested in 
duty knows itself in a not-yet-having-fulfilled, so that what indeed it should do becomes 
questionable to it. This not-yet of a fulfilling... gives us a clue that a creature whose 
innermost interest is with duty is fundamentally finite. 
 
Where an allowing to hope becomes questionable, it rises up in what has been conceded 
or in what remains denied to the questioner. What is asked about is what can be placed in 
the expectation and what cannot. All expecting, however, needs a privation. If this 
neediness even arises in the innermost interest of human reason, then it attests to that 





Kant himself contrasts human reason with divine reason in just this manner; he contrasts 
our intellectus ectypus with God’s intellectus archetypus (Power of Judgment 5: 408) and 
notes that “no imperatives hold for the divine will” (Grounding 4: 414). What, though, 
does our finitude have to do with grounding metaphysics? And does the analysis of this 
finitude belong to fundamental ontology or metontology? 
There are three interlocking themes that belong under the heading of ‘finitude’ for 
Heidegger. The guiding thread is the recognition that Dasein always finds itself “in the 
midst of beings”—absorbed, captivated, overwhelmed, and dazed by the “mostly 
concealed shimmering of all that exists” (KPM 167). Our being in the midst of things has 
three dimensions: first, our regular comportment toward entities is “undifferentiated”; 
second, the metaphysics of Dasein must begin from the “inessentiality of the self” (MFL 
140); and third, the metaphysics of Dasein reveals our thoroughgoing dependence on 
other entities.  
 4.1.1 Undifferentiated comportment 
A central thesis of Heidegger’s early work is that “there are certain fundamentally 
diverse ‘kinds’ of beings, which prescribe certain contexts in respect of which we take up 
a fundamentally different position” (FCM 275). For the most part, though, we don’t make 
recognize these distinctions:  
...in the everydayness of our Dasein we let beings come toward us and present themselves 
before us in a remarkable undifferentiatedness... the beings that surround us are uniformly 
manifest as simply something present at hand in the broadest sense—the presence of land 
and sea, the mountains and forests, and within this the presence of animals and plants and 
the presence of human beings and the products of human work, and amongst all this the 





Significantly, Heidegger notes that “the ‘mana’ concept is to be explained by this non-
differentiation and being delivered over to the world” (MFL 88). This undifferentiated 
comportment toward entities with different kinds of being—nature, human artifacts, 
organisms, and other selves—shows that “comportment toward beings transpires first 
without awakening any fundamental relationship of man toward beings” (FCM 276). In 
order to see how ontology is possible, then, we need to show how these fundamental 
relationships “are capable of being awakened” (FCM 276). Our finitude “lies in 
forgetfulness,” and so ontology must consist in “remembering again” (KPM 163-4). Our 
finitude, then, is called upon to explain the supposed fact that ontology has hitherto failed 
to recognize the subject matter of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology: “the being of 
entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives” (BT 60).  
  4.1.2 The primacy of the existentiell 
The emphasis on Dasein’s finitude is also meant to highlight the methodological 
priority of what Heidegger calls the “existentiell” in the interpretation of Dasein. 
Concrete existentiell involvement is “necessary and essential for the metaphysical 
project,” though “it is... as an individual existentiell component, not authoritative and 
obligatory within the many concrete possibilities of each factical existence” (MFL 140). 
This recalls the puzzling admission in Being and Time that the analysis of authenticity is 
guided by a “definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein” 
(BT 358), which is nevertheless “not binding from an existentiell point of view” (BT 
361). This priority of the existentiell carries a pair of dangers: “first, into taking the 




existentiell absolutes in their extreme, fundamental-ontological conceptualization” (MFL 
140). The goal of the metaphysics of Dasein is not merely to catalogue different forms of 
life or to defend some confessional or political worldview; it is to uncover a unified 
understanding of being that lays dormant in various concrete, historical manifestations of 
Dasein. The danger of absolutizing a worldview can be abated, Heidegger suggests, by 
interpreting forms of life unlike our own. In particular, “[p]rimitive Dasein often speaks 
to us more directly in terms of a primordial absorption in ‘phenomena’... A way of 
conceiving things which seems, perhaps, rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint, 
can be positively helpful in bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a 
genuine way” (BT 76). In calling for an ontical foundation for ontology at the close of 
Being and Time, Heidegger asks the puzzling question, “which entity must take over the 
function of providing this foundation?” (BT 487). Crowell claims that “[t]his question 
would make no sense if ‘ontic ground’ merely referred to Dasein, the inquirer, as the 
inescapable starting point for philosophy” (Space of Meaning, 223). Heidegger’s analysis 
of mana in his review of Cassirer may suggest that mythical Dasein is, if not an 
inescapable starting point, at least a fitting place to focus in the study of the human 
being’s captivation with beings. 
 4.1.3 Selfhood and independence 
Finally, Dasein depends for its existence and nature on entities with different 
modes of being from itself. This is not to claim that the human organism depends for its 
existence and nature on other entities, though it is true for Heidegger that organisms stand 




not just refer to the human being; indeed, Heidegger begins referring in his 
anthropological works to the “Dasein in us” (FCM 151, 283). Not only do particular 
possibilities of existence depend for their existence and nature on human artifacts and 
other selves; the existence of a self—at least one that is finite in Heidegger’s sense—
depends on a body. And because Dasein is “essentially thrown and entangled” in nature, 
it can be “governed and surrounded by it”—a feature that is again most prominently 
expressed in mythical Dasein (MFL 138).  As we’ve seen, Crowell believes that any 
admission of this sort commits Heidegger to a form of “transcendental realism” that is 
incompatible with the phenomenological reduction. It’s hard for me to see, though, why 
as a phenomenologist I shouldn’t be able to admit that my being a philosopher, say, 
would be impossible were it not for this organism through which I’m typing this chapter. 
It would, by the lights of a phenomenologist, surely be an objectionable concession to 
naturalism to admit that all I am is this organism, but this claim is plausibly ruled out by 
the recognition that my body and my self have different modes of being. As it stands, it 
hardly seems more problematic than the claim that there would be no hammers without 
chunks of metal and wood—a claim that Crowell claims harbors an equivocation, but one 
that remains domesticated in Being and Time (Space of Meaning, 234). Recall that in the 
review of Mythical Thought, Heidegger suggests that the concept of mana ought to 
motivate an investigation into why Dasein “comes to itself by way of [a] detour through 
the world” and thereby into the relation between selfhood (Selbstheit) and independence 




is; its independence is a kind of autonomy or self-standing in the face of the “null basis” 
of its thrownness (BT 333).  
4.2 “Beings as a Whole” and Dogmatic Metaphysics 
So far I have attempted to elucidate three related senses in which the human being 
is finite, all of which are in different ways manifested in mythical thought. This 
discussion has, I hope, lent some credence to my claim that metontology is, contra 
Crowell, the study of finitude and thrownness. I now turn to another objection to 
Crowell’s reading: he is mistaken to attribute to Heidegger a return to dogmatic 
metaphysics. This reading turns on a clear misreading of what Heidegger means by 
“beings as a whole.” In particular, “it does not signify the sum-total of beings,” but rather 
“the form of those beings that are manifest to us as such” (FCM 284-5). Attributing to 
Heidegger a return to metaphysical speculation about the totality of conditions remains 
within the “naive concept of world” (FCM 285). In On the Essence of Ground, Heidegger 
discusses various senses of ‘world’: the ancient Greek conception of kosmos; the 
Christian conception of world in St. Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas; the speculative 
conception of world in Scholastic metaphysics and Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic; and 
the cosmopolitan conception of world in Kant’s anthropology. The critical point is that 
the sense of ‘world’ or “beings as a whole” that interests Heidegger refers not to any sort 
of totality, but to a “decisive ‘how’ in accordance with which human Dasein assumes a 
stance and maintains itself in relation to beings” (EG 114). This sense of ‘world’ is 
expressed in the Christian characterization of the “worldly” person as one who turns 




“aristocratic world” (EG 120). Now it’s natural to ask with Crowell what the new 
locution “beings as a whole” adds to the analysis of world offered in Being and Time. But 
the crucial point is that Heidegger is clearly not falling into dialectical illusion by 
attempting to legitimize rational cosmology. 
On the Essence of Ground reiterates the contrast that we’ve seen throughout 
Heidegger’s anthropological writings between Dasein’s transcendence and finitude. This 
work tries to carry forward the suggestion in the Kant book that the metaphysics of 
Dasein “grounds” metaphysica generalis. Heidegger distinguishes three kinds of ground: 
“possibility, basis, account” (EG 131). These correspond to “projection of world, 
absorption within beings, and ontological grounding of beings,” respectively (EG 132). 
His claim in this essay is that the twofold nature of Dasein as projecting and as thrown 
somehow explains why we engage in metaphysics by asking questions like the following: 
“Why in this way and not otherwise? Why this and not that? Why something at all and 
not nothing?” (EG 130). 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the question of being is not, as Crowell holds, a 
question about meaning or conditions of intelligibility. The goal of Heidegger’s ontology 
is clearly stated in SS 1928. Ontology concerns 
the clarification of the existence mode of things and their regional constitution. 
Furthermore, the existence of material things of nature is not the only existence; there are 
also history and artworks. Nature has diverse modes: space and number, life, human 
existence itself. There is a multiplicity of modus existendi, and each of these is a mode 
belonging to a being with a specific content, a definite quiddity. (MFL 151) 
 
As noted above, the metaphysics of Dasein is not just the regional ontology of human 




comprising fundamental ontology and metontology—to the clarification of the existence 
mode of things (that-being) and their regional constitution (what-being)? 
  Recall that Heidegger begins Being and Time by asking what ‘being’ means, but 
quickly turns to the task of “reawakening an understanding for the meaning of this 
question” (BT 19). The task of Being and Time, I suggest, is to show what makes it 
possible for us to pose and answer the question of what ‘being’ means through an 
analysis of the essential features of the ontological questioner—that is, to provide 
“ontological grounds for ontology” (BT 487). This is why I noted above that the regional 
ontologies of nature, history, artworks, life, and so on are not strictly speaking parts of 
fundamental ontology; rather, fundamental ontology is supposed to clarify how we can 
achieve ontological, i.e., a priori, knowledge of this sort in the first place. That being said, 
Being and Time and other works are peppered with reflections on regional ontology—for 
example, the tool analysis of BT §15, the sign analysis of BT §17, the sketches of an 
ontology of historical artifacts in BT §75, and the discussion of the essence of life in WS 
1929-30. Now if the metaphysics of Dasein is supposed to prepare the way for ontology 
proper, what does metontology provide over and above fundamental ontology? Though 
Heidegger’s own answer is rather sketchy, I suggest that where fundamental ontology is 
meant to show how ontology is possible, metontology is supposed to show why we’re 
inclined toward it. In fact, Heidegger’s claim is stronger than this: he’s interested in what 
he, following Kant, calls ‘metaphysica naturalis’ (MFL 155, B21), which is not just a 
“factical irruption” in Dasein, but is “transcendentally necessary” (EG 130). The positive 




to dogmatic metaphysics, but an account of why metaphysics belongs to human nature 
(KPM 172). And though Heidegger does include the question of why there’s something 
rather than nothing under the “why” questions that “spring forth” from Dasein’s nature, 
this doesn’t imply that he’s reinstating this question as a legitimate one for metaphysics.  
4.3 Philosophical Anthropology and Ontic-Ontological Entanglement 
I’m sympathetic to Crowell’s point that thrownness was already handled in the 
existential analytic, and in this respect metontology is much ado about nothing, or at least 
about very little. Even so, I think that the textual evidence clearly justifies identifying 
metontology with the analysis of human finitude, in particular with an eye toward 
“grounding” metaphysics. Having made this identification, I close by addressing a series 
of related charges from Husserl, Cassier, and Crowell, all of whom accuse Heidegger of 
something like anthropologism.  
As we’ve already seen, Husserl accuses Heidegger and Scheler of failing to 
undergo the phenomenological reduction. In his marginal notes to the Kant book, Husserl 
aligns Heidegger with “the prejudgment of Scheler, [...] Dilthey, and of the whole 
anthropological line of thought” (Husserl, “Marginal Remarks,” 455). Although 
Heidegger notes that Kant’s anthropology, as empirical rather than “pure,” cannot serve 
as a foundation for metaphysics, Husserl objects that even pure anthropology doesn’t 
enter the sphere of genuine philosophy: “...investigation into essence does not yet make it 
philosophy instead of anthropology” (Ibid.). But importantly, Heidegger agrees: 
philosophical anthropology understood merely as the regional ontology of the human 




In Being and Time Heidegger claims that the while the existential analytic is a 
necessary presupposition of philosophical anthropology (BT 38), developing a full 
philosophical anthropology is not the aim of the book (BT 170). On the contrary, “the 
analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the 
question of being” (BT 38). That Heidegger recognizes a distinction between 
transcendental phenomenology and philosophical anthropology is witnessed by his 
distinction between the two levels of the metaphysics of Dasein. The goal of Being and 
Time is to show how ontology is possible through an ontological analysis of the subject. 
This subject is, of course, a human being, but just as Husserl brackets empirical sciences 
in order to investigate pure consciousness, Heidegger reserves questions about 
embodiment, sexuality, our relation to nature, and so on for a separate investigation. 
Cassirer shares Husserl’s impression that Heidegger’s emphasis on “concrete 
worldly Dasein” constitutes an abandonment of philosophy’s proper task. In his notes for 
the projected fourth volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer claims that 
“[f]or Heidegger, ‘dasein,’ as individual particular being, is always primordial. 
Everything else is ‘degeneration,’ a falling away from dasein” (Metaphysics of Symbolic 
Forms, 204). Cassirer appears to situate Heidegger alongside Bergson, Klages, and others 
who see the task of philosophy as the attempt to grasp Leben without the distortive effect 
of Geist, though he rightfully notes that Heidegger’s “view of ‘existence’ and 
‘temporality’ is not determined, like Bergson’s, through the contemplation of the natural 
phenomenon of life… rather, for him all temporality has its roots in the ‘present moment’ 




religious phenomenon of death…” (Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, 201). Cassirer 
objects that “[t]he ontological cannot be separated from the ontic nor the individual from 
the general in the way that Heidegger tries to—rather the one is only from within the 
other” (Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, 201-2). On his interpretation of Being and Time, 
“all giving in to the general is for Heidegger a ‘fall’” (Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, 
201). In the language of the third volume of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer accuses Heidegger 
and other “philosophers of life” of one-sidedly emphasizing expression over 
representation and signification.  
For Cassirer, perceptual consciousness is at its most basic level oriented toward 
expressive qualities, rather than objects and properties. I immediately perceive a face as 
friendly, a storm as foreboding, or the mood in a room as tense. The expressive character 
of perceptual experience is the form of consciousness “in which myth is originally rooted 
and from which it forever draws new nourishment,” yet it is present even in theoretical 
forms of consciousness (Phenomenology 62, 73). In representation, objects are 
constituted not only as bearers of an expressive tone, but as things with attributes 
standing in spatial and temporal relations. Finally, in signification consciousness moves 
beyond understanding its world in terms of the category of substance to understanding it 
in terms of purely functional relationships. For Cassirer, Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
quantum mechanics, and group theory exemplify this turn away from substance concepts 
to function concepts. As in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the dialectic of Cassirer’s 
Phenomenology of Knowledge moves from “picture-thinking” to pure conceptual 




(Phenomenology of Spirit, 35). Cassirer reads Heidegger as claiming that any move 
beyond the purely personal to the impersonal and objective is an inauthentic “fall from 
grace” (Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, 202). 
  The worry that Heidegger’s philosophy is bound to the merely personal resembles 
the worry discussed in Chapter 2 that Being and Time harbors a hidden religious agenda. 
There I tried to show that while Heidegger’s analyses do have roots in his readings of St. 
Paul and St. Augustine, as well as in his reading of Mythical Thought, they are subjected 
to a method meant to reveal their status as expressions of a unified, if often concealed, 
self-understanding. In this respect, Cassirer and Heidegger share a common 
methodological starting point. Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms is an attempt to 
“apprehend the subject of the cultural process, the human spirit, solely in its pure 
actuality and diverse configurations, whose norms it will strive to ascertain” (Mythical 
Thought, 13). Similarly, Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein studies various forms—
mythical, religious, artistic, philosophical—through which the human subject expresses 
itself, only to be silenced by philosophical analysis that works with an impoverished set 
of basic concepts.  
 Where Cassirer and Heidegger diverge, of course, is in their analysis of the 
subject that expresses itself in these various forms—for Cassirer it is the “animal 
symbolicum” (Essay on Man, 26), for Heidegger “thrown projection.” The obvious 
question here is how, and how far, these answers to Kant’s fourth question really diverge. 
What is important in the present context, though, is that Cassirer and Heidegger’s 




Meaning, 241). This entanglement is at the heart of Husserl and Crowell’s accusations of 
anthropologism and “the problem of double grounding,” respectively. Cassirer 
misunderstands Heidegger when he interprets this entanglement as a refusal to move 
beyond the expressive sphere. I’ve followed Joseph Schear throughout this dissertation in 
arguing that “Being and Time is above all a metaphysical treatise... It is not an 
existentialist guide to living a life of one’s own” (“Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” 
270). Heidegger neither demurs from making general, impersonal ontological claims, nor 
does he relegate the scientific attempt to grasp the world objectively to inauthenticity. 
 On Crowell’s assessment, “what ‘failed’” about the Being and Time project “was 
not phenomenology (‘phenomenological seeing’), but the ‘inappropriate concern with 
“science” and “research”’… the esprit de système… that demands a successor discipline 
to traditional metaphysics” (Space of Meaning, 241). The phenomenological project, 
according to Crowell, ought to be not “a systematic foundational science,” but a practice 
that emphasizes “the idea of grounding philosophical practice and discourse in the matter 
(die Sache) that calls for and authorizes thinking” (Space of Meaning, 242, 227). It is a 
historical fact that Heidegger did not complete Being and Time. What I have been 
arguing throughout this dissertation is that there is no obvious, fatal inconsistency in the 
project that forced Heidegger to abandon it. This chapter’s account of the ontical 
foundation of ontology, merely suggested at the end of the book we’ve inherited, opens 
up the possibility that the science of being was abandoned but not rejected—that is, that 
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